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SUMMARY
Experience from international operations has shown us that coordination be-
tween a variety of actors, as well as functional sectors, from the international 
community is essential to achieving key objectives necessary for lasting security. 
NATO allies have agreed that a comprehensive approach is required to meet the 
challenges in different operational environments. 
The issues discussed in this study revolve around the interplay between 
individual member states and multilateral organisations. The focus of the study 
is the situation of the small states generally and of Norway in particular. The 
critical questions are what grand strategic options there are for Norway when 
committing military resources to multinational crisis management, and the con-
sequences they might have on the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
The variable “provide military resources” has been given two deﬁned out-
comes: the holistic approach and the atomistic approach. The critical difference 
is the national framework under which the national military units participate in 
international operations. With the former approach the military instrument of 
power is coordinated with the other instruments at the disposal of the providing 
state, be they diplomatic or economic. With the latter the comprehensiveness of 
combining the different instruments is orchestrated at the multinational level 
and the contribution of the small state will in this case be purely military. 
The Norwegian context is explored from a number of academic perspectives: 
history, political science, military theory, law, ethics, information and gender.
Based on the experiences gained from previous international peace support 
operations, a conclusion can be drawn: there are different needs in different 
regions of the area of operation. The current operation in Afghanistan is no 
exception and therefore serves as an example in the ensuing discussion.
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FOREWORD
The primary role of the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College is to 
provide the Norwegian Armed Forces with relevant military education. Such 
education should strengthen our professional identity and core values while 
maintaining high academic standards. 
In order to stay relevant we need to take part in the debates on issues that 
relate to our profession of arms, be it military theory, national and international 
politics, joint operations or peacetime management. We do this by encouraging 
debate in the classroom, at seminars and in writing.
I am proud to present this volume of papers on the Comprehensive Ap-
proach, a concept that NATO has deﬁned as highly signiﬁcant to future plan-
ning and conduct of operations. This project, initiated about a year ago, was 
tasked with delineating the different ways of approaching comprehensiveness 
and suggest implications for the Norwegian Armed Forces. In essence, the book 
revolves around two alternative approaches (holistic vs. atomistic), discussing 
what small states in particular should consider once they have decided to par-
ticipate with military forces in a multinational operation that is based on the 
principles inherent to the comprehensive approach. The authors apply seven 
perspectives to the analysis: history, political science, military theory, legal, eth-
ics, information (media) and gender. Each of them, I ﬁnd, gives us a better grasp 
of the comprehensive approach – opportunities and pitfalls alike. 
I commend Approaching Comprehensiveness to you. These issues are impor-
tant. 
Geir O. Kjøsnes
Brigadier 
Commandant 
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College
INTRODUCTION TO A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE
Håkan Edström and Charlotte E. Ingalls
The aim of this study is to illuminate two current grand strategic options for 
Norway when it comes to providing military resources to multinational crisis 
management, and the consequences either might have for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. We will therefore mainly be addressing in this volume Norway’s contri-
butions to NATO’s comprehensive approach. 
Conceptual framework and the use of military power
During the Cold War, Norway and other smaller NATO member states were 
heavily inﬂuenced by security doctrines originating from the USA. The Truman 
and Dulles doctrines, containment, massive retaliation, mutually assured de-
struction (MAD), ﬂexible response and roll-back strategy are all examples of 
American conceptual developments. These concepts and doctrines have all been 
subject to extensive research and comment.1 
Smaller member states were, more or less, importers of security. The stra-
tegic setting left relatively little room for them to inﬂuence conceptual develop-
ment. This condition may have bred a certain conceptual and transformational 
complacency in smaller member states in the sense that smaller states became 
conditioned to expect the major players to provide most of the capabilities re-
quired, as well as leadership and guidance in any transformational and concep-
tual development.  
There were, however, conceptual developments going on in Norway during 
the Cold War era as well. The idea of total defence was developed in the post-
World War II period. It rested on the perception that the defence of Norway 
should include both a military defence and a broad civilian preparedness. The 
underlying principle of the traditional concept was that the collective resources 
in society, if necessary, should be mobilised to defend the country, to deal with 
acute and severe security challenges during war or when war was imminent.2  
1 See for example J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); C. S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky 1988); N. Friedman, Conﬂict and Strategy in 
the Cold War (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000); and C. V. Crabb, The Doctrines 
of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982). 
2 Norwegian Ministry of Defence,   Støtte og samarbeid. Det moderniserte  
totalforsvarskonseptet [Support and cooperation. The modernised Total Defence 
concept], Oslo, February 2007, p. 10.
OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
The concept rested, in other words, on the idea of optimal exploitation of 
society’s limited resources. It must be seen in light of the need to address con-
cerns of a likely attack or invasion from the Soviet Union. However, with the 
changing security environment of the 1990s, these concerns subsided and atten-
tion turned towards addressing vulnerabilities of modern society.3 Furthermore, 
there was recognition in Norway of the increasingly complex and unpredictable 
nature of the security environment, characterised by new security challenges and 
greater focus on societal security.4 
In this setting, one might have expected the idea of total defence to be 
abandoned or parked alongside the curb, as it hardly seemed relevant to the 
new security landscape. However, that was not the case. Instead, Norway mod-
ernised it, giving it added relevance to the new security context. In short, mod-
ernisation entailed that the inter-sector ﬂow of support was no longer limited to 
high levels of existential threat, but could take place in both directions whatever 
the crisis level. In addition, support could be activated at a considerably lower 
crisis level than under the traditional total defence concept. The view was that 
the total resources that were available to deal with major crisis and war should 
also be available to deal with challenging crisis-like situations in peacetime.5 
The example of total defence serves two purposes. First, it shows how some 
small states out of necessity had to think conceptually, holistically and trans-
sectorally in order to deal with signiﬁcant security challenges. Second, it shows 
how a small state succeeded in modernising and maintaining the relevance of a 
traditional defence concept in a new and more complex security environment. 
Even small states have conceptual awareness which could be of value to concept 
development in a broader setting.
When it comes to the global environment of the post-Cold War era, inter-
national operations have demonstrated to contributing states the need of co-
ordination and cooperation. Coordinating the actions of various actors from 
the international community is considered essential to achieving key objectives 
necessary for lasting security. NATO allies have, for example, agreed that a 
3 See for example Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, Et sårbart samfunn. 
Utfordringer for sikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet i samfunnet [A vulnerable society. 
Challenges in civil protection and emergency planning], NOU 2000:24, Oslo, 2000.
4 See for example Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av 
Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008 [Continuing the modernisation of the Armed Forces 
2005–2008], Report to the Storting, no. 42, 2003-2004, Oslo.
5 See, for example, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, Samfunnssikkerhet og 
sivilt-militært samarbeid [Societal security and civil-military cooperation], Report to       
the Storting, no. 39 (2003-2004); and Stortinget, Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om 
samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-militært samarbeid [Report from the Defence Committee 
about societal security and civil-military cooperation], Report no. 49 (2004−2005).    
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comprehensive approach which involves all these actors is required to meet the 
challenges of different operational environments. At the same time, the UN has 
introduced the idea of the integrated mission, and the EU seems to be adopting 
a concept based on the principles of the comprehensive approach. All three con-
cepts have been subject to recent research and comment.6 
Obviously, the small states had conceptual awareness during the Cold War 
era. This awareness seems to have included considerations of military strategy. 
Different options emerged for the use of military resources under the terms of 
the national total defence concept, and the broader conceptual supremacy of the 
USA.7 
At least two questions stand out: How do the new multilateral concepts 
such as comprehensive approach and integrated missions affect the grand stra-
tegic thinking of small states? Which alternative strategies for the use of the 
military instrument have small states developed? This project focuses on the 
latter question.
The aim of the study 
The issues addressed in this study concern the interplay between individual 
member states and multilateral organisations. The focus is on the situation of 
the small states and the strategic options available to a small state when military 
resources for use under the framework of multinational crisis management out-
side the small states territory. To be more precise, we explore the consequences 
of the strategic choice for the contributing state, in this case Norway.
As this study in our opinion covers a certain amount of unknown terrain, 
we have chosen to formulate a relatively modest objective. Our ambition is to 
increase awareness of the implementation of multilateral concepts such as the 
comprehensive approach and integrated mission. It is not to explain associated 
processes in individual member states vis-à-vis NATO, the UN and/or the EU. 
Nor to explore any of the concepts of the multilateral organisations.
6 See, for example, C. de Coning, The United Nations and the comprehensive approach, 
DIIS Report (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008), p. 14; E. Gross, EU and the comprehensive 
approach, DIIS Report (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008), p. 13; and B. Smith-Windsor, 
Hasten Slowly – NATO’s Effects Based and Comprehensive Approach to Operations, 
NATO Defence College Research Paper (Rome: NDC, 2008), p. 38.
7 See, for example, H. Edström,     Hur styrs Försvarsmakten? – Politisk och militär syn 
på försvarsdoktrin under 1990-talet [How is Defence managed? Political and military   
perspectives on defence doctrines during the 1990s] (PhD diss., Umeå University, 
2003).
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The need for new knowledge
The void in knowledge which this study aims to partially ﬁll is multifaceted, and 
there are some aspects which have not been taken fully into consideration in pre-
vious research. Although there is a relevant literature at hand,8 we believe our 
project can provide some new insights. Primarily, it means understanding how 
a small state can contribute militarily to international cooperation. By drawing 
on different perspectives we will discuss how a state should contribute, though 
without giving unambiguous recommendations. 
There is another gap in our knowledge: how the ability of international or-
ganisations is affected by how the various member states choose to contribute to 
the collective effort. While this in itself is not a new question, this study focuses 
on one speciﬁc area, i.e. NATO and the member states of the alliance coupled 
with the implementation of the relatively recently adopted concept of the com-
prehensive approach. In this study, the comprehensive approach is viewed as 
applicable in international crisis and conﬂict management in general. At present, 
the implementation of an approximation of the concept is concentrated to a 
speciﬁc empirical case, that of Afghanistan. It comes with the risk therefore that 
an equation mark will be placed between comprehensive approach and ISAF 
strategy. For the individual member state, for example Norway, the PRT func-
tion could hence be interpreted as a speciﬁc and local adaptation of the general 
comprehensive approach rather than of the speciﬁc ISAF strategy. Our aim is to 
problematise the general comprehensive approach concept, thereby improving 
our knowledge of the use of grand strategic tools in general. However, this does 
not mean that we will shy away from using speciﬁc examples, from, for instance, 
Afghanistan.9   
8 See, for example, B. Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987); S. Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War” in 
The Use of Force – Military Power and International Politics, eds. R. J. Art and K. N. 
Waltz, 5th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, 1999); C. S. Gray, Modern 
Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); E. N. Luttwak, Strategy – The 
Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 
1987); and B. R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1984).
9 See, for example, E. B. Eide, A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent and K. von Hippel, Report 
on Integrated Missions – Practical Perspectives and Recommendations (Oslo: NUPI, 
2005); T. M. Flatemo, Norsk konseptutvikling i Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Meymahne [Norwegian concept development in Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Meymahne] (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, 2008); K. 
Friis and P. Jarmyr, eds., Comprehensive Approach – Challenges and opportunities 
in complex crises management, NUPI Report, no. 11 (Oslo: NUPI, 2008); and P. V. 
Jacobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations – A Work 
in Slow Progress, DIIS report (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008), p. 15.
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Deﬁning the international conceptual frames
According to the deﬁnition used in this project the comprehensive approach 
entails the multilateral coordination of the three governmental instruments of 
power, i.e. diplomatic (D), military (M) and economic (E), in order to achieve 
the strategic objectives of the international organisation.10 
We shall be focusing solely on the military instrument. To be able fully 
to appreciate how small states can provide military resources to international 
organisations, we need a broader contextual background. The discussion will 
therefore touch upon the other instruments as well.
The variables – national strategic options
We aim in this project to critically explore two grand strategic options and their 
consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces from various vantage points. 
But for the ﬁndings to facilitate overarching conclusions it is a necessity, not an 
option, to use the same set of variables under each perspective. For the purposes 
of this project the independent variable, the use of military power, has two de-
ﬁned outcomes: the holism and the atomism. 
The outcomes are theoretically constructed and inspired by Danish and Ca-
nadian empirical examples. The critical difference between the contemporary 
Danish approach and the former Canadian approach seems to be the national 
framework under which the national military units participate in international 
10 See UK Ministry of Defence, The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 
4/05 (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006).
Figure 1.1: The dichotomy; The strategic choice between an atomistic or a holistic approach in 
providing military resources to multilateral crisis management abroad.
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operations.11 Under the former the military instrument of power is coordinated 
with the other instruments at the disposal of the providing state, i.e. diplomatic 
and economic (M+D+E). In the further discussion this will be deﬁned as the 
holistic approach. Under the latter approach the comprehensiveness of combin-
11 On Denmark, see for instance the Danish Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defence, 
“Samtænkning af civil og militær indsats i internationale operationer” [Coordinating          
civilian and military contributions to international operations] (Forsvarsministeriet 
[online 19 Mar 2009]); and K. Fischer and J. T. Christensen, “Improving civil-military 
cooperation the Danish way”, NATO Review, summer (2005). On Canada, see J. H. 
Vance, “Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign”, 
in Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts, eds. A. English, D. 
Gosselin, H. Coombs and L. M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 
2005); and W. G. Cummings, Operational Design Doctrine: Hamstrung or Footloose 
in the Contemporary Operating Environment? (Master’s thesis, Canadian Forces 
College, 2007).
Figure 1.2: In contributing militarily to a multilateral comprehensive approach, one option is to 
provide military (M) resources separately from the other national instruments,  i.e. diplomatic (D) 
and economic (E), which could also be provided. The other option is to send a nationally coordinated 
package of diplomatic, military and economic (D+M+E) resources. The question is how each of these 
options impacts on the armed forces.
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ing the different instruments is orchestrated at the multinational level, and the 
contribution of the small state will in this case be uncoordinated at the national 
level. In the further discussion this will be deﬁned as an atomistic approach. 
Since the aim of this project is to establish how a small state can use its military 
instrument, the focus will be on the military (M) contribution. This approach 
does not imply that the overall contribution needs to be solely military. Dip-
lomatic and/or economic resources might be provided as well. But since the 
three governmental instruments under this approach are uncoordinated at the 
national level, and since the focus of this project is on how the military resources 
can be provided, the non-military instruments will not be further discussed. 
We are well aware that the political reality is much more nuanced than the 
theoretical dichotomy illustrated in ﬁgure 1.1. However, the dichotomy is an 
analytical tool to facilitate our exploration of of the grand strategic options at 
the national level. 
The key question is how the two approaches to the use of military power 
impact on the Norwegian Armed Forces. We employ a set of different perspec-
tives to explore a broad range of aspects relating to the underlying question.
Expressed in terms of causality, how to provide is the independent variable 
and Armed Forces the dependent. The outcomes on the independent variable are 
deﬁned as holistic or atomistic. The speciﬁc outcomes on the dependent variable 
will be deﬁned within the scope of each perspective. 
The following section focuses on the problems surrounding the selection 
of relevant perspectives when exploring the Norwegian context. Although we 
aim to establish the impact of the two national strategic options, there will most 
likely be no clear answers as to which of them a small state should pursue. On 
the contrary, because we apply different analytical perspectives to the strategic 
choice, the outcomes will most likely be given in terms of pros and cons associ-
ated with each.
The selection of perspectives
We believe that we can gain a better understanding of the comprehensive ap-
proach if we use more than one scientiﬁc perspective to problematise its practi-
cal implementation. This of course raises other questions, such as which per-
spectives are best suited to increase our awareness/understanding. 
Traditionally, it is fair to say that the historical, the political-scientiﬁc and 
the military-theoretical perspectives are established within strategic studies. A 
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quick glance at the areas of competence found within the security policy and 
strategic departments at various national defence universities would probably 
conﬁrm this statement. 
In addition, the conﬂicts that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War 
have grown increasingly complex and are characterised by a broadening set of 
challenges requiring new approaches. In our view, the ability of the individual 
member states as well as international organisations to deal effectively with 
these new wars depends in part on their ability to take a wider view of the new 
challenges and of the possible ways of addressing them. This entails heightened 
focus on the role of the media in the conﬂicts of our time. To this we have added 
Norway’s self-image as a major humanitarian power, and an ambition to include 
more normative perspectives.12 Disciplines such as ethics, law and gender seem 
appropriate considering both the complexity of modern crisis management and 
the Norwegian context. It does not, however, mean that all of these perspec-
tives would be the best suited from a general point of view, but as this project 
focuses on the speciﬁc Norwegian context we consider them appropriate to this 
particular study. 
Furthermore, the British, Canadian and Danish cases have also helped us 
select perspectives.13 Based upon those lessons, we found it fruitful to explore 
the Norwegian context under 
a historical perspective in chapter two
a political science perspective in chapter three
a military-theoretical perspective in chapter four
a legal perspective in chapter ﬁve
an ethical perspective in chapter six
an media perspective in chapter seven
a gender perspective in chapter eight.
12 See, for example, H. Edström, N. T. Lunde and J. H. Matlary, eds., Krigerkultur i en 
fredsnasjon [Warrior culture in a peace-fearing nation] (Oslo: Abstrakt, 2009).
13 For the British experience, see for example the UK Delegation to NATO, 
“Comprehensive Approach Workshop, Brussels, 8 March 2007” [online 18 Mar 
2009]. For Canada, see Department of National Defence, “Defence Policy White 
Paper”, 1994 (National Defence and the Canadian Forces [online 19 Mar 2009]). 
For Denmark, see for example the keynote speech by Søren Gade, Danish Minister 
of Defence, at a NATO seminar on civil and military activities in international 
operations, Copenhagen, 20 June 2005, “Transforming NATO – A Political and 
Military Challenge” (NATO [online 19 Mar 2009]).
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Methodological considerations
In this study we consider several aspects of validity. One is the use of the same 
concept and terminology by several authors. Since each contribution belongs 
to a different academic discipline, deﬁnitions are likely to vary from chapter to 
chapter. The lack of a deﬁnitive deﬁnition of comprehensive approach increases 
the difﬁculties. We are aware of the problem, but ﬁnd the different perspec-
tive approach too rewarding to let it be a decisive objection. Having said that, 
the authors have strived to use the key concepts more or less consistently, i.e. 
comprehensive, atomistic and holistic approach. Also, there is no homogenous 
causality between the independent and dependent variables. Under the each of 
the perspectives the direction of causality goes from “the use of military power”, 
i.e. atomistic or holistic options, to “Norwegian Armed Forces”. In the further 
discussion, however, we also look at the effect of going in the opposite direc-
tion. Plausible alternative explanations for observed co-variation between the 
independent and dependent variables have not been excluded. Hence changes 
to the dependent variable, i.e. the Norwegian Armed Forces, may be attributed 
to the additional variables, and not just to variations in the atomistic or holistic 
approach. Given the aim of this study, however, we do not believe these aspects 
of validity to inﬂuence our efforts to illuminate the grand strategic options at 
the national level. 
Nor should the points raised in this discussion about validity necessarily 
affect the reliability of the study. Reliability is about the likelihood of reaching 
the same, or at least similar, results upon a repetition of the research process. 
This applies even if the process is repeated by different researchers. 
As we do not fully explore the impact of the chosen approaches on the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, we have not explicitly considered possible alternative 
outcomes. Nor do we detail how each perspective de facto operationalises the 
dependent variable because the very purpose of this project is to present dif-
ferent grand strategic options for small states in situations where the decision 
makers might not believe that there are alternatives at hand. How the dependent 
variable can and should be operationalised is consequently of secondary inter-
est, at least within the scope of this study.
Finally, we have not asked the various authors to weigh the pros and cons 
of the two deﬁned outcomes of the independent variable. The perspectives will 
therefore not produce clear and unambiguous answers. In lieu of this, the results 
from the studies under the different perspectives will be given on scale. As this 
scale does not have deﬁned intervals between the two outcomes of the dichoto-
my, it would be overly ambitious to state that we have taken inter-subjectivity 
into full consideration. On the other hand, this could have been addressed by 
conducting a more detailed analysis and, for example, weighting the inﬂuence of 
the different aspects. The reason for not doing so must again be seen in connec-
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tion with the purpose of the study, to illuminate the matter at hand and increase 
awareness of the possible options. This, in our opinion, can be done despite the 
identiﬁed shortcomings in respect of reliability.  
The ﬁndings
When Norway deliberates whether to adopt a holistic or atomistic approach 
there are several aspects decision makers will have to take into account. This 
project takes only a few initial steps towards illuminating the two grand strate-
gic options at hand. We are well aware that several other theoretical perspectives 
could have been used, some of which might have been even more fruitful when 
analysing the strategic choice. Nevertheless, we do claim some interesting ﬁnd-
ings.
Within each of the seven perspectives, we have found arguments for and 
against both options. Our main conclusion is that decision makers have to real-
ise that even if they are unwilling to use a policy-oriented top-down approach 
to the problem, sooner or later they will face an experienced-based bottom-up 
approach that might force them to pursue suboptimal, or even unfavourable, 
solutions. 
NORWAY AND THE ATOMISTIC APPROACH
Historically, the atomistic approach, adopted in good faith, seems to be the 
most recommendable for smaller nations such as Norway. There are two criti-
cal conditions, however: national interests should overlap as little as possible; 
and there should be an effective supranational body working to forge common 
policy into strategy.
The political science perspective also favours the atomistic approach. With 
its point of departure in the phenomenon of national interests, the perspective 
concludes that since the atomistic approach implies no need for a full spectrum 
of military capabilities, and since a more niche-oriented structure of the Nor-
wegian Armed Forces might be a necessity if the national interests truly are 
the objectives of national security policy, this option seems most favourable. It 
also allows Norway to trade full-spectrum operational capabilities and quantity 
for highly available rapid reaction units combined with increased quality at the 
tactical level. With such a structure for its military forces, Norway might be 
able concurrently to provide armed resources for the protection of its regional 
interests in Northern Europe, and for the promotion of its interests in a global 
context, hereby gaining as much inﬂuence as possible in the UN, NATO and the 
EU at the strategic level.
The third perspective that favours the atomistic approach is the ethical. 
The conclusions cannot, however, be deduced from theory alone, but require a 
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correlation between theoretical and empirical ﬁndings; between norms in gener-
ality and speciﬁc context; and between the different levels ranging from politi-
cal strategy, to military strategy and operations and tactics. Under the logic of 
the just war tradition and defence of impartiality and relativism, the atomistic 
approach, despite its disadvantages, might from an ethical perspective be pre-
ferred. The choice is, however, not made solely on the merits of the option itself, 
but because ethical problems are more difﬁcult than under the other option.
NORWAY AND THE HOLISTIC APPROACH
From the perspective of military theory, the holistic approach would be the op-
tion of choice. There are at least two arguments in favour of this approach. First, 
it might be necessary to bring together the different means at the state’s disposal 
in order to achieve an overall national strategic end. Second, it might need ro-
bust tactical military forces, together with other national resources on the bat-
tleﬁeld, to inﬂuence the planning and the conduct of operations at the theatre 
level. (Note that there is a difference between the strategic inﬂuence, discussed 
in terms of political science, and the operational inﬂuence discussed under the 
military theory perspective). 
The legal perspective also points to the advantages of the holistic approach: 
a nationally coordinated provision of forces is considered to work better at cre-
ating legal coherence. The legal perspective argues that this might be even more 
important when the operation requires substantial law enforcement support. 
Another important argument in favour of the holistic approach is the avoidance 
of critical national dissent on legal conceptions during, for example, detention 
and riot control operations, in addition to self-defence operations. A third argu-
ment relates to the establishment of critical standards for the rule of law. The 
procedures for division of power and the principles of command between civil-
ian elements and the armed forces are hence considered to proﬁt from being 
synchronised nationally under the holistic approach.     
The third perspective to favour the holistic approach is media. The most 
important argument is that holism gives the commander an opportunity to ad-
dress his media operations priorities and tell “the most compelling story”. The 
holistic approach is also considered better suited to the coordinating of efforts 
using the three levers of power within a national context, making cooperation 
and coordination easier and resulting in a higher degree of comprehensiveness, 
at least within the context of the contributing state. Another aspect in favour of 
this option is its ability to impact on the coverage by the media, and hence the 
resulting public perception of the contribution, both nationally in Norway and 
locally in the theatre of operations.
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The fourth and last theoretical perspective to prefer a holistic approach to 
the national contribution is gender. However, it should be noted that the conclu-
sions are tentative, and remain uncertain as to which of the two options, atom-
ism or holism, is currently best suited to ensure the adequate inclusion of gender 
considerations in a Norwegian contribution. Furthermore, for this perspective 
to be of value, it relies on an assumption that the overarching multinational 
comprehensive approach also favours a gendered approach. Gender awareness 
is known to diminish the risk of unintended negative consequences of an opera-
tion, so enhance efforts to improve missions and to ensure the success of the to-
tal operation. A holistic approach would probably in any case be both desirable 
and beneﬁcial for all involved; the local population in the area of operations, 
NATO and Norway. Also note that Norway has been pursuing gender equality 
at home for many years, and has a declared policy of promoting gender equality 
globally. Norway should therefore be in an excellent position to contribute to 
the conceptual development of the Alliance with regard to gender issues.    
THE NORWEGIAN DILEMMA
In quoting Winston Churchill, “the only thing worse than allies is not hav-
ing allies”, the historical chapter points to the nucleus of the dilemma facing a 
small state such as Norway. The simplest way of avoiding disagreement between 
coalition partners might be not to talk about the problems at all. The “mutual 
agreement of avoidance” will, however, sooner or later have to face up to the 
realities of the battle ground. In the era of information technology, the media 
will probably make this sooner rather than later. 
The art of ambiguity is, as we have seen, to ﬁnd the right balance between 
domestic political agendas in Norway on the one hand, and the needs of the 
Norwegian military on the other. Deliberately pretending to commit something 
that you neither can nor will deliver ought not to be part of policy. It is the surest 
way to cause friction in coalition operations and, what is worse, could lead to 
the dissolution of the Clausewitzan trinity: the people, the government and the 
army with its commander.
Tentative conclusions
The crucial challenge facing Norwegian policy is how to develop the national 
grand strategic concept. This is related to the ﬁrst of the two questions we asked 
earlier: How do the new multilateral concepts such as the comprehensive ap-
proach affect the grand strategic thinking of small states? The tentative steps 
taken so far by some of the ministries, we argue, are simply not enough. First, 
they do not appear to be integrated with a top-down approach, and fail therefore 
to provide the conceptual guidance needed at lower levels. Second, they are not 
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interdepartmental; each of them focuses solely on a particular grand strategic 
instrument. They fail therefore to provide instructions on how to coordinate the 
national effort. Another tentative conclusion related to the ﬁrst question is that 
the vocabulary of an interest-oriented security policy seems to go hand in hand 
with the logic of realism. When policymakers start thinking and speaking in 
terms of national interests, the traditional logic of idealism will be undermined. 
The gap between the old and new logic and rhetoric might, in worst case, lead 
to a grand strategic vacuum. 
This project has, however, focused on the second question: Which alterna-
tive strategies have small states developed for the use of the military instrument? 
Our ﬁndings offer no clear arguments as to which one of the two strategic op-
tions is preferable for a small state like Norway. As illustrated in ﬁgure 1.3 
below, none of the seven perspectives offers a clear recommendation. There are 
pros and cons under every single perspective. The results, therefore, are not con-
centrated at a single point on the scale, but rather are scattered across a wider 
range. Despite these provisos, both the people and the armed forces expect their 
government to provide leadership from the top and based on policy. Decision 
making without full insight into the problem is not a new phenomenon. This 
study has, however, provided some insights into the dilemmas facing policy and 
decision makers. 
The absence of an explicit policy could itself, however, indicate a choice. With-
out direction stemming from a clear policy, experience gained from the area of 
operations might be the only guidance available to ﬁeld commanders. This might 
be the intention of the decision makers, i.e. to adopt a bottom-up approach to 
the challenges. There might, however, be other explanations. The politicians 
might, for example, be shying away (neglecting is a too strong a word) from 
their obligations to provide the necessary guidance. 
Figure 1.3: The dilemma of the policy and decision makers: Different recommendations from ad-
herents of different perspectives.
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The aim of this project is to delineate two grand strategic options (i.e. ho-
lism and atomism) that are available for Norway in the provision of military re-
sources to multinational crisis management, and the consequences either could 
have on the Norwegian Armed Forces. By employing a set of different perspec-
tives, we explore a broad range of issues and arguments. 
An atomistic approach, ridden with caveats, is presumably the order of the 
day. National military resources are contributed in order to create an image of 
the contributing state as an active Alliance partner, but without jeopardising the 
domestic political agenda unnecessarily. The other strategic option at hand for a 
contributing state, i.e. a holistic approach, would also seem to beneﬁt the mem-
ber state. The question is whether these advantages can outweigh the problems 
created by both of the approaches for the coalition as a whole. 
In spite of this difﬁcult situation for policy making, the decision makers 
have to decide whether to use a top-down policy based approach to the chal-
lenges or not. If they opt for an experience based bottom-up approach, they may 
have to face an even less favourable situation in the future, at least from their 
point of view. 
On the other hand, if the overriding multilateral concept does not provide 
clear-cut deﬁnitions, and the general national grand strategic policy is not ex-
plicitly expressed, there might be no other option than to use a bottom-up ap-
proach. Consequently, the development of national strategies on the use of the 
military instrument might currently be conducted in quite different circumstanc-
es than during the Cold War era. To clarify the grand strategic options open to 
Norway and other small states when committing national military strategies is 
hence an important task. 
Approaching comprehensiveness is not, as we will see, an easy operation.
 
THE NOBLE ART OF CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY
Harald Høiback
Introduction
The most quoted tenet in the Western world concerning war and peace, is prob-
ably Carl von Clausewitz’s: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means.”1 This was a late discovery by Clausewitz, and scholars still discuss how 
signiﬁcant it really was for the ﬁnal draft of Vom Kriege. Despite the fact that 
the slogan is rather worn out among strategists, it is remarkably often misun-
derstood. 
John Keegan, for instance, claimed that “[w]ar is not the continuation of 
policy by other means. The world would be a simpler place to understand if this 
dictum of Clausewitz’s were true.”2 However, the dictum was never intended to 
be true. What Clausewitz wanted to say was that war ought to be a continu-
ation of policy, not that it always was. The aim of the war should be political 
in nature, and the waging of it should proceed along political lines.3 He knew 
perfectly well that many wars had been fought outside the bounds of policy.4 
Clausewitz’s point was that such behaviour was irresponsible and not in accord-
ance with raison d’état. 
In English, the word “politics” has connotations other than “policy”.5 For 
instance, when George W. Bush opened his ﬁrst speech after having ﬁnally been 
recognised as the next president of the United States, he said, “After a difﬁcult 
election we must put politics behind us.”6 The president elect’s phrasing would 
sound strange if one were not aware of the difference between policy and poli-
tics. 
Politics is usually connected to sectional interests and backbiting, while 
policy is a strategy for reaching common goals: “[P]olitics is a multilateral phe-    
1 C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and transl. by M. Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), book 1, chapter 1, p. 87.
2 J. Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson, 1993), p. 3.
3 “The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, 
are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.” 
Clausewitz, On War, book 8, chapter 6b, p. 605.
4 Ibid., book 3, chapter 18, p. 222.
5 The difference of meaning between policy and politics is more distinct in the English 
translations of Vom Kriege than in Clausewitz’s own language. 
6 G. W. Bush, “Address in Austin accepting election as the 43rd President of the United 
States”, Austin, 13 December 2000 (The American Presidency Project [online 30 Apr 
2009]).
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nomenon, whereas policy is the unilateral subcomponent thereof. My ally, my-
self, and my enemy are all bound up together in politics, but we each have our 
own policies.”7 
If war ought to be the continuation of policy, and not politics, by other 
means, two questions arise: whose policy should war be a continuation of, and 
how can cerebral policy be transformed into physical military action? In other 
words: How is politics to be transformed into policy, and then into action? The 
questions are generic; they pop up regardless of who actually wages the war. 
The question of whether a state should use a holistic approach in its co-
operation with other states, i.e. whether it should unilaterally coordinate its 
military contribution with other of its governmental contributions, or go for the 
atomistic approach, where the orchestration of the different instruments is done 
at the multinational level, is evidently also a question of whose policy should be 
carried through, i.e. how and where the policy should be carved out, and how 
that policy should be made militarily executable. 
This chapter presents a rather broad historical perspective on these ques-
tions with the aim of adding some counterweight to the often ephemeral head-
lines of current debate. First we will have a look at a procedure called “method 
of avoidance”. To air one’s sincere opinion is a rare luxury in coalition opera-
tions. Then we will look at some of the oldest stunts in the circus, namely double 
dealing and balancing of hats. This takes us to two minor cases, before we round 
off with a brief comment on the freebooting do-gooders. In other words, many 
of the evergreens of the scholarly treatment of the pros and cons of coalition 
warfare will not be treated here. 
It is to be hoped that this panoramic outlook will add some depth to the 
more topical issues discussed in later chapters. In order to get the message across 
I have also peeled off some of the academic qualiﬁcations and caveats one would 
normally expect to ﬁnd in such a text.    
Whose policy?
Clausewitz’s concern was not the relationship between politicians and ofﬁcers, 
but between policy and war. Clausewitz, qua ofﬁcer, had himself explicitly de-
ﬁed the orders of the Prussian king when he thought he had a better policy for 
Prussia than the former and his ministers, and defected to Russia in 1812.8 Nor 
7 C. Bassford, “Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitz’s Thought” in Clausewitz in 
the Twenty-ﬁrst Century, H. Strachan and A. Herberg-Rothe (Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 85.
8 P. Paret, Clausewitz and the state, the man, his theories, and his times (Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 218.
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is there reason to think that Clausewitz would have found it strange that among 
his 112 contemporaries who signed the Norwegian constitution in May 1814, 
33 were members of the armed forces. Just as little as the Militär-Reorganisa-
tionskommission, which he joined in 1808, restricted itself to military matters 
only.9 Hence, that war is the continuation of policy by other means implies much 
more than just granting the politicians the prerogative to rule generals. Policy is 
not simply about who says what, but about the consistency of measures taken. 
The ability to reach consensus, to get from politics to policy, is an enduring 
challenge in all types of social relations, including the military. During the Great   
War for instance, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, 
tried to establish a single authoritative channel where “all opinions, from what-
ever source they might emanate should be tested and criticised in relation to 
other plans and proposals”.10 The General Staff should be the furnace in which 
competing politics were forged into coherent policy. The Imperial General Staff 
should be the only source of military advice to the government, and the supreme 
staff authority over forces in the ﬁeld. Robertson’s system never worked accord-    
ing to plan. The politicians had insufﬁcient conﬁdence in their generals to leave 
priority setting to them, and the generals did not trust their own chief enough to 
let him do all the talking to the politicians. Hence, even purely unilaterally, the 
British forces were ridden by politics. 
An important precondition for getting from politics to policy in any area 
of life is a mutual willingness to avoid pushing controversial questions too far. 
The philosopher John Rawls’s ideas about “Justice as Fairness” give us a broad 
view on this method of avoidance: 
[W]e try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed 
moral and religious, questions. We do this not because these questions are unim-
portant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important 
and recognise that there is no way to resolve them politically. The only alterna-
tive to a principle of toleration is the autocratic use of state power. Thus, justice 
as fairness deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically speaking. … The 
hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might call it, existing differ-
9 Gerhard Förster describes the commission’s basic idea or        Grundgedanke: “Ohne 
veränderte gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse keine wirksame militärische Reform” [No 
effective military reform without societal change] Carl von Clausewitz, Lebensbild 
eines patriotischen Militärs und fortschrittlichen Militärtheoretikers [The life of a 
patriotic soldier and progressive military theorist] (Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutche 
Demokratischen Republik, 1989), p. 18.
10 H. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 
145.
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ences between contending political views can at least be moderated, even if not 
entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can 
be maintained. 11 
It is an inherent feature of coalitions that they cannot resolve their disputed 
questions by “autocratic use of state power”, unless they are alliances bordering 
on imperialism or a master-vassal relationship. That separates coalition warfare 
from unilateral warfare. As a rule then, coalitions are forced to reach consensus 
by toleration, or are doomed to founder. The “method of avoidance” is there-
fore a supreme military skill in coalition warfare, but one rarely appreciated. In-
deed, one of the generals from the Great War learned the hard way how difﬁcult 
coalition warfare actually was: “Since I have seen Alliances at work, I have lost 
something of my admiration for Napoleon.”12
In all organisations there is a pendulum swinging between doing politics 
and doing policy and, almost like a law of nature, external pressure will enhance 
cohesion while its absence will give a smaller scope for self-interest greater lev-
erage. As long as Napoleon, Der Kaiser or Hitler posed a deadly threat, very 
odd coalitions found it in them to forge a common policy, but as soon as the 
guns of the enemy fell silent, the pendulum swung towards greater particular-
ism and more politics. The prototype of all later alliances, the Grand Alliance of 
1813–15, was deeply dependent on pressure from without to maintain cohesion 
within.13 
The same logic governs the relationship between the services of a single na-
tion as well. The US services worked best together, according to Winnefeld and 
Johnson, when there was a certain chance of losing, as for instance in the air war 
against Japan in World War II: “Never before and rarely since has there been the 
same degree of cooperation, coordination, and willingness to put service inter-
ests aside in prosecuting an air campaign.”14 But as soon as the danger of losing 
the turf war over budgets is greater than the immediate danger of losing the real 
11 J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, vol. 14, no. 3 (1985): 230–1. 
12 General Maurice Sarrail to Clemenceau in 1918, quoted in Coalition Warfare: An 
Uneasy Accord, K. Neilson and R. Prete (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), p. 
vii.
13 “The pressure exerted by the mere knowledge that Bonaparte was still at large, 
reinforced as it was by his sudden and dreadful appearances, was enough to hold the 
alliance together in moments of crisis and eventually to persuade it to consolidate its 
resources in such a way that victory became impossible.” G. A. Craig, Problems of 
Coalition Warfare: the Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813–1814 (Colorado: 
United States Air Force Academy, 1965), p. 21. (Just for the record: It was Napoleon’s 
victory that became impossible.)
14 J. A. Winnefeld and D. J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations, Pursuit of Unity in 
Command and Control, 1942–1991 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 34.
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war, willingness to sacriﬁce own ends to the greater good rapidly disintegrates. 
Sometimes it is not even clear whether foreign enemies or sister services pose the 
greatest threat. John Lehman, for instance, warned against fraternising too cor-
dially with countrymen in the wrong uniform: “The current defense ideology of 
‘jointness’ hobbles our military effectiveness terribly, and in the event of a major 
war with the Soviet Union could well lead to defeat.”15
 To sum up so far. If much is at stake and if overall consistency in meas-
ures is important, then the atomistic approach seems reasonable. The method of 
avoidance also works best when there are important questions at stake. If real 
danger looms one is often willing to overlook serious ﬂaws in one’s partner, as 
Churchill for instance did, comparing Stalin and the devil: “If Hitler invaded 
Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the devil in the House of 
Commons.” That is particularly the case for small partners in big coalitions. 
If the stakes are lower, however, and if the outcome of the conﬂict is not 
vital to the state’s own survival, the holistic approach seems more realistic, i.e. 
the participating nations’ will to coordinate their military contributions with 
others of its governmental contributions is signiﬁcantly greater. 
Even in Clausewitz’s era states cooperated, but it was always with ulterior 
motives, and everybody knew it. The risk with the holistic approach is thus that 
it can rather imperceptibly degenerate into the continuation of politics by other 
means, in the sense that if all participating nations make up their policy before 
they leave home, the result will be politics in the coalition, not policy. 
If there is virtually nothing at all at stake for the participating states, the 
atomistic approach seems to reappear again, but this time the contributions 
more often than not come loaded with caveats. 
Ideally, a coalition commander would like to have no national strings at-
tached to the contributed units, but in themselves caveats are not insurmountable 
obstacles for coalition commanders as long as they are honestly communicated. 
If a nation contributes a knife so to speak, with the caveat that it should only 
be used to cut, the commander has no reason to complain if he’s shown the red 
card for using it to hammer in nails. However, if he’s gets a red card, or rather 
an informal red card, a so-called “pink card”, when he uses it to cut, frustration 
is bound to erupt. In other words: predictable and declared caveats, restrictions 
and preconditions are much to be preferred to hidden and undeclared caveats 
that pop up apparently at random in the heat of operations. Hence, caveats 
can be given in both good and bad faith. Given in good faith the contributing 
15 Secretary of the Navy John Lehman (1988) quoted in K. Allard, Command, Control, 
and the Common Defense (Washington: National Defense University, 1996), p. 305.
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nation announces its caveats clearly to the commander. Given in bad faith, the 
contributing nation apparently comes with few caveats, but has many hidden 
up its sleeve. 
Caveats given in bad faith can cause enormous friction if they come as an 
unwelcome surprise to the commander. Sometimes nations only donate some 
tightly controlled assets to serve as military “hangarounds” in order to be seen 
in the right places with the right people, without any real political intention of 
making a tangible difference in the theatre. Moreover, if you suspect the recepta-
cle into which you deposit your contribution to be “beset by suspicion, antago-
nism and double-dealing”,16 then all you’re likely to put in it will probably be 
garbage, in the sense that the assets you provide cannot be used by the coalition 
commander in any militarily meaningful way. In other words, under an atom-
istic approach, with good faith and with few caveats, the national control of 
contributed military assets can sink to virtually zero per cent, as indeed was the 
case with certain Norwegian assets during World War II. An atomistic approach 
with many caveats, or a contribution given in bad faith, however, can mean that 
national control over the contributed assets can border on 100 per cent, as is 
arguably the case for German assets in Afghanistan.17
So far we have elaborated on the struggle of progressing from politics to 
policy, but regardless of whether the coalition’s deliberations actually end in 
politics or policy, words have eventually to be turned into actions if the consid-
erations are to have any practical consequences at all. 
From words to action 
In all wars governments have, according to Richard Betts, their primary focus 
on political concerns, while the generals have theirs on the ﬁghting. “To para-
16 W. Philpott, “Haig and Britain’s European Allies” in Haig a Reappraisal, Bond and 
Cave (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999), p. 129. 
17 This comparison is problematic for several reasons. First of all Norway had only a 
skeleton left of their government during the World War II, and their ability to concert 
was correspondingly small. Furthermore, the German intentions and conduct in 
Afghanistan are still a hotly debated issue. It would not, however, be amiss to conclude 
that “politically, Berlin ﬁnds itself in a mess over Afghanistan” and that in Germany 
the “consensus on a comprehensive approach does not extend beyond rhetoric”. 
T. Noetzel and B. Schreer, “Counter-what? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in 
Afghanistan”, RUSI Journal, vol. 153, no. 1 (2008): 45. That said however, on 
“the ground” the picture of German troops as the odd man out is perhaps not that 
justiﬁed after all: “The existing literature on the differences between the British and 
the German way of conduct in Northern Afghanistan has been found to be somewhat 
stereotyped and exaggerated.” K. Larsdotter, “Exploring the utility of armed forces 
in peace operations: German and British approaches in northern Afghanistan”, Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 19, no. 3 (2008): 366.
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phrase Clausewitz, the purpose of war is to serve policy, but the nature of war 
is to serve itself.”18 Quite often, the political and the military concerns pull in 
different directions. 
How then can military operations be the continuation of political purpose 
and not of war’s own nature? Here we will focus on two generic challenges in 
this realm which inﬂuence all types of coalitions and alliances. The ﬁrst is related 
to the method of avoidance, as touched upon above. Instead of accepting the 
burden of an open confrontation, a participant nation can restrict its military 
contribution by other means, especially through the choking of supplies. Let 
us call it “control by double dealing”. The second challenge is connected to a 
conventional mechanism used to safeguard national interest in an alliance, so 
called “dual hatting”. 
In principle, a coalition’s Force Commander can be given command over 
huge forces, though without any real chance of using them. His political masters 
may say “go ahead” from their aerie, but “no way” with their purse, caveats        
and rules of engagement. According to General Wesley Clark this double dealing 
is part of an ancient ritual: 
This back-and-forth with the Secretary of Defense [is] part of one of the oldest 
political games in Washington, one that is routinely played by generals and their 
civilian politician bosses supporting the commander in wartime. The political 
leaders want to appear to defer to the military – “We’re giving the generals eve-
rything they’re asking for” – but privately, the political leaders often limit these 
requests. If the action works out, both the generals and the political leaders get 
the credit. If the action fails, bad generalship must be to blame – “We gave him 
everything he asked for, and it failed …”19
The relationship between generals and the politicians can thus be less than con-
genial, even in a purely national context. A favourite in this regard is General 
McClelland’s rather unﬂattering portrayal of the Secretary of War during the 
American Civil War: 
I think that he is the most unmitigated scoundrel I ever knew, heard or read of; 
I think that … had he lived in the time of the Saviour, Judas Iscariot would have 
remained a respected member of the fraternity of the Apostles & that the mag-
18 R. K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (2000): 37.
19 W. K. Clark, A Time to Lead, or Duty, Honor and Country (New York: Palgrave, 
2007), p. 216.
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niﬁcent treachery & rascality of E.M. Stanton would have caused Judas to have 
raised his arms in holy horror & unaffected wonder.20 
In coalitions, double dealing is of course the order of the day. Hence it was 
no problem for the Norwegian government to claim that “Norway has trans-
ferred full operational control over KFOR to COMKFOR, which is of beneﬁt 
to NATO. Many nations only grant restricted control, which restricts COMK-
FOR’s freedom of action and increases the need for personnel.”21 This sounds 
nice, but operational control does not include control of logistics. Hence, in 
order to judge a commander’s freedom of action you have to know how many 
resources he can actually pull. You have to know both the overt and covert cave-
ats attached to the command authority. It may sound impressive to hear a father 
bragging about letting his teenage son borrow his new Mercedes as often as he 
likes, but not so impressive if the tank is always empty. To agree on an operation 
does not mean the money will follow. To rewrite an old military saying, “Any 
damned fool can agree on a plan, but it all depends on the willingness to let the 
logistics loose.” To encapsulate: On the surface it may look very altruistic to go 
for an atomistic approach, but if every contribution is equipped with ﬁshhooks 
and roadblocks the real outcome will be meagre.  
 The second point of interest here is so-called “dual hatting”, where a com-
mander sits in two different chains of command, one national and one multi-
national. An especially interesting debate about dual hatting erupted after the 
American disaster in Somalia in 1993.
According to the American constitution, “The President shall be com-
mander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”.22 In May 1994 
President Clinton elaborated upon its implications: 
No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. … The sole source   
of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal 
law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and ﬂows from the President to 
the lowest U.S. commander in the ﬁeld. The chain of command from the Presi-
dent to the lowest U.S. commander in the ﬁeld remains inviolate.23 
20 Quoted in D. K. Goodwin, Team of Rivals (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 
447.
21 Norwegian Ministry of Defence: Controllerrapport 4/00, (Oslo: Regjeringen, 2000), p. 
13.
22 US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2. 
23 U.S. Department of State, “Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral 
Operations”, PDD25, Presidential Decision Directive 25, February 1994. 
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Hence, to be the commander in chief is not only a prerogative of the president,              
but a duty. It would thus be a violation of the constitution to relinquish com-
mand to anyone other than those in the American chain of command. 
America’s dominance in world politics makes it difﬁcult to compare di-
rectly with other nations, but Clinton’s arguments are valid for others as well. 
Obviously, if all participating nations in a coalition argue along his lines, it is 
hard to see how military command can be enjoyed in a coalition at all. So even 
Clinton had to accept that it sometimes could be very beneﬁcial to cooperate.24 
Consequently, the president was willing to give a non-American commander 
limited command over American troops, but added a certain caveat: “The U.S.  
reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever 
actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered.”25 This 
seems like a prudent precaution for a platoon of boy scouts, but in a military 
setting it sounds like a joke.
Danger is inseparable from war, and if the US threatens to pull out their 
endangered troops under foreign command, there will be few teeth left in the 
Force Commanders’ command. This is especially so given the aversion to risk 
in modern military operations. Even in a purely national context the tension 
between force protection and force projection has caused serious concerns: 
It is precisely the individual right to life itself that is causing so much anguish 
among high-ranking ofﬁcers in the US Army [which] has allowed its soldiers to 
think that their mission is not to get hurt. Excessive force protection is eroding 
the warrior’s honour.26
The US is by no means the only nation to reserve the right to “take whatever ac-
tions it deems necessary”, which makes working conditions rather awkward for 
a military commander. Nevertheless, Clinton assures us, “There is no intention    
to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of  
command remains a vital concern.”27 What a relief.
Even the UN opts for an unambiguous chain of command in their opera-
tions and sees “red-carding”, aka “the right to terminate participation”, as a 
considerable problem, “It is essential that the chain of command in an operation 
24 “It is sometimes prudent or advantageous to place U.S. forces under the operational 
control of a foreign commander to achieve speciﬁed military objectives.” U.S. 
Department of State, PDD 25, art. V.
25 Ibid.
26 C. Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 108.
27 U.S. Department of State, PDD 25, art. V.
28 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
be understood and respected, and the onus is on national capitals to refrain from 
instructing their contingent commanders on operational matters.”28 One of the 
UN’s attempted remedies in this regard was to deﬁne a new kind of authority: 
operational authority. Important members, such as for instance the US, and 
Norway for that matter, are not willing to transfer operational command to the 
UN, but the UN was not satisﬁed with mere operational controlas Clinton was 
willing to grant. Hence, they invented a new term which means almost the same 
as operational command, but which is sufﬁciently vague to be accepted. 
Nevertheless, it seems more reasonable to learn to live with the problem, 
than to give in to wishful thinking:
Unity of Command in a multinational force is virtually impossible. Neither the 
US nor any other power is likely to allow their forces to join a multinational 
peace operation and cut their ties to the national command structure and politi-
cal agenda. The experience in Somalia, where national groups maintained dual 
chains of command and multiple agendas predominated, is mirrored by the in-
dependence of French behaviour in Rwanda and the need for separate command 
arrangements for Arab forces in the Desert Storm coalition. Most authors now 
call for a conscious effort to achieve “Unity of Purpose” in peace operations. 
Even this is a very real challenge and depends as much or more on diplomatic 
relationships as on military ones. Moreover, even the military relationships must 
be more consultative than directive-driven.29
An organisation that encompasses all nations and all interests has to practice 
constructive ambiguity to the extreme. In order for the UN’s peace operations to 
be the continuation of policy by other means, or even aspire to that condition, 
the method of avoidance is mandatory. The members have to allow very diverse 
interests to be hidden beneath glossy formulations.    
To sum up: The art of getting from intention to action can be very difﬁcult 
in all areas of life, but it is particularly knotty in situations where agendas are 
poles apart and incalculable risks and later consequences are passed around like 
pieces of hot charcoal. With regards to the differences between atomistic and 
holistic approach, the consequences of varying national will to concert its own 
means can be illustrated by a model. 
28 L. Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809, 
United Nations, 21 August 2000, p. 267.
29 D. S. Alberts and R. E. Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations 
(Washington D.C.: NDU Press Book, 1995) (The Command and Control Research 
Program [online 30 Apr 2009]).
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If we compare military assets to small bricks of Lego, national willingness to 
provide bricks without an accompanying assembly plan will peak when there 
are vital interests at stake, or none at all. In the middle however, where the par-
ticipating nations are rather eager to make a difference in the theatre, they rarely 
dispatch Lego bricks without an idea of how to use them.
As always, a model such as the one above has certain simplistic effects that 
hide important differences. For some states, as for instance Canada, a major war 
on own soil has never been a realistic scenario in modern times. Hence, since the 
Constitution Act of 1867, Canada has always been a contributor, never a host 
nation in a direct military way. For Norway on the other hand, avoiding a major 
war on its soil has been the leitmotiv of Norwegian security policy since 1905, 
granting some temporary deﬂections.     
In the next section we will take a closer look at two coalition commanders 
who were caught in the crossﬁre between politics and policy, and who during the 
military execution of the political intentions tried to wear several hats simulta-
neously. The idea is to illustrate how the art of ambiguity and skill of balancing 
hats remain pertinent elements of coalition warfare, and something it would be 
futile to try to dream away, as already indicated.
Figure 2.1: The balance between national orchestration and relative importance
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The ballad of Ferdi and Wes 
In the spring of 1918 the Alliance ﬁnally agreed to subordinate the forces on the 
Western Front under a single commander, the French general Ferdinand Foch.30 
The agreement has become a classic within coalition warfare:
General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American Governments with 
the co-ordination of the action of the Allied armies on the Western front. To 
this end all powers necessary to secure effective realisation are conferred upon 
him. The British, French, and American Governments for this purpose entrust to 
General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. The Commanders-
in-Chief of the British, French, and American armies have full control of the 
tactical employment of their forces. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the 
right to appeal to his Government if, in his opinion, the safety of his army is 
compromised by any order received from General Foch.31
First of all, the national commanders were evidently allowed to keep their red 
cards. To grant the national commanders the “right to appeal to his Govern-
ment if, in his opinion, the safety of his army is compromised” was obviously 
a severe impediment on Foch’s authority. Not surprisingly, troops are consist-
ently in danger in war. Hence, it was up to the discretion of each component 
commander to keep his red card in his pocket, which turned out to be a hard 
thing to do. Consequently, Foch’s modus operandi had in reality to be based on 
persuasion, not on military command. As we will see below, he was not the last 
to face this dilemma.
The treaty was also deliberately vague and ambiguous. It was supposed to 
mean different things to different people. To a military mind, though, the value 
of constructive ambiguity can be extremely hard to grasp. When the new Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, complained that one “never       
knows where strategy exactly begins and ends”, Foch replied, “in France one 
knows it perfectly”. 32
30 This section is mainly based on H. Høiback, Command and Control in Military Crisis, 
Devious Decisions (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
31 Co-ordination of Allied Operations on the Western Front. Agreement reached at 
Beauvais, 3 April 1918. Signed by Mr Lloyd George, Field-Marshal Sir D. Haig, 
General Sir H. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, General Foch, General Pétain, General 
Pershing, General Bliss. CAB 23 WC 382, (4 April, 1918). Smaller participating 
nations on the Western Front were also included in the deal, but had no independent 
voice in the making of it. 
32 B. Liddell Hart, Foch: Man Of Orleans (London: Penguin, 1937), p. 307.
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Another pertinent question popped up as well. What happened to Foch’s 
French obligations when the Allies bestowed the strategic direction on him? 
Was Foch still a French general with Georges Clemenceau as his political head, 
or was he an international Generalissimo with no obligation to any particular 
nation, except the Allies as such? Inevitably perhaps, Foch immediately started 
to behave like Pinocchio, free at last from political strings. Sir Douglas Haig, 
the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, found Foch’s posturing dis-
gusting: “Foch is suffering from a swollen head, and thinks himself another 
Napoleon!”33 The French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, however, did 
not let Foch ﬁnd comfort in that illusion for long, and playing the role of Gep-
petto quickly reined him in again: 
“Do you know”, the Marshal said to me one day, “that I am not your subordi-
nate?” “No, I don’t” I replied with a laugh. “I don’t even want to know who put 
that notion into your head. You know that I am your friend. I strongly advise 
you not to try to act on this idea, for it would never do.”34 
But what about the stature of Clemenceau? Did his de facto power over the 
Generalissimo elevate him above the other civilian war leaders of the coalition? 
Could he for instance bully the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, as 
a consequence of his power over the Generalissimo? To at least some, including 
the British ambassador to Paris, it was in fact Clemenceau who suffered from a 
swollen head, and not his puppet. “What amuses me is Clemenceau’s open con-
tempt of our P.M. He evidently thinks he can do what he wants with him.”35 
To sum up Foch’s part of the ballad, even if Foch was solemnly placed on 
the pinnacle of the collation’s military hierarchy, his de facto power rested on 
his personal abilities to soothe and convince his fellow generals. A wilful and 
unbending man on horseback was not what the situation called for. He hoped 
his fellow allies had ﬁnally started to supply Lego bricks he could use to ﬁght 
according to his own plan. What they did, however, was to provide their own 
assembly plan as well. 
Those who think the allied powers’ command problems during the Great 
War were childhood diseases which two generations of NATO membership have 
33 R. Blake, ed., The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914–1919 (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 337 (27 October 1918).
34 D. S. Newhall, Clemenceau: A Life at War (Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), p. 397.
35 Lord Derby to Foreign Secretary Balfour in April 1918. See Blake, The Private 
Papers…, p. 395.
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since cured, would be surprised by the political tussling General Wesley Clark 
had to endure during the war over Kosovo in 1999. 
Clark had originally been rather amused by the title he was given in 1997, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. What more could a general ask for than 
being supreme? Wasn’t it “a bit over the top?”36 Alas, as events turned out in the 
Balkans, he was not that supreme after all. Indeed, he had to serve not one, but 
two masters. As SACEUR he had to relate to the Secretary General of NATO, 
Javier Solana, who operated on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. Simul-
taneously, he had as Commander in Chief, US European Command to relate 
directly to Pentagon. In addition, some of NATO’s senior members also found 
it extremely difﬁcult to march in step and tried unilaterally to manhandle the 
general. When Brussels and Washington started pulling him in different direc-
tions he evidently felt it: “I was nearing the fork in the road, I sensed, where 
European and American views were totally divergent.”37 Clark was on the horns 
of a dilemma, but his mission was still to win the war.
As a result of divergent politics of NATO and the entangled command rela-
tionship, Clark even felt a personal responsibility to save the Kosovars:
 
As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I was responsible personally to each of 
the NATO member nations for the overall accomplishment of the mission. There 
was no way for me to hand over this responsibility to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even to the Secretary of Defence. 
As a U.S. commander, I would have to regard the hesitations of my superiors as 
implicit orders, but in NATO, I could not always accept them as such. Instead I 
was bound to continue pushing the strategy until instructed otherwise.38
The politicians’ control of Clark was further complicated by the fact that there 
was consensual disagreement about the aim of the operation and how it should 
be conducted. The disagreements cut across both national borders and depart-
mental boundaries within nations. In addition came the perpetual inter-service 
rivalry: 
There was much made in the press that this was “war by committee”. And it 
is true that NATO agreement was required in many cases and sometimes was 
difﬁcult to obtain. But there was also a purely American committee at work. … 
36 Clark, A Time to Lead, p. 199.
37 W. K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 352.
38 Ibid, p. 453.
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For whatever reason, there appeared to be a far higher degree of “leadership 
by committee” than existing U.S. legislation requires. In practical terms, this 
seemed to constrain my ability to act every bit as much as any transatlantic dif-
ference ever did.39 
Indeed, one of Wesley Clark’s major challenges during the Kosovo operation 
was to sort out friends from foes within the US Administration. On one occa-
sion, Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen told Clark, with a “voice like ice”, 
“I’ve told you before, you don’t give military advice to Holbrooke.”40 Clark’s 
rather reasonable apology goes like this: “[A]s a regional commander-in-chief 
I couldn’t very well do my job without sometimes exchanging ideas with other 
members of the U.S. government travelling in my region.”41 A holistic approach 
would be difﬁcult even in more congenial circumstances. 
The national capital’s lack of direct control with the general was compen-
sated heavily by a number of caveats connected to each nation’s troops: 
NATO commanders’ orders were subject to hour-by-hour scrutiny and possible 
veto from nations. It was a practice that had apparently originated in U.N. op-
erations, called “red-carding”, where nations just temporarily drew back their 
forces from certain actions or operations ordered by higher commands. In the 
operations in Bosnia, we had seen a few cases where nations’ forces simply re-
fused to go along with orders, allegedly based on instructions from home, but 
usually fed by the subordinates on the scene expressing their concerns. … In 
practice almost every nation had special team monitoring its forces, ready to cry 
foul at the least deviation from the expectations. It was a miracle we had made 
it as far as this, I thought, without a major blowup.42
As indicated above, in order to maintain cohesion, it is a prerequisite for any alli-
ance that the politicians use vague and fuzzy formulations. Sometimes, even one 
nation’s unilateral political intentions, if there are any, cannot be expressed in 
words, because clarity would draw too much attention to differences of opinion. 
Hence, the North Atlantic Council had to govern Clark by the least common 
denominator. Even Clark himself philosophised over the fact that as a conse-
quence the plans had to be vague: “The operation was enormously complex in 
practice. Or perhaps the underlying issues that a comprehensive strategy would 
39 Ibid, p. 451.
40 Ibid, p. 113. 
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 399.
34 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
have exposed were too difﬁcult.”43 You could always wish for a common policy, 
but it can be out of reach.
To sum up Clark’s part of the ballad, the political ruling of Clark was 
tricky. By working for a number of member states Clark was responsible to no 
particular one. Since nobody could say what they actually meant, Clark enjoyed 
considerable room to roam, even if he would have liked even more. All the same, 
he was stuck between a rock and a hard place. He felt a personal responsibility 
for winning the war, but he had little say over the means he could use to do so. 
The coalition’s members controlled Clark by controlling the ﬂow of resources 
rather than by taking issue with the mission itself. A tricky situation became 
even more intransigent by virtue of the members’ widely different agendas. Ma-
noeuvre warfare, or other operational concepts demanding unambiguous orders, 
was impossible. Clear intentions are a rare commodity, and perhaps have always 
been in war. What Clark hoped was that the participating nations at least had an 
intention to “solve” the problems in the Balkans. Many of the members did not. 
Their main concern, apparently, was to hang around with the big guys. 
To conclude about Ferdi and Wes: At ﬁrst blush, a lot is apparently ac-
complished when a coalition ﬁnally appoints a supreme commander. Military 
discipline and zeal can ﬁnally kick in and get the mean military machine going 
straight. Alas, as both Foch and Clark could testify, military life is a bit more 
complicated. In Foch’s case the Allies virtually stared defeat in the eyes, and 
knew something radical had to be done to save the war. In Clark’s case, on the 
other hand, his mother country could in principle have done it all by themselves, 
but found themselves for several reasons reluctant leaders in front of a rather 
heterogeneous coalition with often mutually exclusive agendas. On the practical 
level, however, the difference between Foch and Clark, regarding atomistic and 
holistic approach, can be illustrated by a model (ﬁgure 2.2).
Clark thought he had allies who meant business; he did not. Foch thought 
he had allies who trusted him to solve the crisis; they did not. Clark hoped to 
orchestrate a holistic approach, but got only caveat-ridden contributions, often 
in bad faith. Foch hoped to get caveat-free contributions in good faith, but got 
a disharmonious concert.
The freebooting do-gooders
Above we have seen how tactical military assets can be compared to Lego bricks, 
which can be provided with or without a mandatory assembly plan. However, 
43 Ibid, p. 453.
353/2009 APPROACHING COMPREHENSIVENESS 
there are other bricks around as well, and those are bricks with a will of their 
own.   
Non-military and non-governmental actors on the battleﬁeld are by no 
means new. The battleﬁeld itself, and especially its rear areas, have since time im-
memorial been swamped by camp followers, buccaneers and looters. Clausewitz 
was particularly disgusted by the freebooting Cossacks, even if they fought on 
the same side. What Clausewitz did not know anything about, however, were 
altruistic people roaming around in the ﬁeld in order to do good. The Florence 
Nightingales and Henry Dunants were unknown to Clausewitz’s generation. 
Had he known of them he would presumably have disliked them just as in-
tensely as he disliked the brutality of the Cossacks: “war is such a dangerous 
business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”44 To 
our generation however, the “do-gooders” are a great practical concern for all 
military commanders. 
44 Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.
Figure 2.2: Foch, Clark and their different strategic environment
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Integrated mission, comprehensive approach and effect-based approach to 
operations are all virtually synonymous catchphrases that seem like shorthand 
for “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. They are all ways 
to cope with the wide range of different actors, different political and material 
assets, and the widely different agendas present in an operational area. 
A modern battleﬁeld is characterised by the multitude of participants on 
either side of the conﬂict. If the US were to start a war against a South-American 
state to stop the ﬂow of narcotics, the US State Department, US Defense De-
partment, Central Intelligence Agency and the Drug Enforcement Agency could 
all participate without any “unity of command” as such. Add to this the Red 
Cross, Médecins sans Frontières, and numerous private volunteer organisations, 
many without any other cohesion than a similar T-shirt, and unity of command 
would be a deceitful dream. In Robert R. Leonhard’s words, “To attempt to ap-
ply the aged principle of unity of command within this vast cast of characters is 
not only unrealistic, it is illegal.”45 The challenge is exacerbated by the fact that 
international law is not tailor-made for this situation, to say the least, and that 
in morally high-pitched conﬂicts, as for instance the “War on Terrorism” where 
you allegedly are either with us or against us, no neutrality seems to exist.  
Nevertheless, for many of the altruistic organisations there is a great virtue 
in not being party to a “continuation of policy by other means” at all. Princi-
pally, they have neither stakes in, nor any opinion of, the outcome of a given 
conﬂict. Their only stated goal is to ease the victims’ pain, here and now. Many 
of them are not answerable to anyone except their own conscience. Hence, hu-
manitarianism cannot be the continuation of policy by other means. If it were, it 
wouldn’t be impartial, neutral and independent. Contrastingly, all governmental 
assets, from all departments and all public budget divisions, ought to be the con-
tinuation of policy by other means. Not a single penny should be spent without 
asking how this particular decision contributes to the realisation of our policy. 
This is particularly difﬁcult, of course, when most of the biggest NGOs are heav-
ily subsidised with state funds. However, if we still want to follow Clausewitz, 
and allowing for the disuse of the word “war”, Clausewitz’s dictum should for 
our generation be: Any governmental intervention should be the continuation of 
policy by other means. 
In summation: Members of military forces are not the only crowds in areas 
of armed conﬂict. Humanitarians, and even not-so-humanitarians, often swamp 
the military theatre of operation. These are individuals who see no merit in 
45 R. R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1998), p. 202. 
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acting holistically unless commanded by their own conscience. Any military or 
governmental idea of reining these actors in, or subordinating them to military 
logic, is a dream, and not even a beautiful one. One could of course let civilian 
authorities lead the operation, but that would not necessarily reduce the main 
problem, i.e. freebooting do-gooders who refuse to be part of any plan or the 
continuation of policy by other means. 
Tentative conclusions
Any military expert knows that multinationality causes great command and 
control challenges due to practical challenges such as different languages, tech-
nologies, laws and doctrines, and political challenges such as incommensurable 
strategic agendas. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig was quite frank during the 
Great War: “All would be so easy if I only had to deal with the Germans!” 
For most states in the world, however, multinationality is the only way. Few 
nations have the military assets to ﬁght expeditionary wars unilaterally. Even 
those states that can act unilaterally often see multinationality as an important 
legitimating factor for international peace operations. Hence, multinationality is 
politically desirable, but militarily dubious.46 
Given that Winston Churchill was right and “the only thing worse than 
allies is not having allies”, coalition partners must ﬁnd a way to coexist and co-
operate despite huge disagreements. The way to do it is simply not to talk about 
them. If pushed to take a stand on every controversial issue, the alliance would 
founder. Hence, a “mutual agreement of avoidance” is the sine qua non of coa-
lition warfare. That said, however, every coalition partner has to talk frankly 
about matters crucial to the conduct of the operation. A coalition commander 
has a right to know about all the red cards, so as not to be ﬂabbergasted by 
“pink cards” ﬂying erratically around his headquarters. This is the main differ-
ence between constructive ambiguity and devious ambiguity. Constructive am-
biguity is used in order not to jeopardise the efﬁciency of the operation. Devious 
ambiguity, on the other hand, sacriﬁces the operation on behalf of other political 
considerations, of all sorts. Evidently, these two kinds of ambiguity rarely if ever 
come alone, but in an admixture. The art of ambiguity is to ﬁnd the balance that 
makes life easier not only for the politicians and domestic political agendas, but 
also for those who are sent in harm’s way on behalf of the state, not to forget 
those the operation was instigated to assist. To pretend to deliver something you 
46 B. Holmen and S. Ulriksen, Norden i felt: På oppdrag for FN og NATO [The Nordics 
in the ﬁeld. On UN and NATO missions], NUPI rapport 257 (Oslo: NUPI, 2000), p. 
22.
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cannot or will not is perhaps part of politics, but ought not to be part of policy, 
and is the surest way to cause friction in coalition operations. Sometimes the art 
of ambiguity has to be replaced by the art of unambiguity. The passing of the 
buck has to stop, occasionally.
The aim of every military coalition is unity of effort, which is why it sticks 
together. Regarding the effectiveness of military forces, unity of command is just 
a means to an end, not the end in itself. To some this will look like semantic 
hair-splitting: their idea is presumably that unity of command will automatically 
lead to unity of effort, but that is not necessarily the case, as argued here. When 
a given state deliberates between a holistic and an atomistic approach the ques-
tion should be whether either of them gives not unity of command, but unity of 
effort. Lacking a “ﬁfth service”, or non-national military entrepreneurs, with-
out any preferences at all to a mother service or nation, the challenge is to reap 
the fruit of military collaboration without subordination and “autocratic use of 
state power”. The ﬁrst step in that direction is to exorcise the real “ghost of Na-
poleon” – the dream of “unity of command”. Not only deep rooted principles 
of command, but even venerable principles of war do not necessarily survive 
the encounter with the politicised reality. According to General Clark he was in 
fact “compelled to sacriﬁce [the] basic logic of warfare to maintain the political 
cohesion of the Alliance”.47  
To orchestrate a multi-participant battleﬁeld, and not only the military 
part of it, discussion and persuasion are inescapable. The frustration of Clark 
and Foch is partly due to the dissonance between their image of proper gener-
alship and reality. Foch expected to be a traditional Commander-in-Chief, but 
none of his foreign subordinates would play along. Even Clark’s futile attempt 
to pull rank on a foreign ofﬁcer indicates how deep-rooted the image of the 
Great General is.48 
 If the power of the best argument outweighs the power of a general’s 
screaming voice, the aptitude for argumentation and ﬂuency in the method of 
avoidance are skills much more important to the military man than martial 
steadfastness. 
So ﬁnally, where has this chapter taken us regarding the preferability of 
either a holistic approach or an atomistic approach? Nowhere, is the most hon-
47 General Clark quoted in D. Henriksen, Nato’s Gamble, Combining Diplomacy and 
Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998–1999 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 
198.
48 “Mike, I’m a four-star general, and I can tell you these things.” From General Clark’s 
dispute with Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson, British Army, over Pristina airﬁeld in 
1999. Clark, Waging Modern War, p. 394.
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est answer, which is exactly where we were headed. We wanted simply to rehash 
the old complaint about coalition warfare always being difﬁcult. Thereafter, we 
studied two particular approaches and found pros and cons in both, and that 
the speciﬁc context has to be given its due before one is ranked above the other. 
The conclusion of this chapter is merely to bring forth that such questions are in-
herently difﬁcult due to generic challenges in military matters. There is nothing 
particularly new in this, and nor anything particularly sinister either. For smaller 
nations, such as Norway, the atomistic approach, in good faith, seems to be the 
most recommendable, given that there are enough common interests around, 
and there is a working supranational council to forge common policy into strat-
egy. When this is not the case, however, the holistic approach is the most real-
istic to hope for, where national governments see their military contributions in 
relation to their other contributions. However, an atomistic approach, ridden 
with caveats and often in bad faith, is presumably the order of the day, where 
national assets are mainly contributed in order to make the contributing nation 
look nice, without jeopardising the domestic political agenda unnecessarily.49
49 The author wants to thank Håkan Edström and Charlotte Ingalls for kicking this text              
in motion, and Magnus Petersson and Paal Sigurd Hilde for constructive obstructions, 
along with participants at the purgatory held at the Staff College on 2 October 2008. 

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE USE OF MILITARY POWER
Håkan Edström
Background
Is the choice between different approaches to the use of military power in inter-
national operations really associated with the national interests as the Canadian 
discussion indicates? And if so, how do the outcomes of the choice correlate 
with the national interests?
To be able to answer these questions I will start with an exploration seek-
ing how the national interests of some relevant actors are expressed, either di-
rectly by the states themselves or indirectly in the ﬁndings of other researchers. 
I will thereafter use the initial empirical conclusions and the various theories, 
especially those of Barry Buzan, to create a model to be used in the exploration 
of the Norwegian context. In the third step, by using the report of the Norwe-
gian Defence Commission that was presented late 2007, I will try to outline the 
national interests of Norway. Finally I will discuss how a holistic approach and 
an atomistic approach to the use of military power respectively may impact on 
the Norwegian Armed Forces’ ability to protect and promote the national inter-
ests of Norway.
The nature of national interests
The use of national interests as a starting point in the discussion surrounding se-
curity policy is commonly understood to be a great power privilege. Hence this 
exploration will focus on the perspectives of the only remaining super power but 
the perspectives of a multilateral organisation, the European Union, will also be 
included as a reference.
Colin S. Gray describes national interests as a ﬁlter through which the cor-
relations of global events to the state concerned can be subjectively interpreted. 
The very purpose of the interests is, according to Gray, to indicate the signiﬁ-
cance of the events to the strategic decision-makers and thereby help them to 
prioritise the response. Gray suggests a hierarchy of interests with four distinct 
levels. He labels the top level survival interests and deﬁnes them as interests 
which the state is forced to defend in order to be able to survive. Vital interests 
are deﬁned as interests worth ﬁghting for, while major interests do not necessar-
ily have to be defended by the use of force. The fourth and last category involves 
all other interests and are deﬁned as interests that can hardly legitimise the use 
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of force. Unfortunately Gray’s elaborations end at an abstract level and do not 
provide any clear empirical examples.1
In July 2000, just over a year before the events of 11 September 2001, a 
commission on America’s national interests presented its report.2 The commis-
sion’s leading author was Harvard University’s Graham Allison. However, the 
main part of the commission consisted not of researchers but of prominent Re-
publican politicians such as former National Security Adviser and Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice and senator and recent presidential candidate John Mc-
Cain. The commission argued that only a foreign policy grounded in national 
interests can identify priorities for the engagements of the US in the world and 
seems to have been inﬂuenced by Gray since it presented a hierarchy of interests 
ranging from secondary through important and extremely important to vital 
interests.3 
Five vital interests are identiﬁed and all of them are expressed in terms of 
effects (“are to …”); prevent, deter and reduce the threat of WMD against the 
USA, ensure US allies’ survival and their cooperation, prevent the emergence of 
hostile major powers and failed states on US borders, ensure the viability and 
stability of major global systems such as trade, ﬁnancial markets and supply of 
energy, and establish productive relations with nations that could become stra-
tegic adversaries (i.e. China and Russia).4
Extremely important interests are described as conditions that, if compro-
mised, would severely prejudice, but not strictly imperil, the ability of the US 
government. Eleven interests are identiﬁed in this category and also expressed 
in terms of desired effects such as prevent regional proliferation, promote the 
acceptance of international rules of law, maintain a lead in military-related and 
other strategic technologies, and suppress terrorism.5
Important interests are described as conditions that, if compromised, 
would have major negative consequences for the ability of the government. Ten 
important interests are identiﬁed and are expressed in terms of effects such as 
discourage massive human rights violations, maximise US GNP growth from 
international trade and investments, maintain an edge in the international dis-
tribution of information to ensure that America’s values continue to have a posi-
1 C. S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport: Praeger, 1998), pp. 116, 191 and 
200–206.
2 Commission on America’s National Interests, America’s National Interests (Cambridge 
MA.: Belfare Center for Science and International affairs, Harvard University, 2000).
3 Ibid., p. 2.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Ibid., p. 6.
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tive inﬂuence on the cultures of foreign nations and boost the domestic output 
of key strategic industries and sectors.6
The secondary interests, ﬁnally, are also categorised as less important in-
terests and deﬁned as desirable conditions with little direct impact on the ability 
of the government. The total number of secondary interests are not ﬁxed but are 
said to include effects such as enlarging democracy, preserving territorial integ-
rity and enhancing exports of speciﬁc economic sectors.7
In 2002, a year after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, 
the US National Defense University presented a report on the transformation 
of the American military. The report included a study that linked the national 
security interests to politico-military objectives and further to future military 
missions.8 In his study, Sam Tangredi created an illustrative hierarchy of inter-
ests based on analyses of public statements and their objectives, and of military 
missions relating to each of them. 
At top of the hierarchy, Tangredi put the survival interests, that include 
three related but functionally different objectives; survival of the nation, territo-
rial integrity or homeland security, and economic security. The military missions 
identiﬁed with the ﬁrst objective include nuclear deterrence, while critical infra-
structure protection and counterterrorism are examples of missions identiﬁed 
as relating to the second objective. Associated with economic security would, 
according to Tangredi, be military missions such as ensuring freedom of the 
sea, ensuring access to raw materials, and protection of sea lines of communica-
tion.9
The second category in Tangredi’s model is labelled vital or world order 
interests and is deﬁned as interests which are critical to the long term vitality of 
America but which do not necessarily pose an immediate threat to the popula-
tion or material values in America. The three objectives in this category identi-
ﬁed by Tangredi are defence of treaty allies, defence of democratic and pivot 
states, and ﬁnally the deterrence, or winning, of regional conﬂicts. These three 
objectives are related to similar military missions such as overseas and forward 
presence, power projection, conventional rapid response and expeditionary op-
erations.10 
6 Ibid., p. 7.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 S. J. Tangredi, “Assessing New Missions” in Transforming America’s Military, ed. H. 
Binnendijk (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002).
9 Ibid., pp. 16–18.
10 Ibid., pp. 18–24.
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The third and last category is labelled value interests and is focused on the 
reduction of overt violence and the maintenance of peace. The category is di-
vided into two objectives; preventing conﬂicts and performing more generalised 
peace operations.11
In a report presented by the European Union’s Institute for Security Stud-
ies (EUISS) the interests of the EU are divided into two categories; vital interests 
and value interests.12 The three vital interests are, according to EUISS, integrity, 
economic survival, and the social and political security of the Union’s member 
states. The two value interests of the EU are international peace and security, 
and universally accepted norms and values. Taking an approach similar to that 
of the American commission, EUISS expresses actions in terms of desired effects 
in connection with the interests; to protect and project the vital interests and to 
promote the value interests. As in Tangredi’s approach, EUISS relates missions 
to each of the interests. Homeland defence and consequence management when 
it comes to integrity, protection of trade routes and the free ﬂow of raw mate-
rial where economic security is concerned, and combating organised crime and 
preventing any massive inﬂux of refugees where social and political security are 
concerned. The value interests are linked to missions aiming to protect and en-
force the international rule of law and fundamental norms and freedoms.13
To summarise, national interests seem to be closely related to the ability of 
the government, or more precisely to the cabinet’s freedom of action. Hence not 
all interests have equal importance or are given similar priority; there is a hier-
archy of at least two levels. The interests are often expressed in terms of effects 
such as boost, ensure, establish, maintain, maximise, promote, protect, prevent, 
reduce and suppress. The effects seem to be related to:
The vulnerability and resilience of the state regardless of possible antago-
nists, including nature herself. 
The national dependency and capacity to meet the critical needs of the na-
tion, material and immaterial.
The threats and risks emanating from possible enemies, or from nature her-
self, and preventing them from being realised by deterrence or proactive 
actions. 
The values and norms relating to the national culture, mindset and rational-
ity.
11 Ibid., pp. 24–26.
12 EUISS, European Defence – A Proposal for a White Paper (Paris: EUISS, May 2004).
13 Ibid., pp. 9–13.
•
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The effects appear to have two different dimensions; the presence or absence of 
speciﬁc conditions or whether these conditions are desirable or not (see ﬁgures 
3.1 and 3.2 for further discussion).
Creating a model
The starting point of my theoretical discussion is Hans Morgenthau and the po-
litical or classical realism. In the second of his six principles Morgenthau deﬁned 
interests in terms of power.
The main signpost that helps political realism to ﬁnd its way through the land-
scape of international politics is the concept of interest deﬁned in terms of pow-
er. 14
According to Hedley Bull the national interests of a state must be seen in rela-
tion to the objectives the state seeks to achieve. Bull mentions security, prosper-
ity and common values.15 The theoretical discussion take these arguments into 
account and continues by using ideas from the structural realism developed by 
Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little at the beginning of the 1990s.16 
In The Logic of Anarchy (LoA) they present a theory of the global system based 
on three levels of analysis: structural, interaction and unit. 
The organisational principles and differentiation of units, familiar from 
Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism,17 together with systematic patterns in the distribu-
tion of units’ attributes, compose the structural level. The two former parts are 
labelled deep structure and can best be described as the anarchy in the world 
order without a supranational government and with states as principal actors 
fulﬁlling similar tasks. The third part concerns traditional attributes, i.e. mili-
tary capability, economic capability, political cohesion and ideology.18 
Joseph S. Nye distinguished between the two former attributes, which he 
terms hard power, and the two latter, which he terms soft power. Soft power 
is the ability of a political actor, such as a state, to inﬂuence the behaviour or 
interests of other political actors through cultural or ideological means. Soft 
power, in other words, is distinguished from hard power, such as direct coercive 
14 H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace, ed. by 
K. W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 5.
15 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1995), p. 63–64.
16 B. Buzan, C. Jones and R. Little, The Logic of Anarchy – Neorealism to Structural 
Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
17 K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
18 B. Buzan et al., The Logic of Anarchy …, pp. 34–47.
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measures like military action and economic sanctions, by allowing the effects 
of culture, values, norms, and ideas to impact indirectly on the cognitive and 
conceptual frameworks of other actors.19
The discussion surrounding the soft power effects of culture, values and 
norms is in many ways related to discussions about whether there exists a uni-
versal human civilisation, or whether the differences between different ethnic 
and/or religious groups indicate several civilisations and hence a different logic 
for the use of soft power. According to Samuel Huntington, there is no universal 
level:
The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Western civi-
lization. … Universalism is the ideology of the West for confrontations with 
non-Western cultures. … The non-West sees as Western what the West sees as 
universal.20
I do not fully agree with Huntington and would argue that the universal declara-
tion of human rights could serve as a starting point for the deﬁnition.21 In one of 
the conventions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the Council of Europe declares:
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organi-
sation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of 
the High Contracting Parties.22
I argue that the universality lies in the fact that the global system consists of 
states and their relations, not only among themselves, but also to individu-
als, groups of individuals and NGOs. Hence, soft power is about inﬂuencing 
the patterns of these relations so that behaviour corresponds to the values and 
norms of the state exerting the soft power. I interpret this to be at the core of the 
clash of civilisations. To go one step further, the work of Ronald Inglehart and 
his World Values Surveys is apposite. Although Ingelhart focuses on the values 
19 J. S. Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power ( New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002).
20 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 66.
21 United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UN [online 19 Mar 
2009]).
22 Council of Europe, “Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms” [online 19 Mar 2009], article 34 – Individual applications.
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of individuals, his division of values into religious, legal, social, and political 
aspects is interesting. 23
Using the convention of the Council of Europe quoted above, the targets of 
both hard and soft power can be the states’ relation to individuals, to religious, 
social (including economic), and political organisations and groups of individu-
als, and to legal authorities (the rule of law). 
The second level of analysis in LoA, interaction, concerns the interaction 
capacity within the global system, or more precisely the absolute quality of tech-
nological and societal capabilities across the system to interact. Interaction is 
divided into different sectors: economic, military, political, and societal interac-
tions.24
In one of his earlier works, Buzan describes two baselines in the develop-
ment of national security policy. One is inward looking, focused on the vulner-
abilities of the state, the other outward looking, focused on threats against the 
state.25 Buzan also includes a ﬁfth sector, the environmental or ecological, and 
relates each of the sectors to security.
Military security concerns the … offensive and defensive capabilities of states, 
and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the 
organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that 
give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to resources, ﬁnance 
and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. 
Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for 
evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national 
identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the 
local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other 
human enterprises depend.26
As the quotation indicates, outward looking policy relates not only to threats 
directed towards the state, but to needs directed from the state. To distinguish 
23 R. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political 
Change in 43 Societies (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); and R. 
Inglehart “Globalization and Postmodern Values”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 
1, winter (2000): 215–228.
24 B. Buzan et al., The Logic of Anarchy…, pp. 34–47.
25 B. Buzan, People, States & Fear, 2nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 
112–116.
26 Ibid., pp. 19–20. See pp. 116–134 for a deeper discussion. Instead of environmental 
security the further discussion will use the term ecological as deﬁned by Hedley Bull. 
See H. Bull, The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 283.
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the directions of interaction we can use of the model set out above, where condi-
tions are described in terms of the dichotomies desired/undesired and present/
absent. Naturally, threats directed at the state are undesirable and the absence of 
a threat therefore implies security. The capacity to meet critical national needs, 
such as access to resources and political inﬂuence, are desirable conditions and 
their presence therefore implies safety. 
The third analytical level in LoA, the unit level, relates to attribute analysis, or 
more precisely the behaviour of the units explained in terms of their attributes. 
The individual units are examined through their domestic processes and com-
ponents. The processes are analysed not only in relation to bureaucratic proce-
dures, but also in terms of patterns in the action−reaction behaviour in the unit’s 
response to the behaviour of other units.27
According to Bruce Rusett and Harvey Starr, the origins of the modern 
state are to be found in the peace accords of Westphalia. They argue that all the 
attributes necessary came into place in 1648:
The key elements of the modern nation-state were now all available: a people, 
a territory in which they lived, a government with the authority to rule over the 
people and territory.28
Barry Buzan describes a state consisting of three different attributes. The ﬁrst at-
tribute, the physical base, is composed of the population and the territory of the 
state. The second consists of the institutions governing the physical base and the 
third the idea that gives the institutions legitimacy to govern. In the discussion 
surrounding the physical base Buzan introduces qualitative aspects of the terri-
tory such as natural resources and created values. Buzan actually seems to use 
ﬁve attributes; population, territory, infrastructure, institutions and ideas.29
27 B. Buzan et al., The Logic of Anarchy…, p. 47–65.
28 B. Russett and H. Starr, World Politics (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 
1995), p. 53–56.
29 B. Buzan, People, States & Fear… pp. 64–66 and 90–91.
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Figure 3.1: The two dimensions of conditions related to interaction
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To summarise, for the purposes of creating a theoretical model, national 
interests are assumed to consist of four components. At the structural level the 
interests are about value, at the interaction level they are about threats in the 
global community directed at the state, but also the state’s access to critical sup-
plies from the global community. Finally, at the unit level, interests are about the 
vulnerability of the state in relation to each of its attributes.
Each of the four components can be further divided into ﬁve subcomponents as 
described in ﬁgure 3.3 below. The next step is to use this model in exploring the 
empirical case of Norway .
The Norwegian context 
I base my empirical study of Norway on a report from the Norwegian Defence 
Commission. The Commission was appointed in mid August 2006 with a man-
date to analyse the ongoing transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces, 
Figure 3.2: The national interests and the logic of the components
STATE NEEDS THREATS VALUES
Idea Ecological Ecological Individual
Infrastructure Economic Economic Legal
Institutions Military Military Political
Population Political Political Religious 
Territory Social Social Social
Figure 3.3: The interests’ components and their substance
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with a focus on the years 2009–12 but with a perspective reaching as far as 
2020. The report was submitted at the end of October 2007.30
INTERESTS RELATED TO THE STATE COMPONENT
While the Commission does touch on each of the subcomponents listed above, 
their discussion is hampered by a certain terminological inconsistency and a 
tendency to privilege the abstract over the concrete. The Commission also seems 
to mix categories somewhat, making it sometimes difﬁcult to establish what 
exactly they are saying. Their discussion of territory seems more about abstract 
issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty, though they do discuss resources 
– oil and gas primarily – and infrastructure. Perhaps the Commission conceives 
of infrastructure as a shorter-term facet, and sovereignty as a more permanent 
feature. Institutions, they seem to suggest, are particularly likely to attract politi-
cal pressure.31
INTERESTS RELATED TO THE SAFETY/NEEDS COMPONENT
The Commission spends little time on safety and other needs. It does, however, 
prioritise the social well being of the citizens while addressing their social needs. 
The Commission discusses economic security in relation to the energy sector, 
though this section seems more concerned with Norwegian energy exports than 
Norway’s own energy needs. Political and social relations with the international 
community are of critical importance for the country, vital international organi-
sations being the UN and NATO. To summarise, the Commission gives priority 
to political and social needs and safety.32
INTERESTS RELATED TO THE SECURITY/THREAT COMPONENT
The Commission focuses on the political aspects of security and the discussion 
on the vulnerability of the institutions, mentioned above, should be seen in this 
light. Terrorism remains a highly potent threat, which relates to political and 
military security. Work should be done to reduce the threat of direct terror-
ist attacks and to addressing conditions favourable to the growth of terrorism, 
including recruitment to terrorist organisations. Another topic discussed by the 
Commission relates to the Barents Sea and Arctic regions. The discussion around 
30 Norwegian Defence Commission, Et styrket forsvar – Innstilling fra Forsvarspolitisk 
utvalg [Strengthening the Armed Forces – report of the Norwegian Defence 
Commission], NOU 2007:15, 31 October 2007. 
31 Norwegian Defence Commission, Et styrket forsvar, see for example pp. 5, 10, 13, 
18–20, 22, 25, 28–29 and 48–49.
32 Ibid., for example pp. 10 and 19–20.
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the situation in the High North does not, however, focus on the military aspects, 
as it doubtless would have during the Cold War, but on the politics of managing 
marine resources. The Commission does assess the possibility of an armed threat 
against Norway but engages also with economic, social and ecological security, 
if not in a narrower Norwegian context.33
INTERESTS RELATED TO THE VALUE COMPONENT
The Commission discusses several core societal values such as democracy and 
the rule of law, though the situation for human rights claims most of its atten-
tion.34
INTERESTS RELATED TO A WIDER APPROACH
Apart from the discussions about individual interest components, the Commis-
sion also takes a wider view. With the national interests as a broad point of de-
parture, the Commission concludes that Norwegian participation in internation-
al crises management not only helps solve the crisis in question but strengthens 
international organisations and, most importantly, enhances Norway’s leverage 
in these organisations.35 To summarise, the ability and credibility of the UN and 
NATO are core Norwegian national interests. The logic of the Commission’s 
considerations seems to be that the preservation of the present international or-
der and structures, including Norwegian inﬂuence in the relevant organisations, 
is the best way to protect and promote Norway’s other national interests.36
EMPIRICAL SUMMARY
Norway’s key national interests are presented in the ﬁgure below.
STATE NEEDS THREATS VALUES
Idea Ecological Ecological Individual
Infrastructure Economic Economic Legal
Institutions Military Military Political
Population Political Political Religious 
Territory Social Social Social
33 Ibid., for example pp. 5, 10–13, 15, 18–23, 29–30, 47–49 and 52.
34 Ibid., for example pp. 5, 10–11, 13, 17, 19, 22–23 and 48.
35 Ibid., for example pp. 24 and 51.
36 Ibid., see for example pp. 5, 10–11, 13–17, 21–24, 27, 29 and 48–50.
Figure 3.4: The prioritised interests of Norway
52 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
We can summarise the key interests as follows:
Reduce vulnerabilities, primarily those relating to aspects of sovereignty, i.e. 
the idea, but also those relating to territory and the ability of the Norwegian 
institutions to resist threats. 
Increase safety, primarily regarding needs relating to Norway’s political in-
ﬂuence in the UN and NATO, but also regarding the social well being of 
the citizens.
Reduce insecurity, primarily by strengthening the ability and credibility of 
the UN, when it comes to political security, and NATO, where military se-
curity is concerned. 
Promote Norwegian values, especially with respect for human rights, but 
also democracy and rule of law.
Military power and the national interests
The preservation of the existing international system seems to be Norway’s 
prime national interest. More precisely, the existence of transatlantic links, in-
stitutionalised in NATO, combined with a capable UN system, appear to be 
prioritised by the Commission. At the heart of the discussion are the desired po-
litical structures together with recognition of Norway’s need to inﬂuence them. 
Although the Commission claims to have taken a broad approach in its analysis, 
the discussion seems to have a normative point of departure. Hence the focus 
appears to be on ensuring conformity between universal values and Norway’s 
national preferences by actively working to inﬂuence the former. What conclu-
sions are then to be drawn for the contemporary use of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces?
Since the discussion is so centrally concerned with sovereignty, territory 
and particularly the resources offshore, Norway tends to come across as an 
ethnocentric state with strong normative preferences. The Commission is aware 
of the political vulnerability of Norway’s ambitious policy on the continental 
shelf and its resources. The Commission even recognises the political problems 
emanating from some of the positions taken by NATO allies such as the UK, 
Iceland and Spain. This might have inspired the Commission cite the UN system, 
rather than NATO, as the best means of maintaining the present international 
political order. However, since political means alone are not enough to ensure 
Norway’s sovereignty over its claims at sea, at least not where its disputes with 
Russia are concerned, NATO will continue to play a crucial role for Norway. 
In other words, as long as the present international order continues to give 
Norway the right to utilise its maritime resources, and as long as the UN system 
works, Norwegian institutions should be able to resist political pressures from 
abroad. As long as Russian democracy remains questionable, there is, however, 
•
•
•
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no guarantee that Russia will be play by the international rules. As long as 
there is a transatlantic link, however, and as long as the NATO system works, 
Norway’s Armed Forces should be capable of withstanding military pressures 
from abroad. The Commission seems, however, to have concluded that Norway 
needs a back-up, or alternative plan, in case policies at the UN and/or NATO 
take a less favourable direction for Norway. The answer seems to be the EU, an 
organisation which, in contrast to either the UN or NATO, can provide a mix-
ture of relevant political and military means.
As we have seen, the Commission concludes that Norwegian participation 
in international crisis management achieves more than resolving a speciﬁc con-
ﬂict. Strengthening the capacity and credibility of international organisations is 
even more important. Considering the discussion above, Norwegian participa-
tion in UN or NATO-led operations appears to be vital for Norway’s national 
interests. More correctly, the question is not about the UN or NATO, but how 
Norwegian Armed Forces can used to help strengthen both organisations and 
hence Norway’s national interests. Furthermore, the Norwegian Armed Forces 
should also be able to participate in EU-led operations, providing credibility for 
the back-up plan. A ﬁrst question for Norway’s political authorities to answer 
is therefore how best to allocate appropriate military resources to the UN and 
NATO, but also to the EU. Related questions concern how to gain political, 
not operational, inﬂuence by contributing different kinds of military units and 
whether these different units can be used to strengthen the international or-
ganisations involved. These considerations, however, involve a number of para-
doxes:  
Norwegian does not necessarily wield the same measure of inﬂuence in all 
three organisations at the same time. Participation in a NATO-led opera-
tion with special forces could, for example, strengthen both NATO’s and 
Norway’s inﬂuence within the organisation but at the same time undermine 
the UN’s and Norway’s standing in the Third World. Norwegian partici-
pation in UN-led peacekeeping operations could also undermine NATO’s 
standing with Norway’s transatlantic allies.
The normative focus on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law could, turn Norwegian public opinion against the deployment of certain 
military units, make it more problematic, if not impossible. The same goes 
for participation in speciﬁc kinds of operation or speciﬁc regions. Even if 
Norwegian military units could theoretically participate, the international 
organisation may view national caveats as an obstacle, creating the opposite 
outcome than desired or intended by Norwegian participation.
Norway cannot rely solely on the military resources of NATO allies to pro-
tect of national interests in the Norwegian neighbourhood. On the contrary, 
•
•
•
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NATO would probably expect Norway to take the operational lead. The 
consequence of this is that Norway must have military capabilities suit-
able for conducting operations, primarily maritime, in adjacent areas. At the 
same time, the UN, NATO and/or the EU could ask for ground forces to be 
deployed in out-of-Europe operations. 
There is also a risk that the Norway’s normative argumentation within the UN 
system might harm national interests or the operational behaviour of Norway’s 
major NATO allies, i.e. the US and the UK, for example when it comes to inter-
pretations of international humanitarian law. This might strengthen Norway’s 
position in the Third World but could also rebound on Norway’s inﬂuence 
within NATO. As long as Norwegian interests in Northern Europe can be safe-
guarded, primarily by political means, from within the UN system one could 
argue, however, that Norway should give highest priority to participating in and 
strengthening the UN. Hence it would be natural for the political authorities 
to consider the role of the armed forces, as well as of the other tools of grand 
strategy. The means, as we have seen, need to be balanced with the national 
interests. And as the discussion above indicates, the political authorities could 
ﬁnd themselves in a “catch 22” situation. No matter how they behave, Norway 
could lose inﬂuence in either UN or NATO. One way out of the dilemma might 
be to loosen up the strong normative positions and reduce the part played by 
tradition in Norwegian diplomacy. Another solution might be to balance UN/
NATO dependency with closer relations to the EU. The Commission seems to be 
considering the second option, not least in the ﬁeld of military cooperation. It is, 
however, not a question of de facto EU membership, but a partial de jure. 
The critical question is the ability of the two approaches, holism and at-
omism, to promote Norway’s national interests and inﬂuence within the UN 
and NATO, but also with the EU. Before I compare them, some important as-
sumptions need to be made. First, Norway is assumed to have limited military 
resources, a large part of which still have to be assigned to Norway’s own neigh-
bourhood to protect its interests in Northern Europe. Since these interests are 
primarily maritime in nature, naval units will clearly have important domestic 
tasks to fulﬁl. Second, Norway is assumed to have some kind of role within the 
NATO chain of command that obliges Norway to provide a framework for op-
erations in Northern Europe. This includes not only an operational staff but also 
a minimum number of Norwegian units, from each of the services, assigned to 
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duties in Norway. Together these assumptions indicate that Norway’s ability to 
provide military units to international operations will continue to be modest.37 
Holistic approach
With a holistic approach most of the military resources Norway is able to pro-
vide for international operations is expected to be concentrated in a single mis-
sion. The Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan is such an example. In favour of this 
alternative is the option of gaining not only strategic inﬂuence but also inﬂuence 
at the operational level since the number of boots on the ground is likely to 
correlate with operational inﬂuence. Another argument in support of the holis-
tic approach is the option for increased emphasis on inter-ministerial efﬁciency 
within the Norwegian government. One argument against holism is that there 
are no guarantees for either strategic or operational inﬂuence. National caveats 
may, for example, be counterproductive to strategic and operational level work. 
If, for example, SHAPE and ISAF are in desperate need of light infantry units in 
southern Afghanistan, unwillingness on the part of contributing nations to pro-
vide anything other than logistic units in the north, will lead to dissatisfaction 
within NATO no matter how many logisticians are provided.
There are, of course, no guarantees of inter-ministerial efﬁciency either. 
The deep-rooted mistrust between different departments, which are quite com-
mon in Western governments, not least between ministries of defence and for-
eign affairs, might in reality prove to be too great an obstacle to overcome. 
One other argument against this alternative is that the qualitative proﬁle of 
the resources needed in the North European context will probably be quite dif-
ferent to those needed in international operations. Since quality costs money 
and since the holistic approach is likely to involve greater demands across a 
broader spectrum of capabilities than the atomistic approach, there is a risk that 
Norwegian policymakers will be trapped in an “either/or” situation. If there is 
a reluctance to choose between reducing vulnerabilities at home and reducing 
insecurity abroad, there is a risk that, in the long term, “either/or” may become 
“neither/nor”. 
37 According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence there were 625 Norwegian soldiers 
deployed abroad 19 January 2008. About 80 % of these troops (495) were deployed 
in Afghanistan. The remaining personnel were military advisers, observers and staff 
ofﬁcers deployed to other missions. See Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Fakta om 
Forsvaret 2008” [Norway’s Armed Forces – facts and ﬁgures] (Forsvarsnett [online 18 
Mar 2009]).
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Atomistic approach
With an atomistic approach, not only the military, but all the instruments of 
the grand strategy, can be deployed on a number of different missions all over 
the world. Concurrent participation in several separate international operations 
with either military or other grand strategy tools thus speaks in favour of this 
approach. The possibilities for gaining strategic inﬂuence in several internation-
al organisations are thus considered to be better than with a holistic approach. 
A consequence of this approach is that Norway would have more options and 
could take subordinate national interests into consideration. With an atomistic 
approach Norway has, in other words, the opportunity simultaneously to re-
duce vulnerabilities, increase safety, reduce insecurity and promote Norwegian 
values from a strict Norwegian perspective in several different contexts while 
at the same time strengthening and gaining inﬂuence in the UN, NATO and 
the EU. An argument against the atomistic approach is that Norway could be 
interpreted by her allies, and others, as speaking with a forked tongue. Since 
the different grand strategic tools do not necessarily have to be coordinated in 
a single mission, there is a risk that different ministries within the Norwegian 
government might employ different logics and rationales, so that the sum of the 
different outcomes might actually be negative. The use of, for example, military 
means to reduce vulnerabilities relating to aspects of sovereignty in one (NATO) 
context, the economic means to increase security in terms of the needs and social 
well being of the citizens in another (EU) context, and the political means to pro-
mote Norwegian values, democracy and the rule of law in a third (UN), would 
have to be orchestrated and commensurate with an overarching national grand 
strategic policy. In the holistic approach this policy can be formulated ad hoc as 
the case of the PRT in Afghanistan shows. In the atomistic approach, however, 
this policy has to be explicitly articulated in the decision making process. The 
ability and/or willingness of the cabinet in small states is not always at hand for 
this important task.
Tentative Conclusions
Since national interests are considered to be anything but static, freedom of ac-
tion is very likely to be the key to success. Following this logic, the most impor-
tant variable in the comparison between the holistic approach and the atomistic 
approach is probably to be found in the dynamics of global politics. With a 
holistic approach most of the military resources of a small state like Norway 
are expected to be concentrated in a single international operation. To be able 
to beneﬁt from the synergies created in cooperation with other ofﬁcial Norwe-
gian agencies, the military presence probably has to be guaranteed for several 
years. Hence the options for ﬂexible response to different challenges against the 
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national interests of Norway will be at a minimum, due to temporal as well as 
spatial aspects. At the same time, a single mission commitment implies a focus 
on strengthening and gaining inﬂuence in only one, or two at most, of the three 
identiﬁed key organisations. 
The atomistic approach, on the other hand, implies no need for a full spec-
trum of operational capabilities. A niche-oriented structure of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces might not even be an option but a necessity if the national in-
terests truly are the objectives of Norwegian security policy. In contrast to the 
holistic approach, the atomistic approach allows Norway to trade full-spectrum 
quantity, sustainability and operational coherence for tactical rapid reaction ca-
pability. With a high readiness proﬁle for its armed forces, Norway might be 
able to provide tactical military resources not only for the protection of its inter-
ests in Northern Europe, but the promotion of its interests far away as well. Not 
the least of this, Norway will be able to strengthen the UN, NATO and the EU 
concurrently, gaining as much inﬂuence at the strategic level as possible.
The overall tentative conclusion is that an interest-oriented security policy 
appears to go hand in hand with the logic of realism. Once the policymakers 
start to use national interests as a premise, the ad-hoc driven logic of idealism 
seems to be outdated. If so, a change of the conceptual framework and the mind-
set of the government might be needed.

BALANCING ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS
Palle Ydstebø
... a politician who sets a political goal for military operations must have an idea 
of what is feasible for strategy given the resources available and how politics 
may affect the situation for better or for worse.1 
Background – the role of military theory
The role of military theory is twofold. In relation to military thinking and mili-
tary history, military theory is also normative. In order to be normative, military 
theory must be able to generalise. But in doing so it contradicts one of its main 
foundations − military history, which focuses on the individual case and ex-
plains the unique event in context. 
Military theory must teach us what war is, and how to win.2 This chapter 
will focus on the normative aspect of military theory; what must we do to win. 
And in order to win, what the consequences are likely to be for the forces of a 
chosen approach to conducting operations. The approaches discussed are the 
holistic and the atomistic. The consequences will be discussed with regard to 
developing the Norwegian Armed Forces, including operational art. These fac-
tors will be discussed in the context of how to use military forces in order to 
contribute to the achievement of the strategic objectives and ends (which means 
the successful conduct of tactical actions). In doing so, one must balance ends, 
ways and means. 
Figure 4.1 visualises the need for balance; choosing ends within the avail-
able resources and methods, or, if one sees something coming up, to develop 
means and ways to meet an emerging threat or challenge.
During the Cold War, the expansion of Norway’s Armed Forces to counter 
the Soviet threat is an example of developing means. The concept development 
leading to a “manoeuvre doctrine” in the 1990s is an example of developing 
ways. Cashing in on the peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was all about reducing the ends, not without major consequences for the means. 
The ways were also affected, however, when the ends and means were reduced, 
1 A. A. Svechin,   Strategy (Minneapolis: East View, 2004), p. 74. 
2 J. Widén and J. Ångström,     Militärteorins grunder [A primer in military theory] 
(Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2004), pp. 1–13. 
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since the operational options narrowed drastically as the quality of quantity was 
dismantled. The classic strategic challenge is to balance these three factors and 
develop them to match the changing character of war: in peacetime to deter and 
prepare for conﬂict, and during armed conﬂict to apply the forces and adapt 
ends, ways and means as the war progresses. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss in light of military theory the con-
sequences and opportunities for the Norwegian Armed Forces, of the holistic 
and atomistic approaches. More speciﬁcally, whether a holistic or atomistic ap-
proach for the Norwegian Armed Forces actually shapes Norwegian military 
strategy, i.e. the force development and the development of doctrine and opera-
tions concepts, including operational art and tactics. The character of contem-
porary operations will be discussed. Finally possible consequences for any likely 
Norwegian force contribution at the operational and tactical level of war will be 
discussed within the framework of these approaches. 
FRAMEWORK AND TERMS
The Clausewitzian understanding of war as merely the continuation of policy 
by other means forms the theoretical framework for this chapter.3 It means that 
war, or the use of military force as such, is never for its own sake, but is
simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. 
We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we 
3 C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by M. Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press 1976), p. 87. 
Figure 4.1: The Strategic triangle.
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also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political inter-
course or change into something entirely different.4
What Clausewitz is stating is nothing other than the central tenet of what in 
NATO is called the Comprehensive Approach.5 Military force should always be 
regarded as one of many political instruments, a peculiar one, but one with no 
independent role in itself. In that sense, the particular nature of military means 
makes them rather different from all of the other political means, a fact that ide-
ally should be taken into account so that “the trends and designs of policy shall 
not be inconsistent with these means.”6 This should of course inform the use of 
military force for purposes other than full-scale war, such as peace support and 
stabilisation operations. This chapter is concerned only with the armed forces, 
however, insofar as it is the business of the political echelons to ensure that the 
military means support the political intercourse and other means available. It 
includes using military and other means to promote collaboration in the area of 
operations. 
A ﬁnal element in the policy–strategy interdependence is that bad policy 
cannot be corrected by clever strategy, creative operational art or smart tactics, 
or by technological superiority. In order not to get entangled in this debate, this 
chapter will assume a degree of positive coherence between the political ambi-
tions and military strategy and between the latter and other policy instruments. 
This will of course include balancing ends, ways and means. Without a positive 
connection between political ends, available resources and an approach that is 
consistent with both ends and means, any military approach is risky at best. 
Peacetime military strategy should prepare the armed forces to support 
policy in need of military force. That means equipping, training and preparing 
the force for likely military missions that are consistent with Norwegian politi-
cal culture and ambitions. The deployment of the force should adhere to the 
same framework as the policy it is supporting. Other aspects of policy to be 
considered include elements such as ethics and law. But the actual conduct of 
operations should also reﬂect the character of the current war or conﬂict. That 
might well include self-imposed constraints when it comes to weapons and tacti-
cal solutions, as well as subordinating lower echelon military logic to political 
priorities and demands.7 
4 Ibid., p. 605.
5 NATO, “NATO after Riga – Prevailing in Afghanistan, Improving Capabilities, 
Enhancing Cooperation” [online 22 Mar 2009].
6 Clausewitz, On War, p. 87.
7 Ibid., see book 8, ch. 6, e.g. pp. 608–09.
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This chapter is basically interested in the kind of peace support operation 
(PSO) currently running in Afghanistan, which excludes large scale conventional 
war. The reason for this is mainly that Afghanistan will remain, for the foresee-
able future, the focus of NATO and thus of Norway. A limitation will also help 
make the factors to be discussed more manageable. The political framework is 
participation in a multinational campaign with a low political aims (stabilisa-
tion and support for reconstruction) and a consequently low threshold for being 
overrun by domestic political issues (lack of funding, lack of interest, elections, 
etc.). After presenting the two approaches mentioned above in light of military 
theory, the chapter discusses challenges relating to operational art and peace-
time force planning. 
Atomistic approach
The atomistic approach is about providing tactical forces for an alliance, coali-
tion or lead-nation led campaign for shared strategic ends, as outlined by the 
Canadian Armed Forces.8 This has also been the standard Norwegian approach 
to operations on foreign soil since the late Middle Ages. When operating abroad, 
either as part of the Allied forces in World War II or peacekeeping in Southern 
Lebanon, Norwegian forces have always provided tactical assets to the larger 
force. The ability of Norway to control the use of these forces has varied, as has 
the necessity for doing so. 
First of all there is the need for an acceptable strategy. Under the NATO 
framework, the command structure and consensus principle should ensure that 
all twenty-six countries are heard. Some may be less equal than others, but in 
principle none are left out. The forces committed should (supposedly) bring pro-
portional inﬂuence to bear upon strategy and the conduct of operations. When 
it comes to ad-hoc coalitions (e.g. “of the willing”), contributing nations tend to 
be more at the mercy of the leader or his closest compatriots. Contributing na-
tions might accept reduced strategic/operational inﬂuence as the price of being 
part of the team, seasoned with a hope for some future political beneﬁt. 
As a consequence, Norway will have to balance the need (desire) for stra-
tegic and operational inﬂuence with the forces provided. That means having 
the “right” forces to deploy at the right time. On 10 of September 2001, what 
was expected of a contributing nation had no comparison with expectations 
just a few days later. At the time, Norway was had a battalion-size battle group 
8 J. H. Vance, “Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces do not 
Campaign”, in The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, eds. A. English, D. 
Gosselin, H. Coombs and L. M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 
2005), pp. 280–83. 
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in Kosovo, and was restructuring its army to meet such needs. Over the next 
few years Norway sent a wide variety of forces to Afghanistan, both for Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Stabilisation and Assistance 
Force (ISAF). These forces were selected from a broad force structure before the 
latter’s transformation to meet the needs of the future. The deployment of an 
armoured combat engineer squadron to Iraq, (a so-called “humanitarian engi-
neer company”),9 in the summer of 2003 proved to be the limit in terms of both 
coalition and mission of what was politically acceptable in Norway. 
The initial Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan comprised selected 
technical and tactical units for duty with OEF and ISAF, ranging from special 
operations forces (SOF) and sappers to civil-military cooperation units (CIMIC) 
and a surgical unit. Norway assumed the leadership of a multinational battal-
ion-size battle group in Kabul late autumn 2003. This battle group was a typical 
example of a high proﬁle contribution. When it was traded with the quick reac-
tion force (QRF) in the German-led Regional Command North (RC N) in Ma-
zar-e-Sharif, Norway continued its high proﬁle tactical contribution to ISAF. 
The principal challenge for a small nation is to tailor its forces to the de-
mands of political acceptability and a force structure that is sustainable in the 
sense of being able to ﬁeld relevant and robust forces; and it has to be affordable 
over time. But even a shared strategy does not necessarily affect the nation’s con-
tribution in the same way as domestic policy and politics, as seen in the failed 
attempt to provide engineer troops to the UN in Darfur or Haiti in 2007–08. 
The atomistic approach needs above all a shared strategy. This might not 
be too difﬁcult under an established alliance or the UN, but can be more chal-
lenging in ad-hoc coalitions. Then the forces being asked for need to be avail-
able, along with some degree of sustainability for those forces. Finally, the coun-
try needs to balance strategy and the need to retain some inﬂuence over the 
forces one can afford to contribute – or forces which it is politically possible or 
desirable to provide. And then, sooner or later, the domestic politics card will 
be played at home. 
9 K. M. Bondevik, “Stortinget – møte den 19. november 2003 kl. 10” [Storting –              
meeting of 19 November 2003 at 10:00] (Stortinget [23 March 2009]); Kjell Dragnes, 
“Humanitære soldater” [Humanitarian troops], Aftenposten, 13 December 2005; 
and Dagbladet, “Humanitært eller militært?” [Humanitarian or military?] editorial, 
Dagbladet, 5 June 2005.
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Holistic approach 
The holistic approach requires Norwegian military forces to be applied in ac-
cordance with a holistic policy, i.e. “with the addition of other means”.10 The 
Norwegian government will engage across a broader front to achieve its politi-
cal ends and ambitions, but within the framework of an international operation. 
Strictly speaking, it means that the Norwegian Armed Forces will be providing 
direct support for the political intercourse and other available means by interact-
ing primarily with Norwegian civilian resources. The Norwegian military strat-
egy will thusly be more directly linked to Norwegian policy and ambitions. 
The consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces of a holistic approach 
should be less complicated to manage, since the political-strategic level will 
manage the multinational dimension. Once deployed, civil−military interaction 
will largely be between Norwegians, all within a national culture of cooperation 
and interoperability. The forces deployed must cover all the military functions 
needed for the immediate tactical tasks, relying upon the multinational forces 
for operational and strategic resources. This will demand a much wider national 
force composition than with an atomistic approach, since national forces are 
expected to fulﬁl much more of the force requirements at the tactical and lower 
operational levels. Those forces must have a combined arms capability at tacti-
cal level in order to fulﬁl a wide range of tactical tasks. Norwegian strategic or 
operational resources can in this speciﬁc case also support the multinational 
operational and strategic echelon (e.g., NORSOF, ISTAR etc.).11
When NATO expanded into northern Afghanistan, Norway took over the 
PRT MEY after the UK. The PRT MEY developed into a multinational and ho-
listic approach unit, including police, development aid etc. During the time Nor-
way had both the PRT MEY and the QRF, holism and atomism were both ap-
plied. In addition, NORSOF was redeployed to the Kabul area as an operational 
resource. When the QRF was handed over to the Bundeswehr in July 2008 and 
all Norwegian military forces, together with some of policy’s other means, were 
moved to PRT MEY, there was a clear focus on the holistic approach, with a 
multinational element including Iceland and Latvia. But as the public defence 
debate at the time indicated, the fatigue of the newly transformed Norwegian 
Armed Forces was already taking its toll. 
Holism is well tuned to the idea of NATO’s comprehensive approach, and 
will allow a government to implement policy instruments on a broad basis in or-
10 In this example, Clausewitz logic is deliberately presented with a twist; the other 
means being everything but the military. 
11 NORSOF (Norwegian SOF), ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition 
and reconnaissance). 
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der to pursue its political ends and ambitions. For the armed forces, the holistic 
approach demands a broad troop contribution and a larger force pool to be able 
to sustain its contribution for some time. It is a desirable approach for doing 
well, but perhaps too demanding for a lean (or skinny) force. 
Operational consequences
This section will discuss the consequences of holism and atomism at the opera-
tional and tactical levels. In a Norwegian context the operational level includes 
both the ability to conduct Norwegian-led combined joint campaigns and op-
erations, and to provide core headquarters (HQ), such as HQ KFOR-V, and 
competent staff ofﬁcers in a combined joint HQ. At the tactical level it is all 
about the services’ ability to ﬁeld forces for operations within the framework of 
the two approaches, to deploy tactical HQ for national or multinational tacti-
cal components, and ﬁnally to provide competent service staff ofﬁcers in the 
multinational HQ. 
OPERATIONAL ART 
Operational art is deﬁned by NATO as “the employment of forces to attain stra-
tegic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration 
and conduct of strategies, campaigns, operations and battles.”12 The Norwegian 
Joint Doctrine (NJD), deﬁnes operational art as “ a military commander’s use 
of the means at his disposal to achieve the desired effects and fulﬁl the overall 
objectives.”13 In short, operational art should make sure that military means are 
applied in such a way that they contribute to the strategic objectives, and thus 
the political ends or ambitions. 
This might sound self-evident, but military history is not lacking in exam-
ples of the contrary. The causes are often complicated and at times complex, but 
one of the key problems that emerged as Western society became industrialised 
and bureaucratised, was to maintain the connection between policy and strat-
egy, on the one hand, and the means to achieve the strategic objectives, on the 
other. Two main approaches appeared, one mainly bottom-up and one mainly 
top-down. 
12 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(C), 21 March 2007, para. 0429, pp. 4–15. 
13 Norwegian Defence Staff, Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (Oslo, 
2007) para. 0510, p. 105. 
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The bottom-up approach, exempliﬁed by the Germans in the two world 
wars, is best expressed by Ludendorff when placing tactics above strategy.14 Su-
perior tactics should create tactical victories and the strategic victory should be 
the culmination of all these. The most famed result of this approach is what is 
known as Blitzkrieg. The German tactical successes in the opening years of the 
Second World War ﬁlled the gap of a lack of Wehrmacht strategy, at least until 
early December 1941.15 Blitzkrieg has thus been one of the most inﬂuential his-
torical cases when it comes to concepts and doctrinal development in the West 
since the mid 1970s. 
The top-down approach is what is known today as operational art. It 
emerged in several places, but the theoretical underpinnings were developed and 
written in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and ’30s. The physical outcomes, such 
as large scale armoured penetrations and envelopments might indicate a similar-
ity with Blitzkrieg. But that is only the surface. The key difference between the 
German Panzer Operations and the combined joint operations of the Western 
Allies, or the large multi-front operations of the Red Army, is their strategic-
tactical linkage. Or as some would say when it comes to Blitzkrieg, the lack of 
such.16 
Since its adoption by NATO, operational art has become institutionalised 
as the Alliance’s approach for applying military means to strategic ends. Despite 
being challenged (or complemented, depending on one’s viewpoint) by emerging 
concepts, such as the effects-based approach to operations, operational art is 
still a key element of NATO doctrine, and of the NJD. 
The PSO framework does not exclude operational art, despite operational 
art’s origin in the twentieth century’s world wars and the Cold War standoff. 
Operational art is still about applying forces to achieve strategic ends, whether 
those ends were NATO’s defence against the Soviet Army, or providing security 
and stability in the Hindu Kush. It is still about the application of military force 
for strategic ends, where the direct linkage between these ends and the forces is 
14 G. Isserson, “The Evolution of Operational Art”, in Evolution of Soviet Operational 
Art, 1927–91: Documentary Basis. – Vol. 1: Operational Art, 1927–64, ed. H. E. 
Orenstein (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 49. Also Svechin is critical of the German 
lack of strategic use of tactical and operational successes e.g. Svechin, Strategy, pp. 
69, 85. Both these reﬂects the Russian (Soviet) critique of the German focus on the 
military and not the political dimension of war. See also R. B. Asprey, The German 
High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff conduct World War I (New 
York: Quill, 1991), p. 367. 
15 Conversation with LtCol dr Gerhard P. Groß, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt         
(MGFA), Potsdam 30 October 2007. See also K.-H. Frieser, Blitzkrieglegende 
(München: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), pp. 437–41.
16 Ibid.
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less than obvious. And most importantly, it is about subjugating tactics to strat-
egy and not allowing excellent lower level performance to put policy at risk by 
demanding a strategy that does not support the political ends and ambitions.17 
Norway’s stated ambition − to be able to conduct combined joint opera-
tions on Norwegian soil or territorial waters, including crisis management − 
will not be discussed here, as it is outside the multinational PSO framework. In 
a holistic approach Norway’s National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) should in 
theory assume a greater responsibility for a Norwegian force contribution than 
it would under an atomistic approach. First of all because the military contribu-
tion is expected to be larger and more complicated since that alone is putting a 
larger strain on logistics. Since Norwegian forces will carry out more missions 
themselves and liaise directly with Norwegian civilian resources, the higher ech-
elon coordination in Norway is expected to be greater. In that case, the NJHQ 
might take over some coordination authority from the strategic level, because of 
its staff capacity and organisational proximity to the Area of Operations. That 
might revitalise the operational level in managing the planning of civil – military 
cooperation in the theatre. 
An inherent risk in the holistic approach is that the actual managing of the 
operations might drift from the multinational HQ over to the NJHQ. Not by 
design, but as some form of “command creep”; one tends to cut corners to get 
things done. The more national the effort in a limited (tactical) part of an Alli-
ance operation, the greater the temptation to utilise national channels to control 
national assets. Another challenge is the degrading of the multi-nationality as 
such. A national tactical sub-optimisation that is counter to the operational 
optimisation in the theatre might occur. Then the bottom-up approach might 
return in new clothing, undermining a common strategy. Failing to subordinate 
national hobbyhorses to the overarching strategy and operational concepts of 
the Alliance can produce spectacular local success stories, but put the joint ef-
fort at risk. 
With an atomistic approach, the NJHQ will run national issues as the 
national contingent commander (NCC), national logistics, and hopefully act 
as a buffer between the political/strategic level and the Norwegian tactical 
commander(s) in the AOO. Since the Alliance will ideally plan and conduct 
the operations, national authorities should, again ideally, limit their efforts to 
providing and sustaining their contributions. However, there will always be na-
tional limitations and caveats. National authorities will then administer these 
17 J. B. Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory”, Parameters, vol. XXXVIII, no. 2 (2008): 25, 
26–28.
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limitations, which might include the so called “red card”, a direct refusal to 
participate in an operation or part of it. Other limitations can be geographical, 
as was the case with the German and Norwegian refusal to participate in the op-
erations in southern Afghanistan.18 These limitations and caveats will, of course, 
also be valid with a holistic approach, but are much more valid when a nation 
provides tactical forces under an multinational HQ and the different nations 
have different levels of risk acceptance, troop posture etc. Germany did send 
200 specially trained paratroopers to reinforce their PRT in Kunduz in February 
2008.19 These troops were part of the German holistic PRT approach, and the 
paratroopers operated under German national command in the vicinity of the 
PRT in order to prevent and combat threats posed by insurgents. 
The operational challenges are very much about managing the nation’s 
strategic choices when it comes to participation. Operational art, and the op-
erational HQ, are tasked with managing the troops in the theatre in such a way 
that the nation’s strategic objectives are achieved. Both the holistic and atomistic 
approach pose challenges. Some are common, some unique, and others reﬂect 
higher echelon (motivated by politics) limitations. The operational level has its 
unique complexities to deal with, very different from the complexities of early 
twentieth-century operational art, but it is still about applying tactical means to 
achieve some sort of strategic ends. 
FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS
Since the autumn of 2003 Norway has deployed the core of a mechanised infantry 
battalion with a battalion headquarters and a CS/CSS company to Afghanistan. 
As a result of the reduced size of the army and the increased fatigue of deployed 
personnel, Norway was barely able to ﬁeld a company-size task unit in 2008.20 
Norway is present in Afghanistan for its seventh year, and is expected to be there 
for some time yet. Norway has also acknowledged NATO’s strategy, which calls 
18 The most celebrated case in the media is the political limitation posed upon the 
Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. E.g. Spiegel, “Nato-Partner wütend über deutsche Kampf-      
Hemmungen”, Spiegel Online, 16 November 2006 [online 23 Mar 2009]; M. Gebauer 
and S. Weiland, “USA und Briten überziehen Deutschland mit Kritik-Kampagne”, 
Spiegel Online, 17. November 2006 [online 23 Mar 2009], and Spiegel, “Berlin will 
Afghanistan-Einsatz ﬂexibel regeln”, Spiegel Online, 18 November 2006 [online 23 
Mar 2009]. 
19 Spiegel, “Germany Discovers a War in Afghanistan”,       Spiegel Online International, 
9 August 2008 [online 23 Mar 2009], Thomas Wiegold, “In Deckung und hoffen” 
Online Focus, 7 April 2008 [online 23 Mar 2009]; and Thomas Wiegold, “Verband 
dringt auf mehr Soldaten für Afghanistan“ Online Focus, 22 April 2008 [online 23 
Mar 2009].
20 Verdens Gang, “Må kutte styrker i Afghanistan” [Forces facing cuts in Afghanistan],            
editorial, VG, 3 April 2008.
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for a long term presence with substantial ground forces, assisting in providing 
security for development, and in training and equipping the Afghan National 
Army (ANA). Such a long term commitment allows the contributing nations to 
prepare and develop forces suited for that task. 
As Norway has accepted NATO’s long term presence in Afghanistan, and 
has chosen to participate both for the future of Afghanistan and the future of 
NATO, Norwegian troop contributions and national force development should 
ideally reﬂect such a choice. The recent experience with the quick reaction force 
(QRF) – and the respect that force has gained – is a clear indication of the kind 
of forces needed and appreciated by NATO, and there should be very good a 
reason for such a success to be abandoned. Norway has a well-deserved record 
of delivering boots on the ground for PSO and stabilisation operations. This, 
combined with Norwegian troops’ proven ability to ﬁght and win engagements, 
should make such an option a likely choice. Furthermore, the valuable experi-
ence of having battalion and company commanders and an ample number of 
small unit leaders ﬁelded in a national combined arms task group would alone 
be worth the effort. 
Based on NATO’s stated needs over the next decades in Afghanistan (a 
struggle NATO cannot afford to lose),21 it is a little odd that the current Defence 
Analysis does not jump to the rescue and reinforce the Army’s capability to con-
tribute with a much needed robust tactical unit. The present predictability for 
the forces for NATO’s mission in Afghanistan in the years to come is just as pre-
dictable as the need for forces for the defence of Norway during the Cold War. 
Theatre-wide and operational contributions from all services could supplement 
a valid and visible footprint on the ground, based on demand and availability. 
Such a contribution would serve both Norway’s need for Alliance coherence and 
also reinforce national capabilities with up to date and valid experience in an 
allied tactical and operational context. 
With a holistic approach the services would in principle establish a broader 
national force in theatre, and also cooperate more closely with national civil 
resources. That will demand a wider variety of national tactical forces to be 
integrated in a joint force. But also a more focused political leadership to harmo-
nise national assets with the Alliance and also to provide broad national civil-
military planning and coordination of national assets. The military demands 
will be comparatively heavy in maintaining a force at the higher tactical or lower 
operational level, including national logistics led by the NJHQ. Compared to an 
21 NATO, “The Istanbul Agenda”, video interview with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer [online            
22 Mar 2009]. 
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atomistic approach, holism will put a greater strain on a larger part of the Nor-
wegian Armed Forces, a strain that the current force structure probably would 
not be able to sustain. The experience gained with the predecessor of the NJHQ 
as core for KFOR V HQ in 2001 might give an indication of the demand for a 
national ﬁeld HQ with support units in a holistic approach. 
Both approaches will need a force structure large enough to train units and 
commanders at the lower tactical level (brigade, task group and air wing), both 
in order to ﬁeld and maintain forces, and to provide highly competent service 
staff ofﬁcers for tactical and operational level headquarters in national or mul-
tinational forces. 
Tentative conclusions 
As the aim of military theory is to give guidance on how to win in war, or secure 
strategic ends using military force. To succeed, those ends must be addressed in 
one way or another. If not, military forces will be reduced to a passive presence 
or worse, involved in bottom-up initiated actions that may score tactical suc-
cesses but are just as likely to harm the (assumed) strategic ends. 
The aspects and challenges in a theoretical perspective of the atomistic and 
holistic approaches to the application of military force serve to amplify what 
small nations are struggling with in the military ﬁeld. Both approaches highlight 
speciﬁc small-state challenges in ensuring that the nation’s contribution into a 
multinational campaign or operation really serves the nation’s strategic ends. 
Those speciﬁc ends must be identiﬁed and expressed if there are any unique na-
tional strategic ends outside an alliance or coalition. As the Canadian examples 
illustrate, national strategic ends might simply be just being there alongside our 
most important ally.22 If being a force contributor is what matters, just having 
the “right” kind of forces might be enough. If the tactical contributions are also 
units capable of securing tactical Alliance objectives, the strategic gain might 
well be proportionally far greater than the unit’s volume. The Norwegian QRF 
in the ISAF RC N might well serve as an example. The rest are information op-
erations to make sure the world knows how supportive we are of the common 
cause of world peace. And, of course, hope that any goodwill provided by such 
contributions can be cashed in when Realpolitik rules. 
If there are important national strategic ends worth pursuing, the holistic 
approach might be the approach of choice. Bringing together the nation’s other 
political means alongside the military’s might then be the likely choice to achieve 
an overall national strategic end. The demands on own forces are greater than 
22 Vance, “Tactics Without Strategy …”, p. 281. 
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contributing isolated tactical units; holistic forces might include robust com-
bined arms tactical forces combined with a certain degree of national ability to 
inﬂuence the planning and conduct of operations at the operational level. That 
will also call for a national command and control capability able to provide 
strategic and/or operational comand and control, and to interact closely with 
any in-theatre JHQ. A holistic approach may also demand quantity as well as 
quality. Quantity is a feature currently lacking in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
and is not expected to reappear in the foreseeable future. 
When we use the models of the holistic and atomistic approach as analytic 
models, we see that the Norwegian contribution to the operations in Afghanistan 
has moved from a atomistic approach at the tactical and operational level, over 
to a holistic approach, as seen in the reinforcement of the Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Team in Meymaneh (PRT MEY) and the subsequent handover of the QRF 
to the Bundeswehr in the summer of 2008, leaving the time limited NORSOF as 
the remaining atomistic contribution. 
Both approaches should need a national force structure capable of sup-
porting the strategic military ends Norway chooses to pursue. For a small state, 
balancing ends, ways and means might be quite a challenge. Perhaps just the 
acceptance of the interdependency between ends, ways and means might be the 
ﬁrst step in choosing an approach to one’s own international involvements that 
will give strategy a chance. 

THE ROLE OF LAW AND HOW TO MAINTAIN LEGAL COHERENCE
Sigrid Redse Johansen
Legal coherence – approaching the problem 
The chapter discusses the use of military power by NATO nations. Is the out-
come of the operation best served by an atomistic or a holistic approach to 
implementing the comprehensive approach? In my chapter I examine this ques-
tion by looking at one legal consideration: the quest for legal coherence. I have 
named it “The role of law and how to maintain legal coherence”. The title pre-
supposes that “legal coherence” is a good thing to have. 
In addressing these legal considerations I ask a couple of fundamental ques-
tions, namely whether legal coherence is a good thing to have in a multinational 
military operation framework and, if it is a good thing to have, how to achieve 
it in the context of a comprehensive approach. Is legal coherence best achieved 
under a holistic or an atomistic approach? 
What is legal coherence? 
We have coherence when things ﬁt together. In this case the applicable legal 
framework. One example is the deﬁnition of criminal acts. If I for example 
express a strong dissatisfaction with the Norwegian government and its dispo-
sitions over the continental shelf in the High North, the statement is governed 
by my constitutional right to freedom of expression. If I express the same dis-
satisfaction in a situation where Norway should happen to be at war with its 
neighbours – defending the northern areas – my statements might be punishable 
as treason.1 The punishable element of my actions (my statements) is related to 
the state of war in the Norwegian territory. The two legal regulations, freedom 
of speech and criminal treason, are understood in relation to each other. We 
might simply say that my freedom of expression in times of peace is coherent 
with my restricted freedom of speech in certain areas, at war. This is a two-sided 
relationship: the constitutional freedom of speech on one side and the penal 
code criminalising treason on the other. And ﬁnally, enforcing the penal code is 
1 Norwegian penal code of 1902, art. 86, and new penal code of 2005 (not yet into 
force), art. 119.
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a matter for the Norwegian police. The use of military force is reserved for cases 
of external threat.2 
In an international or comparative context it is not unusual for different 
countries to have different approaches to the question of applicable law, both 
regarding the substance of the law, for example whether a statement such as 
that referred to above is criminal or not, and regarding enforcement methods, 
whether it is the police or the armed forces who have the powers to prevent 
certain crimes. Different approaches in different countries is not a problem as 
long as their respective sets of norms work mainly autonomously from each 
other. The problem of coherence arises if the two systems of legal norms are to 
work together as one. The Norwegian understanding of freedom of speech may 
not be legally coherent under another state’s conception of treason – if the two 
conceptions were to be merged within the same framework of norms. This may 
result in a more than two-sided relationship; there would be the relationship 
between freedom of speech and punishable treason in a national context and the 
same relationship in a multinational context. In the following I leave the deﬁni-
tion of what legal coherence is alone, and ask whether legal coherence is to be 
considered a common good. 
Legal coherence – a common good? 
The answer to the question might have been implied by the premises of the 
abovementioned example. Incoherence between legal conceptions might create 
challenges. We can look at these challenges more closely to discuss the presumed 
desirability of legal coherence. 
To have a well-functioning legal system a modern state must be governed 
by the rule of law. This means in the simplest terms that legislation, decisions 
and enforcement measures are guided by rules and not the arbitrary use of state 
power. Rule of law is often linked to fundamental human rights, for example 
the right to protection from arbitrary deprivation of life (referred to as the right 
to life), the right to liberty and security of person, the prohibition of slavery 
and the right to a fair trial, to mention some examples.3 Arbitrary execution of 
power hinders equal treatment of equal cases. This – equal treatment of equal 
cases – is a basic tenet in the creation of rule of law. Substantial lack of legal co-
herence is a challenge for this part of the creation of rule of law. Another aspect 
2 Norwegian Constitution, art. 99, second paragraph. 
3 See UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 
(ICCPR), art. 6, 8, 9 and 14. The equivalent rights are laid down in Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950 
(ECHR), art. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
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of equal treatment of equal cases is the level of transparency and predictability. 
Each citizen must be able to foresee the likely consequences of their actions. Let 
us therefore stick to the initial presumption that legal coherence normally and 
in broad terms is a common good to achieve in a state governed by the rule of 
law. But what, then, about joint military operations abroad? Is legal coherence 
a common good there as well? A military operation does not primarily enforce 
law. Law enforcement is a civilian task. But military force will support civilian 
law enforcement as a part of a comprehensive approach.4 The understanding 
of permissible and non-permissible methods in these supporting functions may 
differ from one troop-contributing nation to another. One state may use riot 
control agents for crowd control purposes and another state may have attached 
national reservations (caveats) to the use of such less lethal weapons based on 
the presumption that these weapons are solely for use by ordinary police for ci-
vilian law enforcement purposes – or are not tolerable at all. Two other practical 
areas exposed to different conceptions of applicable law, and hence where legal 
coherence would be perceived as a common good, are ﬁrstly regarding the arrest 
of persons and the subsequent handling of detainees, and secondly the execution 
of self defence. This use of national caveats is a challenge for the legal coherence 
of the force as a whole, both when it comes to operational planning and where 
factual execution is concerned. It requires a shared situational awareness regard-
ing the concept of law among troop-contributing nations in order to know who 
will be able to support whom in different kinds of operations. Here, too, let 
us therefore stick to the initial presumption that legal coherence is a common 
good, and move on to the core of this chapter, namely the implementation of 
the comprehensive approach and the choice between a holistic or an atomistic 
approach. 
Legal coherence and the comprehensive approach 
NATO plays – at least for the future of NATO itself – a vital role in the interna-
tional presence in Afghanistan. A discussion of the implementation of a compre-
hensive approach will for all practical purposes be directed at Afghanistan. The 
UN Security Council (SC) has focused on cohesion in this regard, when stating 
in resolution (RES) 1776 (2007) 
that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as 
the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcom-
ing the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international com-
4 See also NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(C), 21 March 2007, pp. 1–9 and 1–10. 
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munity to address these challenges in a coherent manner through the compre-
hensive framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact.
This trend has been followed up. The Security Council has further recently (June 
2008) emphasised 
the importance of a comprehensive approach to address the drug problem of 
Afghanistan, which, to be effective has to be integrated into the wider context of 
efforts carried out in the three areas of Security, Governance, Rule of Law and 
Human Rights, and Economic and Social Development.5 
There are two issues I want to take forward from these quotations: the “cross-
cutting issue of counter-narcotics” and the “coherent manner through the 
comprehensive framework”. For the purpose of this chapter it is the military 
(supporting) role in the struggle to combat crime (drugs) in a coherent manner 
through a comprehensive framework, which is interesting. This also implies that 
in this chapter I do not discuss comprehensiveness when it comes to humanitar-
ian aid and development projects. My tentative conclusions in this chapter may 
therefore have less value for these other civilian aspects of coordination. 
Armed forces are primarily present to provide security; this is the essence 
of the mandate of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).6 The com-
prehensiveness entails a balance between armed force and law enforcement in 
the struggle against, among others, the drug industry. It is no secret that drugs 
ﬁnance weapons and therefore sustain the armed resistance against the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan and hence the international presence supporting the Gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing discussion and a need for constant 
consideration of the extent and manner in which the armed forces should deal 
with counter-narcotics. Drug dealing is a crime and crime is dealt with using law 
enforcement methods, by the police. The coherent manner in which these chal-
lenges are to be addressed – as emphasised in SC RES 1776 above – includes the 
need for a legally coherent approach. A legally coherent approach would entail 
a consistent view on the legal limits for the use of military force against actions 
which are primarily considered to constitute crime (and not military operations) 
and on the legal framework for cooperation between the armed forces and the 
civilian police. Thus legal coherence would entail consistency in the policy re-
ﬂecting law as in whether one nation makes its forces available for certain kinds 
5 UN SC res. 1817, 11 June 2008. 
6 See for example UN SC res. 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003) and 1707 (2006). 
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of operations in close contact with law enforcement, or for supporting the local 
police during search and arrest operations. 
Moving now from this general introduction on legal coherence and com-
prehensive approach to the more speciﬁc topic of combating crime in a military 
context, I shall attempt to draw some conclusions on which of the two ap-
proaches, holism or atomism, is the more likely to facilitate legal coherence, 
illustrated by the ﬁght against organised crime (particularly drugs). 
Military repression of crimes? 
The title of this section is rather biased. I do not necessarily mean there is such a 
trend, but I believe it raises a relevant question. And the question, or challenge, 
as I see it can be put as follows: the comprehensive challenge is to choose and 
synchronise the appropriate means in order to achieve the aim of the operation. 
Should it be negotiation, trial or destruction? I have tried to illustrate the chal-
lenge as follows: 
The boxes illustrate different enforcement measures and applicable law, where 
the degree and intensity of use of force increases from left to right. At the same 
time the boxes illustrate the cooperation or synchronisation between civil pow-
ers and the armed forces. I will comment on each box separately (apart from the 
ﬁrst two which I treat jointly) and try to focus on issues of concern for promot-
ing legal coherence.
NO ENFORCEMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Both “no enforcement” and “law enforcement” are civilian “regular” methods 
of dealing with crime. I have separated the left box from the other boxes since 
diplomatic pressure does not involve force in the sense that is relevant here. 
The law enforcement methods (the second box from the left) are governed 
by typical rule of law guarantees, for example the right to personal liberty and 
security, the presumption of innocence, the right to fair trial and the right to 
Figure 5.1: Illustration of methods for applying force, where the degree and intensity of use of force 
increases from left to right.
“No enforcement”
Diplomatic pressure   
and negotiation
Law enforcement
Investigation, 
apprehension and trial
Human rights law
“Combined force”
Law enforcement and 
armed force
Human rights law and 
Law of armed conﬂict
Armed force
Directly deadly force 
without trial
Law of armed conﬂict
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life. Rule of law guarantees and law enforcement procedures are designed with 
a situation of peace in view. The rules will normally still apply when peace is 
broken but the initial position, legally speaking, is one of peace. 
The different rules are subject to national interpretation and some of them 
may be subject to national derogation when public emergency so requires.7 The 
right to life may not be derogated from, except “in respect of deaths resulting 
from lawful acts of war”.8 This means that civilian enforcement measures are 
subject to a doctrine of “minimum use of force”. 
Death may be inevitable, but it should be so as a result of force which is no more 
than absolutely necessary ... in defence of any person from unlawful violence … 
in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained ... in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insur-
rection.9 
These criteria illustrate the European standard. The same wording is not repeat-
ed in the UN convention (ICCPR article 6), though the principle of “minimum 
force” is recognised. The article in the European convention (ECHR article 2) 
refers to three different situations: self-defence, arrests and detentions, and riot 
control. Each of these different law enforcement situations may also, in certain 
circumstances, be handled by the army. When handled by the army the human 
rights standard for the protection of life applies. Troop-contributing nations dif-
fer in their conception of when their armed forces are authorised to take part in 
the two latter kinds of situation and what measures they are authorised to use. 
Regarding the ﬁrst situation, that of self-defence, multinational rules of engage-
ment (ROEs) grant every person their individual right to self defence. Without 
entering the debate regarding the deﬁnitions of the international norm for indi-
vidual self-defence, one can note that the notion of self-defence may differ from 
nation to nation and that this again may result in imposed restrictions – either 
explicitly or implicitly – on the force. Norwegian criminal law, for example, 
deﬁnes self-defence as including the right to protect third persons and property. 
This may be conceived as extended self-defence by other nations. Norwegian 
criminal law further deﬁnes necessity as a ground for justiﬁcation – and not only 
7 ICCPR, art. 4. It is a controversial question whether a state can derogate from human 
rights obligations extraterritorially. I leave this discussion here.
8 ECHR art. 15, second paragraph. The same is not explicitly said in ICCPR, but lawful 
acts of war are not normally considered to breach the right to life in this context either. 
9 ECHR article 2 (2). 
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an excuse – leaving the act not only free from criminal responsibility, but making 
it lawful, and hence not possible to respond to with an act of self-defence. 
Moving now from these examples of law enforcement to the fourth box 
above, namely situations where armed force is being used. 
ARMED FORCE 
As stated in the box, the applicable set of rules is primarily the international 
humanitarian law (the law of armed conﬂict). The situations will (normally) oc-
cur in an armed conﬂict. One of the major differences from the law enforcement 
situations when it comes to applicable law is the threshold for the protection of 
life. As referred to in the above section, the right to life as a human rights guar-
antee allows deaths “resulting from lawful acts of war”. This implies that use of 
force is not limited to the “minimum use of force” standard as in situations of 
self defence, arrest, detention and riot control. It is permissible to use directed, 
deadly force where the aim of the force is to kill the opponent. Another differ-
ence is that the overall aim of the use of force is solely to kill or inﬂict physical 
harm. It is not being used to bring someone to trial for an alleged crime. Inter-
national law places restrictions on the methods and means used in armed con-
ﬂict and one of its primary goals is to minimise the human suffering to what is 
strictly necessary if military objectives are to be achieved. In this regard it is not 
considered strictly necessary to direct military operations at civilians; we uphold 
a principle of distinction. 
So far we can distinguish fairly easily between the situations – peace or 
armed conﬂict – and the applicable law – primarily human rights standards or 
primarily humanitarian law standards. But there may be situations in which it 
may be argued that both sets of rules are applicable. Those are the cases I have 
labelled “combined force”, and placed in the box in the middle in ﬁgure 5.1.    
“COMBINED FORCE”
The “combined force” situations are situations where both armed force and 
law enforcement measures may be argued to be applicable. There may be situ-
ations which have escalated beyond the control of the local police. There may 
be situations where the army is expected to provide for security in an area and 
encounters crowds of people, and there may be situations where the army is to 
control certain areas and administer road controls. There may, in other words, 
be situations where the initial situation does not correspond to either regular 
law enforcement or the “regular” use of armed force in an armed conﬂict situ-
ation. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the operations are aimed at regulat-
ing situations like this, and will serve as a guideline; but as emphasised above, 
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the different national conceptions may lead to different national reservations in 
cases like those mentioned. 
There is one further question, and this applies more in the speciﬁc con-
text of the comprehensive approach – in particular in Afghanistan – and that 
is whether the “box in the middle” is increasing, or put differently, whether it 
reﬂects the “normal standard”. When the challenges require a comprehensive 
approach in a coherent manner, where – as is the case in Afghanistan – drugs 
ﬁnance weapons, will the initial position require physically close coordination 
between law enforcement and use of military force, rather than the means de-
scribed in the boxes on either side?
I can only presume that the answer is “yes”, so let us assume so. We may 
characterise such a situation as both a trend towards military repression of 
crimes and, at the same time, the other side of the coin – towards the increased 
“civilianisation” of the armed forces. What then is the consequence? One obvi-
ous consequence is the need for an even more coherent approach to the applica-
tion of rules. We can identify a need to deﬁne the aim of the particular operation 
concerned. Is it a person wanted for negotiation, for trial or wanted dead? One 
must identify the desired effect, in synchronisation with political (diplomatic), 
humanitarian and economic means. Is this done best when the national troop 
contribution is provided under a holistic or an atomistic approach? I will ad-
dress this issue on the basis of what has been presented so far. 
Holistic versus atomistic approach
Under a holistic approach the military forces are deployed in national coordi-
nation with the civilian components. The atomistic approach has the military 
forces deployed in multinational coordination with the civilian components 
– not nationally. Today, Norway contributes in a manner that may be described 
as akin to the holistic approach, as in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
in Afghanistan. The PRTs are primarily nationally run in close cooperation with 
the Afghan authorities and international organisations. The structures of the 
PRTs differ in the different regions in Afghanistan. The Norwegian ofﬁcial web 
page enumerates their tasks: to support the elected central government in Kabul, 
the national Afghan army (ANA) and the national Afghan police (ANP), and to 
assist these in the development work in the provinces. The PRT is therefore an 
important institution in the work of disarming illegal armed groups, identify-
ing elements of the narcotics trade and contributing to reducing the power of 
regional warlords. The civil element in the Norwegian-led PRT consists of po-
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litical advisors, police and development advisors whose main task is to support 
democracy and the development of society within their respective ﬁelds.10 
These tasks may be compared with the illustration in the foregoing sec-
tion, where synchronisation issues must be identiﬁed according to the goal of 
the operation, whether it is negotiation, trial or destruction. Let us ﬁrst state 
the obvious: Norwegian armed forces cooperate with Norwegian police, who in 
turn assist the local police. The Norwegian national framework for cooperation 
between army and police is already legally coherent to a degree which is practi-
cable.11 This may work as follows: the Norwegian police assist and advise local 
police regarding the use of force and separation of powers between the army 
and the police during a search operation for illegal weapons; the local police ask 
for security support from the Norwegian army during the search operation. The 
Norwegian armed forces will (it is to be hoped) follow the same principles as 
those already advised by the Norwegian police. This is a step in the right direc-
tion towards legal coherence – and towards operational effectiveness. What is 
gained by this? The local police will receive advice which is already coherent, 
and the local population will have a chance to see what procedures are being 
followed during law enforcement (search operations), which again is one of the 
basic rule of law guarantees. 
Can this be done at the multinational level? In theory, yes, of course, and 
it would be the optimal situation, but there may be practical challenges regard-
ing the different legal conceptions of law enforcement methods and assistance 
from the armed forces, as mentioned in the previous section. Whether the armed 
forces are trained for, and authorised to, assist in riot control situations using 
“less lethal” gas weapons for crowd control purposes or not, differs from nation 
to nation. 
The advantage of coordinating the civil and military efforts at the mul-
tinational level rather than the national level is argued to be broader unity in 
the overall area of operations. One could say that NATO as an alliance should 
be able to demand that the application of force take place in a legally coherent 
manner in cooperation between civil actors in law enforcement assignments and 
armed forces either supporting the civil powers or conducting military opera-
tions themselves. On the other hand, NATO is (still) a military alliance and has 
10 Norwegian National Joint Headquarters, “De norske styrkene i Afghanistan” 
[Norwegian forces in Afghanistan], 4 February 2008 (Forsvarsnett [online 18 Mar 
2009]).
11 The Norwegian principle is laid down in the Constitution article 99, second 
paragraph, and Instructions on assistance from the Armed Forces to the police, 28 
February, no. 220, 2003. 
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no authority to instruct its civil counterparts. Nor does it have full command 
over its own military forces. This implies that troop-contributing nations, main-
taining full command, and transferring operational command, will always be 
able to deny requests for certain actions and the disposition of its own forces, 
even though the nation does not exercise instruction in operational matters. 
These mechanisms will always grant the contributing nation the possibility of 
controlling controversial conduct by its armed forces, including whether and 
how they take part in law enforcement assignments as illustrated above – in 
particular apprehension, detention and riot control issues. 
In the PRT concept, which is regional and closely connected to peacetime 
functions of the host state, NATO forces ﬁnd themselves in the core environ-
ment where civil coordination issues should be exercised coherently. 
Let us assume that there are obvious advantages for the law enforcement 
functions from taking a holistic approach when the mission is to reconstruct or 
establish peacetime functions – as is the primary task of the PRTs. We may then 
ask how different regional holistic approaches will inﬂuence the reconstruction 
of a whole country. Again we may start with the obvious: creating little Norway, 
little Germany and little Italy in another country will hardly be perceived as a 
good way to achieve national unity, especially when the host state is already 
fragmented. So we do not want a holistic approach which leaves a national 
footprint so deep that the regional differences become ﬂagrant. This is not legal 
coherence and it is cited as a challenge by Norway’s Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, in a speech to Parliament on 5 February 2009. Mr Støre 
argues for a closer Nordic coordination of the efforts in Afghanistan.12 At the 
same time, legal coherence may not require total unity. In a state which is well 
functioning under the rule of law, some regional differences are acceptable. To 
put it another way: we accept legal pluralism, but not internal incoherence. But 
when we accept the pluralism we must also address the challenges. Synchronisa-
tion issues always need to be faced at a multinational level and it may be that 
one of the most crucial factors is shared legal awareness. National differences 
can hardly be avoided but they can be communicated and therefore taken into 
consideration during planning.   
The reﬂections above may not be valid for a multinational operation where 
the focus is less on state reconstruction and directed more towards “traditional” 
12 See Jonas Gahr Støre, “En samordnet plan for Norges bidrag til Afghanistan” [A 
coordinated plan for Norway’s contributions to Afghanistan], 5 February 2009 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [online 18 Mar 2009]).
833/2009 APPROACHING COMPREHENSIVENESS 
combat but, in any case, nor is the combat situation that which critically re-
quires the implementation of a comprehensive approach. 
Tentative conclusions
Certain conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing. Legal coherence, under-
stood as an internally well-ﬁtted legal framework, is assumed to be a common 
good and worth achieving when implementing a comprehensive approach in a 
multinational operation. Legal coherence is particularly demanding when the 
operation takes place in a situation marked by a primary need for law enforce-
ment to contribute towards establishing the rule of law and respect for funda-
mental human rights. Law enforcement is not primarily a military task, but the 
need for military assistance while combating serious crime is apparent. Law 
enforcement is a function of state power and is primarily exercised in peacetime 
situations. The situations in which directed lethal force is authorised arise solely 
in an armed conﬂict situation. During peacetime and in the conduct of law en-
forcement, the principle of minimum use of force is applied. The coordination 
between civil elements and military forces when it comes to supporting law 
enforcement tasks is marked by national limitations, which again will pose a 
challenge to the achievement of legal coherence. 
For the creation of legal coherence, nationally coordinated provision of 
forces in a holistic approach may work better than providing forces in an ato-
mistic approach when the operation requires substantial law enforcement sup-
port. The critical national differences regarding legal concepts are expected to 
show up particularly during detention and riot control operations, as well as 
in self-defence issues. National synchronisation may not be advantageous for 
humanitarian aid and other development projects, which may beneﬁt from, in 
the case of Afghanistan, closer UN coordination. This point of view has been 
taken from the Norwegian authorities and is not necessarily completely true of 
the creation of rule of law in support of law enforcement. In order to help meet 
a foreseeable need for the employment of force in support of law enforcement, 
thereby contributing to the establishment of rule of law standards and maximis-
ing operational effect, the procedures for separation of powers and principles of 
command between civil elements and the armed forces may beneﬁt from being 
synchronised nationally.

ETHICAL PREREQUISITES AND IMPLICATIONS
Nils Terje Lunde
Introduction
In this chapter I discuss choice of strategy from an ethical perspective. Often 
one thinks of the ethical perspective as a matter of implications. But this is just 
one part of the ethical perspective. The more fundamental question is about the 
ethical prerequisites for a chosen political/military strategy. Discussion of ethi-
cal prerequisites will give a necessary framework for understanding the ethical 
implications. On the other hand it is important to stress the practical role of 
ethics and ethical reasoning. It has to do with concrete choices in politics, as 
well as in the ﬁeld.  
The relationship between theory and practice can also be seen as a rela-
tionship between strategy and tactics. The principal question is here is in what 
way and to what degree strategic choices impact on tactical decisions. This is 
a general question which is beyond the scope of this chapter, The main focus 
is strategy, not tactics. This means that the major analysis will be of ad bellum 
rather than in bello. The line of distinction between these two is, however, not a 
precise one. It indicates that some in bello aspects, namely distinction and pro-
portionality, need to be discussed.
Applying an ethical perspective to choice of strategy is not self-evident. 
Some of the traditional models of choice analysis in political science regard the 
ethical perspective as irrelevant. Their theoretical framework is political realism 
in its various forms. If ethics is discussed at all, it may be understood largely as 
a question of rhetorical phrases, i.e. language used to legitimise hard political 
reality.1
Paradoxically, this line of reasoning can also be used from an ethical posi-
tion which in many ways is the opposite of political realism, namely paciﬁsm. 
In the context of this chapter it is not possible to discuss the different meta-
positions on the relationships between ethics and the use of military power. The 
question of the role of ethics compared to other factors is, however, of great 
importance and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
1 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd 
ed. (1st ed. 1977) (Basic Books, 1992), pp. 3–20.
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Choice of strategy is deﬁned as choice between two different approaches: 
holistic and atomistic. Fundamentally, of course, it necessary to ask whether 
the option is of signiﬁcant ethical interest. If one is to discuss the ethical merits 
of holism and atomism, one a priori accepts the use of Norwegian or other 
countries’ military forces in international operations. It has to be stated that the 
most fundamental ethical discussion about the modern use of military force is 
not about approach but rationale. In the context of this chapter it is important 
to mention this, even if it is not possible to discuss it more broadly. However, 
the question of rationale for military force is also relevant in a discussion of the 
different approaches. Is military power to be understood as an isolated instru-
ment or as a more or less integrated instrument in the service of (Norwegian) 
security, interests and values?2 The answer to this question may involve choosing 
between a holistic approach and an atomistic approach.
The need for legitimacy 
Max Weber deﬁned legitimacy as a necessary prerequisite for any exercise of 
power.3 He also said that the monopoly on violence is a prerequisite of the 
modern state.4 In this deﬁnition the question of legitimacy may be regarded as 
fundamental, and actualised in all use of military force. This is also a basis for 
the discussion of choice of strategy. It is also a paradigm for a discussion of re-
lationships between ethics and other normative factors. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the legitimacy of using military power has 
been an important topic in Norway. This is reﬂected in political statements and 
military doctrines as well as public debates. The reason for this resurgence in 
interest is the fundamentally changing security situation, with new conﬂicts and 
a new role for the use of Norwegian military power.
During the Cold War, the security conditions, from a Norwegian perspec-
tive, were relatively stable. The rationale for using the Norwegian military pow-
er was territorial defence against invaders. Since the Cold War, this has changed 
dramatically. General Werner Christie, one of the heroes of WWII, who rose 
later to the rank of commander in the Royal Norwegian Air Force during the 
Cold War, puts it this way:
2 The triad “security, interests and values” is the term used in NOU 2007: 15 and again 
in Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser 
og verdier” [A Defence for the protection of Norway’s security, interests and values], 
Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008).
3 M. Weber, Makt og byråkrati [Power and bureaucracy], ed. Egil Fivelsdal (Oslo: 
Gyldendal, 1995) p. 87.
4 Ibid., p. 4.
873/2009 APPROACHING COMPREHENSIVENESS 
When the Norwegian Armed Forces were merely a national defence against in-
vasion; the task was clear. It was not necessary to debate ethics when the invader 
stood on the threshold of our border. Now it is different. We are participating in 
international “peace operations”. We have become crusaders, ﬁghting for ideas. 
… Now is the time for a serious moral debate … in order to prepare ourselves 
for the new challenges.5
What Werner Christie says in short is that the new rationale and role of Norwe-
gian military power is in need of a new deﬁnition of legitimacy. The legitimacy 
of territorial defence is self-evident. It follows directly from Weber’s deﬁnition 
of the state. The principle of a nation’s right to self-defence is fundamental in 
international politics and law. The other side of the coin is prohibition against 
intervention in another state, i.e. another state’s internal affairs. The question, 
however, is what is meant by “internal affairs”. It is also a question of the re-
sponsibility of a single state, or a group of states, in relation to international 
organisations such as the UN and NATO. 
The Norwegian debate on military legitimacy – and Kosovo 
The questions about the deﬁnition of internal affairs and the role of states in re-
lation to international organisations both featured prominently in the public de-
bates in Norway during the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99. In a broader sense, they 
also actualised the question of legitimacy and the new use of military power. 
The military campaign lasted from 24 March to 10 June 1999. It was part 
of what is known as the “Kosovo conﬂict”. The Norwegian contribution to 
“Allied Force”, which the NATO operation against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was called, comprised six F-16 combat aircraft and a total of 210 
men deployed as part of NATO’s Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF).6 My reason 
for using this particular example is not to give an ethical evaluation of the opera-
tion itself, or pursue an ethical discussion of the conﬂict, but rather to examine 
the Norwegian debate and some of very important issues it raised regarding the 
legitimacy of military power.
Although the Norwegian contribution was a part of an already established 
IRF, it was hotly contested nonetheless. There was no public consensus about 
the contribution, and while that was primarily a political challenge, it was also 
a military one. The deployed troops had families and were very much part of 
5 W. Christie, “Om etikk og moral” [About ethics and morality], Heimevernsbladet, no. 
10, oktober (1998): 3. Author’s translation.
6 T. Kristoffersen, Samarbeid og sikkerhet i Europa [Cooperation and security in 
Europe] (Oslo: Folk og Forsvar, 2002), pp. 316–319.
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their local communities. Norwegian military culture has traditionally enjoyed 
very strong ties with civil society. There has also been strong popular and politi-
cal consensus about the use of military power. This follows from the traditional 
use of the armed forces in defence of Norwegian territory and for the country’s 
survival. A war fought for these reasons will naturally gain more support from 
the public than a war for political interests. From one point of view one could 
say that the new use of Norwegian forces should not need broad public support. 
This follows from the transition from a war of existence to the use of military 
force as a political instrument. From another point of view, however, the mat-
ter is more complicated. In a modern democratic and open society, where the 
presence of the media on the battleﬁeld ensures operational transparency, public 
opinion will inevitably play a fundamental role.     
Another issue was whether the Norwegian contribution was ﬁelded for 
political reasons, or stemmed from more humanitarian intentions. It was a ques-
tion about the deﬁnition of “intention”. Another deﬁnitional question was more 
formal: was this a war or not? The then Norwegian Prime Minister stated that it 
was not war, but a limited military operation.7 Others said the distinction was 
irrelevant: the important point was the reality. 
One aspect of that reality was the absence of a formal UN Security Council 
endorsement of the operation. This actualised the complex relations between 
politics and international law, but also the role of moral perspective in relation 
to politics and international law, in short, the question of legitimacy. What, one 
asked, legitimises the use of military power in international operations?
The principle of legitimacy
The debates in Norway over the handling of the Kosovo crisis could also be seen 
as a public discourse on legitimacy. The same could be said in relation to the 
war on terror in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Norwegian forces were 
committed to Afghanistan, but without a political consensus in Norway. When 
Norwegian participation in an invasion of Iraq became an issue, the political 
conclusion this time was that Norway did not wish to participate. 
The new international situation created fresh dilemmas for the use of Nor-
wegian forces abroad, demonstrating once again the need for a clearer deﬁni-
tion of legitimacy. According to a Government white paper, Norwegian military 
7 Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik to the newspaper Aftenposten 25 March 1999. 
Later, Bondevik admitted that he should rather have called it a war, K. M. Bondevik, 
“Tale til Forsvarets fellesoperative hovedkvarter, Jåttå” [Speech to National Joint 
Headquarters, Jåttå], Stavanger, 2 September 2003 (Regjeringen [online 23Mar 
2009]).
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power may only be used for legitimate purposes. Legitimacy is said there to have 
legal, ethical and political aspect. Political legitimacy is not necessarily the same 
as ethical or legal legitimacy – and vice versa. The conclusion is that Norwegian 
armed forces may only be used for legitimate ethical, political and legal reasons, 
though the Government also says that weak legal legitimacy may be offset by 
strong political and ethical legitimacy. The correlation is illustrated in the fol-
lowing model.8
We often think of relations between ethics, law and politics as linear and deduc-
tive. In other words, we expect ethical norms can be translated into rules and 
regulations and provide a legal framework for policy making. Use of military 
force under this model is a function of politics, cf. the Clausewitzian view of war 
as the continuation of politics by other means. 
In reality, things are more complicated. The law, and this includes interna-
tional law, is not just a framework within which politics takes place. It itself is 
created by political decisions. Political realities inform the interpretation and im-
8 Originally developed in N. T. Lunde, “Krigens legitimitet” in Militæretikk [Military 
ethics], N. T. Lunde and B. Mæland (Trondheim: Tapir akademisk forlag, 2006), p. 
77.
Figure 6.1: Trinity of legitimacy
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plementation of the law. From this two distinctions can be drawn, one between 
the more static nature of laws and the dynamic nature of politics and another 
between idea and reality. Ethics is, to a certain degree, about ideas, but ideas 
tempered by reality or, more correctly, perceptions of reality. Changing legal and 
political realities are likely to impact on how ethical norms are understood and 
interpreted.     
Just war theory as a framework for analysis
In the Norwegian debate about Iraq in 2003, the theory of just war was actu-
alised as a framework for an ethical analysis of the use of Norwegian military 
power. The then Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, himself a theologian 
schooled in the classical theory of a just war, used just war criteria in the gov-
ernmental discussion of whether Norway should take part in the invasion of 
Iraq or not.9 The just war as a normative framework for the ethical evaluation 
of military power is also cited in Strategic concept for Norwegian Defence, given 
by Ministry of Defence in 2004.10  
In this chapter is it neither possible nor necessary to relate the full history 
and theory of just war. Just war is a broad normative tradition within our cul-
ture, though it is more of a tradition than complete theory. It has accrued over 
a period of 2,500 years, and forms part of the very roots of our cultural history 
and as such is closely linked to our historical, cultural, religious, social and po-
litical development.11
Just war theory posits certain ethical criteria for waging war at all (ad 
bellum) and for how war is waged in the ﬁeld (in bello). The two sets of cri-
teria can be complemented by other sets related to the overall political picture 
(ad pacem), the international legal and political structure preventing war (ante 
bellum) and the normalisation of society after war (post bellum).12 Against a 
choice-of-strategy background, the main focus of this chapter will be on ad bel-
lum, though I shall also deal to a certain degree with in bello. 
9 Bondevik, “Tale til Forsvarets fellesoperative hovedkvarter”. See also N. T. Lunde,           
Norm og situasjon: En drøfting av kirkelig krig/fred-debatt i Norge 1945–2003 [Norm 
and situation. A discussion of ecclesiastical war/peace debate in Norway 1945–2003]         
(PhD diss, Lutheran School of Theology, 2007), p. 293f.
10 Norwegian Ministry of Defence,    Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for 
Forsvaret [Force and relevance. Strategic concept for the Norwegian Defence] (Oslo:       
Regjeringen, 2004), p. 52.
11 J. T. Johnson, Can Modern War be Just? (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1984), p. 6f.
12 Lunde, Norm og situasjon … pp. 227–233.
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With regard to just war as a broad tradition there are no standard criteria, 
but one possible list could be that proposed by James Turner Johnson.13  
Jus ad bellum Jus in bello
(whether resort to force is justiﬁed) (wheter a particular form of force is 
justiﬁed)
Just cause
Right authority
Right intent
Proportionality (in the sense of total good 
and evil anticipated)
Peace as an end
Last resort
Proportionality (in the sense of proximate 
good over evil)
Discrimination, or non-combatant 
protection
Even more elaborate lists could be made.14 I shall however use these criteria to 
frame my ethical analysis of the choice between a holistic and atomistic strategy. 
This is not to suggest that all of the criteria are relevant in this analysis, and in 
the following I will concentrate on those criteria which may be regarded as being 
most relevant in this context.
Just cause 
The formal deﬁnition of the criterion of just cause is that use of military power 
needs a just cause in order to be legitimate. The material deﬁnition of the criteri-
on may, however, vary. In its narrowest form, just cause is deﬁned as self-defence 
against military attack by another state. On this interpretation, international 
operations are illegitimate in nature, and the distinction between atomism and 
holism is irrelevant. 
This narrow interpretation is not, however, the main normative position. 
Even if self-defence is regarded as the main example of a just cause, a wider 
interpretation of “self-defence” and “military attack” can legitimately be made. 
13 Johnson, Can Modern War be Just? …, p. 18.
14 J. H. Yoder, When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1996), p. 154ff.
Figure 6.2: Just war criteria
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While Norway has traditionally favoured the narrow interpretation of just 
cause, in the post-Cold War period, the rationale for using military force as an 
instrument of territorial defence was replaced by the need to achieve security 
policy ends. This fresh outlook is evidenced in a 2008 Government white paper 
where the purpose of military action is deﬁned in terms Norwegian security, val-
ues and interests.15 This trinity actualises the question of just cause. It is indeed 
open to different interpretations, and one may ask whether this, as a framework 
for just cause, is too broad. And are security, values and interest compatible 
factors or not? 
The answers will clearly affect the choice of approach. If one deﬁnes just 
cause narrowly with the emphasis on theoretical and practical differences be-
tween factors relating to security, values and interests, the atomistic approach 
would appear to be the more straightforward and “tidier”. On the other hand, 
if just cause is deﬁned broadly and dynamically, stressing the compatibility of 
security, values and interests, the holistic approach would seem more to the 
point and comprehensive.
Right authority 
The criterion of right authority is, in its formal deﬁnition, about competence 
in the exercise of power, including authorisation of the use of military power, 
command and control over military forces. It is called competence de guerre. In 
its material deﬁnition it has traditionally been understood as a function of the 
magisterial power of the state. It follows directly from the principle of sover-
eignty, elaborated in a territorial monopoly of violence and the prohibition of 
intervention. On the other hand, this traditional interpretation is rather out of 
step with the legal and political developments in international relations. The role 
and function of the state become relative as a result of an international system of 
security, a legal framework modifying the rights of the individual state, and of 
course the political realism on which international relations are based.
The question of right authority will consequentially actualise the nature of 
relations between domestic and international levels. Where does responsibility 
lie for the use, function and broader political goals of military participation in 
international operations? On the one hand, an atomistic approach will give the 
state command and control over its military forces in international operations 
15 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser 
og verdier” [A Defence for the protection of Norway’s security, interests and values], 
Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008).
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but weaken its control over the broader political function of these forces in thea-
tre. This will be decided outside the state. 
Adopting the holistic approach would give the state authority over a more 
elaborate and complex spectrum of means. But it could weaken the necessary 
focus on the military forces as other means become more important and in turn 
weaken the proper authority over military forces. One could also ask whether it 
is legitimate, or even possible, for a magisterial power to exercise the necessary 
and proper authority over such a spectrum of means. With regard to the crite-
rion of right authority, the integration of different means in a holistic way would 
imply using the same standards and criteria regarding command and control of 
military means over the other means within the chosen spectrum. This may be 
possible, but will of course lead to new dilemmas and challenges. 
This indicates further how the issue of right authority is not limited to 
discussions about relations between the international and domestic authority. It 
is also about challenges at home. In its general form it is about establishing and 
developing authority in a modern democratic state. If one presupposes a certain 
degree of public support as being necessary for international operations, the 
question will be which of the approaches would likely result in most public sup-
port. This cannot be answered a priori. What one can say is that holism requires 
broader public support, and has a better chance of obtaining it than atomism. 
The latter is more limited in scope and will consequentially neither require, nor 
gain, the same positive interest from the public. 
On the other hand, an atomistic approach could be more susceptible to 
criticism given the nature of the means and the fact that it would be the only 
Norwegian contribution in the theatre. Within the framework of a holistic ap-
proach, the various means deployed will attract both positive and negative reac-
tions. The failure of one could weaken the legitimacy of the others, with possible 
negative fallout for the military forces. And were the military forces to fail, it 
could undermine the legitimacy of the humanitarian means.   
Proportionality (ad bellum)
The formal deﬁnition of proportionality as an ad bellum criterion is that use 
of military power has to be proportional in the sense of the total good and evil 
anticipated.16 The thinking behind the idea of proportionality is that the use of 
military means is not without costs – even if the cause is just and the goal achiev-
able. In other words, it requires a cost/beneﬁt analysis. Such an analysis is, of 
course, both complex and difﬁcult. 
16 Johnson, Can Modern War be Just? …, p. 18.
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Firstly there is the difﬁculty of evaluating proportionality between goals 
and means − if goals and means can be compared. A further difﬁculty follows 
from the nature of the use of military means. It is not mathematics, but rather a 
complex interplay of forces. Then there is the difﬁculty of proportionality in the 
ad bellum sense being a predicted evaluation, not a concrete evaluation of a suc-
cessful operation. Whether the goal in fact is achievable is, in this respect, more 
a question of faith than science. Notwithstanding these reservations concerning 
the possibility of a proper evaluation of proportionality, I will try to indicate 
some relevant differences between approaches in the light of this criterion.
Choosing an atomistic approach brings the classical problems of propor-
tionality to the fore. The question will be whether the approach is proportionate 
to the desired goals. The conclusion depends, moreover, on how one deﬁnes the 
goals. It is in fact a variation of the wider discussion on whether of military force 
can solve problems. If the problems are military in nature, the proportionality 
requirement may theoretically be fulﬁlled. If the problems are primarily politi-
cal, economic or social in character, one may question whether military power 
alone is the right answer. 
This actualises the holistic approach. One may say that, compared with an 
atomistic approach, a holistic approach is by deﬁnition better designed to solve 
the many challenges of which the military factor is just one. On the other hand, 
it can be said that an atomistic approach does in no way mean that military 
force is the sole means deployed in theatre. It would be the only Norwegian con-
tribution, but there would be a comprehensive approach internationally, which 
of course would include non-military means. The difference is about the Norwe-
gian perspective, not the operation in itself.
This perspective, in turn, actualises the relationship between the domestic 
and international levels. At the domestic level, proportionality can be deﬁned 
and evaluated differently than at the international level. This may reﬂect real dif-
ferences in interpretation of the situation in theatre, but it may also be the result 
of different interests. Choice of the strategy may depend more on domestic and 
international interests, than an evaluation of proportionality in theatre.       
Last resort
One of the most important criteria in this discussion is last resort. In ethical 
terms, military power traditionally has been understood as last resort, i.e. when 
all peaceful means have been exhausted. In the Clausewitzian deﬁnition of war 
as a continuation of politics by other means, the traditional focus has been on 
the term other means. In this context military means are deﬁnitionally different 
from other means. Military means are used in situations where peaceful means 
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have been tried without success. Last resort would therefore suggest an atomis-
tic approach. 
But we could also interpret the Clausewitzian deﬁnition by accentuating 
continuation ... by. Military power would then be regarded as an integrated 
instrument of policy. The criterion of last resort could also be interpreted in ac-
cordance with this. This follows from the original Latin deﬁnition of criterion 
as ultima ratio. Military force may be the most powerful means, but it is not 
necessarily the ﬁnal means. It can also be integrated with other means. A holistic 
approach is, one could say, based on the more integrated and dynamic interpre-
tation of this criterion.
Right intent and Peace as an end
The just war criteria listed above include right intent and peace as an end. They 
are listed as two separate criteria. However, the traditional material deﬁnition 
of right intent is peace. The right intent of the use of military power is to de-
fend, re-establish or establish peace. Consequently these two criteria should be 
considered together. The combined criterion is, in the language of ethics, tele-
ological. A teleological perspective may deﬁne the overall goal (telos) of the use 
of military power. 
In this way it actualises questions regarding the relationship between means 
and goals, as already discussed in the context of proportionality. The question 
here is the overall goal,  i.e. peace, is more likely to be achieved atomistically 
or holistically. Do the different approaches make much of a difference in this 
regard? If they are understood as alternative options,  i.e. between a military op-
eration in theatre or a combined military and civil operation, this would clearly 
be important. But this is not the question being considered here. Here the focus 
is rather on the Norwegian perspective and the Norwegian strategy.
This actualises the other possible deﬁnition of right intent, which is about 
motivation. This is also a teleological perspective, but not in the sense of overall 
goal. Here it is a more virtue-oriented perspective, concerning the motivation 
of the actors. Motivation can be an individual’s (and in this respect a part of in 
bello) or a collective’s. Under this interpretation the criterion is relevant.   
Ethically and critically, we have to question the motives for adopting ei-
ther of the two approaches. What is the reason for choosing one of them? Is it 
a result of an analysis of the challenges in the theatre or of national interests? 
The pursuit of the national interest is of course a legitimate aspiration, but it 
is still necessary to distinguish between national interests and challenges in the 
theatre.  
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Proportionality (in bello) and discrimination
The two in bello criteria, proportionality and discrimination, are here analysed 
together. Proportionality in the context of in bello means the concrete propor-
tionality of military force in the theatre. In this sense it is an ethical translation 
of the military principle of economy of forces where the underlying logic of 
proportionality ad bellum is the same as in bello. I discussed the logic earlier in 
this chapter and will therefore not pursue the matter further. 
I want instead to examine the other criterion in bello, namely discrimina-
tion or distinction. In its formal deﬁnition, it requires a distinction to be drawn 
between legal and illegal subjects and objects in war. Only military subjects 
and objects may lawfully be targeted by military means. The ethical point of 
this distinction, from a deontological perspective (duty ethics), is that attacks 
on persons or objects have to be legitimised in order to be ethically acceptable. 
From a utilitarian perspective the distinction is a way of minimising the negative 
consequences of warfare to what is militarily necessary. In this respect it is the 
ethical translation of the principle of military necessity. 
From a general perspective of modern warfare, the criterion of discrimina-
tion is problematic. The classical challenge is total war, where society is seen as 
participating in the war effort. This, however, is not the challenge in internation-
al operations, deﬁned here as limited operations. The criterion of discrimination 
faces other problems as well, as conventional warfare,  i.e. war between states, 
gives way to violence perpetrated by intra-national paramilitary groups whose 
methods we regard as illegal and illegitimate. These are general trends which, in 
themselves, do not favour one of the approaches above the other. 
There is however a signiﬁcant difference between them as far as discrimi-
nation is concerned. Atomism, from a national perspective, makes it easier to 
satisfy the discrimination clause in practice. If the Norwegian contribution to 
the theatre consists of military forces alone, it would be easier to draw a line 
between military and non-military targets. The rules of engagement will be an 
operational realisation of this distinction. Under a holistic approach, however, 
the Norwegian contribution would consist of military and civil elements, each 
with a different status in international law. At the same time, they can be seen 
as integrated parts of a wider package, working towards a common goal. This 
integration or mixture of different elements could make it harder to distinguish 
theoretically and practically between military and civilian elements in the theatre 
which would probably weaken the position of the military and, more especially, 
the civilian element such as humanitarian organisations in the area. It could also 
make it harder to achieve the overall goals of the operation. 
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Tentative conclusions 
Ethically, the choice of a holistic or atomistic strategy has to be seen within a 
broader framework This including not only practical implications but funda-
mental factors. One of the most important factors in international operations 
is legitimacy. The legitimacy of international operations, and thus of choice of 
approach, is not given. Legitimacy may be seen as a correlation of three factors: 
ethics, politics and law. 
Legitimacy may in turn be operationally realised in terms of ethical criteria. 
The criteria of the just war tradition could be a relevant language and starting 
point for this realisation. The criteria will not just serve as a general guide, but 
be of use in the concrete analysis and comparison of the two strategies. As the 
analysis has shown, most of the traditional criteria are also relevant to a discus-
sion of this speciﬁc question. 
Having said that, however, it is not possible to draw entirely clear and 
unambiguous conclusions and recommend one strategy clearly above the other. 
Across all of the criteria discussed, each strategy has its share of pros and cons. 
This is due partly to the several possible interpretations of the criteria them-
selves, and indeed of the strategies. A third point is that this analysis is a theo-
retical exercise; it has not drawn on practice or experience. In other words, it is 
a discussion a priori, not a posterior, and in that sense, a limited perspective. 
But the absence of clear and unambiguous directions from the just war 
criteria is not necessarily a fundamental problem. It follows from the underlying 
logic of the just war tradition itself that ethical conclusions cannot be deduced 
from theory alone, but require a correlation between theory and practice, be-
tween norm and situation and between strategy and tactic. 
Notwithstanding this defence of impartiality and relativism, I would put 
forward a possible conclusion, or rather a hypothesis, for further discussion. 
Although holism is dynamic and comprehensive, it nevertheless courts relatively 
difﬁcult ethical problems. In a choice between holism and atomism, the latter, 
despite its disadvantages, may be the preferable option. 

THE MEDIA ASPECT OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY 
OPERATIONS
Dag Rist Aamoth
The relevance of the media
“Write, act and tell the most compelling story.” 1 This will be the key to success 
in today’s military operations, at least according to retired general Sir Rupert 
Smith. In his book, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, 
he introduces a new paradigm of warfare that he calls “war amongst the peo-
ple”.2 Sir Rupert challenges the traditional Western approach to war and points 
out that the use of military force seldom leads to the achievement of the de-
sired political end state. A more subtle approach is needed, a comprehensive ap-
proach, which encompasses more than brute military force alone. Information 
is one of the aspects that needs to be incorporated into the plan, as alluded to in 
the general’s statement. 
The importance of information is apparent to today’s military command-
ers. After all, the introduction of the microchip and satellite technology to mili-
tary operations led to what many analysts refer to as an information revolution 
in military affairs.3 This technological development has enabled Western forces 
to enjoy a degree of information superiority on the battleﬁeld making them su-
perior to any other conventional military adversary. A point well demonstrated 
by the US-led coalitions in the 1991 Gulf War as well as in the initial phase of 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, technological superiority within the in-
formation ﬁeld has not made it easier for the West to “tell the most compelling 
story”. Richard Holbrooke makes this point as he ponders al-Qaeda’s ability 
to utilise information: “How can a man in a cave outcommunicate the world’s 
leading communications society?” 4 One part of the answer is that communica-
tion technology is available to the consumer worldwide. Internet and mobile 
phones are as readily available for members of al-Qaeda as for the US military. 
1 H. Høiback, “Den beste historien” [The most compelling story] (Forsvarsnett [online 
19 Mar 2009]).
2 R. Smith, The Utility of Force (England: Penguin Books Ltd., 2006).
3 See for instance N. Davis, “An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs”, 
Strategic Review, vol. 24, no. 1 (1996): 43–53.
4 US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9-11 
Commission Report (US Government [online 19 Mar 2009]).
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This partly evens out the technology gap. Still, the most important reason is 
probably in the realm of storytelling. In Western military terms this is covered 
by information operations and public affairs or media operations. Information 
operations (Info Ops) are in NATO deﬁned as
a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information 
activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capa-
bility of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in 
support of Alliance mission objectives. 5
These types of operations are by deﬁnition directed against an enemy. They are 
also partly kinetic, and the information used might be in the form of psychologi-
cal operations that aim to deceive and deter the enemy. The effect is often limited 
to a small group of personnel and will be short-lived in those cases where the 
information used does not reﬂect reality. 
The somewhat clandestine nature of information operations makes it a 
priority for Western armed forces to separate them from media operations. The 
theory behind this is to try to safeguard the credibility of the armed forces by 
having an ofﬁcial staff as a “spokes apparatus” which is supposed to serve the 
media and the public with trustworthy information.6 The purpose of this arti-
cle is not to discuss the problems of separating these disciplines; rather it is to 
discuss how the armed forces should approach Sir Rupert Smith’s challenge of 
telling the best story. As the purpose of the operation is to change a set of condi-
tions permanently into a desired end state, the story needs to have a long-lasting 
effect. As such, it needs to leave a credible impression and stand up to the scru-
tiny of the press and the different audiences. The main focus will therefore be on 
media operations. Media operations are directed at both decision makers and 
populations, both at home, in theatre and internationally. All of these audiences 
might need to be “compelled” to achieve the military objective and the political 
end state. Further, the message demands coherence between the writing, acting 
and telling. This means that the information being given represents the reality 
to a high degree. This rules out information operations. The problem the com-
mander is left with is how to approach the media to make sure his story reaches 
the target audiences in a credible and compelling way. 
This chapter will review the problem of media−military relations. As the 
ﬁnal outcome is to advise on how Norway should structure its contributions in 
5 MC 422/3, 9 March 2007.
6 NATO Military Public Affairs Policy, (MC 0457/1), September 2007, p. 15.
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coalition warfare, the discussion will ultimately be brought down to the national 
level. While the general discussions will not be limited to Norwegian experi-
ences, the point of departure will in most cases be a Western one based on the 
assumption that Norway shares most of its challenges, within the ﬁeld of media 
operations as elsewhere, with its neighbours. The structure is intended ﬁrstly to 
underpin the relevance of the media by looking at a theoretical model of how the 
media impact on military operations. Secondly, to investigate some recent media 
trends and discuss their likely impact on today’s military operations. Thirdly, to 
discuss how the commander needs to approach the media today. The ﬁnal dis-
cussion will then revolve around the ﬁndings and priorities of these three parts 
as it attempts to conclude whether the atomistic or holistic approach enables the 
commander to tell the most compelling story. 
The underlying thesis which this article attempts to demonstrate is that me-
dia operations are gaining importance in today’s conﬂicts; they are more com-
plex and pose more challenges for the commander than was formerly the case. 
Concerning Norway’s approach to contemporary military operations, it appears 
that national beneﬁts of the holistic approach might come at the cost of coalition 
disadvantage. 
A theoretical approach to the impact of the media
The introductory statement indicates Sir Rupert Smith’s view of the relevance 
of the media. To discuss how media operations can contribute to achievement 
of the military objective and the political end state, it is necessary to assess the 
impact of the media on military operations and how this impact can be ex-
plained. The Crimean campaign, 1848–52, is generally recognised as the ﬁrst 
war visited by the media and what we today refer to as war correspondents. The 
most inﬂuential contemporary correspondent was probably William Howard 
Russell, reporting for the London Times. His reports on the chaos and amateur-
ish conduct of the campaign by British forces are said to have brought down the 
British Government.7 Today, it is generally referred to as the CNN effect a term 
which gained currency after the 1991 Gulf War and is obviously not limited to 
the impact of the Cable News Network alone. Ken Livingston deﬁnes it as “The 
impact of new global real-time media on diplomacy and foreign policy.” 8 The 
idea is that the media can change a state’s foreign policy − or reveal the lack of a 
policy − by presenting stories in an emotive and sensational style. And if policy 
7 P. Young and P. Jesser, The Media and the Military (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 
p. 23.
8 B. Bahador, The CNN Effect in action (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 4.
102 OSLO FILES ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY
is changed as a result, the use of military force could be affected as well. The US 
involvement in Somalia in 1992 might be a typical example of media exposure 
effecting a change in foreign policy. Critics would argue that the link between 
critical media reports and government actions is too hard to document. The 
reports might even be a result of Government media policy leaking informa-
tion to support an impending decision. In his case study on the CNN effect and 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, Barak Bahador acknowledges these difﬁculties. 
Still, after a thorough examination of media reporting, political actions and the 
attitude of key political decision makers he is able to build up a solid argument 
that the media played a signiﬁcant role in the decision making process leading 
up to the war on Serbia. Bahador demonstrates how three Serbian massacres, 
carried out over the period 1 January 1998 to 11 March 1999, caused eight per 
cent of the total deaths and three per cent of the destruction of villages in Kos-
ovo. This meagre foundation gave rise to 48 per cent of the media coverage, and 
was linked directly to 38 per cent of Government actions, among them being the 
NATO activation order.9 
A more theoretical approach to the media’s impact might consider some of 
Clausewitz’s thoughts on the conduct of war. He describes war as a paradoxical 
Trinity of the forces of Reason, Emotion and Skill.10 Disregarding the relation-
ship between these forces will lead to failure. The forces are exempliﬁed or rep-
resented by the state as the reason, the people as the emotion and the army and 
the commander as the skill. Retired colonel Harry G. Summers applies the trin-
ity to his analysis of the US failure in Vietnam. After assessing the Vietnam War 
through the tri-focal lens of the trinity, it seems clear that the war effort had to 
fail. First of all the rationale for US involvement in Indochina was unclear. There 
were more than twenty different rationales for US involvement in the area.11 
And the public were not appraised of the war effort because President Johnson 
wanted to focus on his ambitious national societal programmes. The negative 
political aims of avoiding open conﬂict with the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China led to an untenable mission for the military forces allied to 
political micromanagement of the military campaign. On the battleﬁeld the US 
military was tactically superior, but were unable to translate their successes into 
the desired political end state. They claimed political interference as the rea-
son for their lack of success. The American people initially supported Johnson’s 
policy in Vietnam, until at least the Tet offensive of 1968. At which point they 
9 Ibid.
10 C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and transl. by M. Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press 1976).
11 H. G. Summers Jr, On Strategy (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 98.
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realised that their government’s claims to be winning the war did not hold true. 
Through massive demonstrations the people made their point of view apparent; 
Johnson did not stand for re-election and Nixon became president on a pro-
gramme promising to get the US out of Vietnam. In 1975 South Vietnam fell to 
the armies of the communist North. In the aftermath the US has been plagued 
by the so-called Vietnam syndrome. It has shaped US society and US security 
policy for decades. The interesting point is the signiﬁcant role played by the 
media in this process. The US military blamed the media for losing the Vietnam 
War for it by setting the minds of the American people against the troops serv-
ing in Vietnam. The reporting that took place in the wake of the Tet offensive 
was biased, and it portrayed the US forces and US policy with a negative slant. 
However, this was partly a result of a less than forthcoming approach to the 
media by the armed forces who used censorship and widespread restrictions on 
accessibility to control the media’s output. The paradox is that the Tet offensive 
was another tactical triumph for the US military in that the offensive broke the 
back of the Viet Cong, allowing the South to gain some level of control over its 
territory. Nevertheless, the negative reporting must have had an effect on the US 
population and contributed to the decision to pull US forces out; but to blame 
the media entirely would be to overlook the most important fact, namely the 
gross lack of agreement on the war between the people, the president and the 
armed forces. In popular terms, the trinity was not in balance and the media 
simply pointed this out.
The Vietnam case demonstrates the obvious. The media derives its ability 
to inﬂuence opinion by publicising information on events throughout the trinity. 
This information will add to the foundation on which each actor bases its deci-
sions. An ever present media would make it very hard for the state, or the mili-
tary, to exert leverage by controlling the ﬂow of information. Since information 
is power, the media are a powerful actor in society. As long as the media publi-
cise timely and unbiased information, they will in most cases support the func-
tioning of a democracy. Imagine the impact of a well functioning media during 
the First World War. Would the Europeans have accepted the war if they were 
better informed about its consequences? On the other hand, if the information 
is somehow manipulated, the media might hamper the democratic processes by 
creating a false foundation for decision making. In any case, the armed forces 
need to take the potential impact of media reporting into consideration. A well 
thought out media policy should help the commander to get his messages across, 
protect the operation and personnel, but at the same time satisfy the democratic 
need for transparency. 
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The media in today’s wars
So has the impact of the media changed in contemporary military operations? 
Technological innovations from the steam press to the Internet lie behind the 
media’s current ability to disseminate enormous amounts of information, vir-
tually in real time, across a variety of channels. The media reach more people 
all of the time. So, does it mean that the impact on the actors in the trinity is 
greater? It probably does. The argument against would be that people tire of 
being overwhelmed by information from news channels, commercials and the 
Internet. There is a limit to the amount of information one person can digest. 
On the other hand, people adapt and expect to be kept abreast of the most 
important developments in the news. The demand for information has led to a 
24-hour news industry, especially on the radio, TV and Internet. Demand also 
leads to competition between news agencies, which again fuels the constant bat-
tle to generate news more efﬁciently. Few media companies can today afford to 
have journalists specialise in military affairs alone. This, combined with sen-
sationalist headlines and images, makes it difﬁcult to get across more complex 
messages which demand insight and analysis. And as most Western media today 
are driven by proﬁt, news stories must be designed to titillate the desires of the 
spectator to keep him interested enough to buy tomorrow’s issue or watch the 
channel again later. Not quite the ideal one has of the media as the guardian of 
a transparent democratic society. Controversial framing and dramatisation in 
most cases sell better than subtle analysis. 
The media business has created media conglomerates like News Corpora-
tion and Time Warner whose annual revenues exceed the size of most national 
economies.12 They have the economic and information leverage to ensure con-
tinued ﬁnancial success. The fact that these companies are multinational further 
complicates the picture as the so-called new wars, to a greater degree than tra-
ditional wars, are fought over interests, not out of necessity. This challenges the 
will and interest of national media to fall in behind national goals, and posting 
encouraging stories about the nation’s troops in times of war. In the new wars, 
the media feel less constrained to support the national goal. During the initial 
phase of the Iraq War, US media were overwhelmingly supportive. In the UK, 
the media were split down the middle.13 This demonstrates what the commander 
can expect today, national and international media questioning the rationale of 
any military operation. 
12 See for instance Hoovers, “Fortune 500 companies” [online 19 Mar 2009] and CIA, 
“The 2008 World Factbook” [online 19 Mar 2009] referring to statistics.
13 S. Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds (Hurst & Company, London, 2006), p. 97.
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Just as the emergence of the media challenged the information monopoly 
enjoyed by the state, the information revolution has enabled bloggers, hackers 
and citizens with a camera cell phone to challenge the dominant position of 
the media. This is a challenge both for the editor as well as the commander. As 
events unfold the editor will receive vast amounts of information, but will strug-
gle to verify the sources. Less critical publishers will beat the media to the draw. 
The commander for his part will ﬁnd that every witness to the conduct of opera-
tions, even his own soldiers, has the capability to distribute information globally 
using simple means like Internet access and a pocket camera.
The conclusion is that more information will reach society from the bat-
tleﬁeld of the new wars than was formerly the case. It will travel more quickly, 
reach more people and might be presented with a lesser degree of understand-
ing of the context of the information. One factor to watch when assessing the 
impact of news reporting is the credibility of the media. People are well aware 
of certain media’s tendency to dramatise news and the commercial incentive 
is easily recognisable as news items are sandwiched between commercials. But 
does this mean the impact of negative reporting on a military operation will be 
softened by the readers’ scepticism with regard to the validity of the story? Will 
the CNN effect slowly disappear as the spectator grows more cynical about the 
information presented by the news media? 
Media operations today
From the Western point of view, contemporary military operations will be typi-
ﬁed by increased complexity. The complexity is mirrored by the multinational, 
multiagency approach to war combined with the attempt to cooperate with 
non-governmental organisations and private actors who are providing services 
within the military sphere. The ﬁghting itself is also complex since the tradi-
tional concept of military victory is not sufﬁcient to achieve the political end 
state. The superiority of Western military forces makes the protracted strategy 
the preferred choice for any likely enemy. Basically the enemy will use a combi-
nation of guerrilla and terrorist tactics. There is nothing new about this, counter 
insurgency wars have frequently been fought by former colonial powers like 
Great Britain and France as well as the superpowers, the US and Russia. What is 
new is perhaps the scale of the asymmetric attacks and the emergence of multi-
national, non-territorial terrorist networks like al-Qaeda which utilise the media 
and modern information technology to achieve their goals.
So how do the military handle the media side of these wars? Reviewing 
the military approach to media operations, two priorities have dominated the 
military−media relationship: operation security and public support. 
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The ﬁrst of these relates to the inherent scepticism military commanders 
have always had about revealing information which might be used to advantage 
by the enemy. The history of operation security deﬁnes the adversarial relation-
ship between the military and the media and is well formulated in the British 
Ministry of Defence’s guidelines to the media during the Falklands War: “The 
essence of successful warfare is secrecy; the essence of successful journalism is 
publicity.” 14
The priority of operation security has been balanced somewhat by the need 
to inform in order to ensure public support. This has traditionally been a low 
hanging fruit since most media will rally behind national goals in times of war; 
the Vietnam War being an exception to this rule. Historically, the use of censor-
ship and access control has further ensured that military forces are portrayed 
in a positive manner by the national press. Although a military priority, public 
support is the responsibility of the state, not the commander. The commander’s 
responsibility is rather to make sure that he operates according to the political 
ramiﬁcations and goals, and that he provides information on the conduct of 
operations and the rationale for the military part in the endeavour. The result 
for the armed forces can then be measured both in credibility, funding, recruit-
ment as well as the moral support and public backing which is so highly desired 
to bolster the will of the troops as they try to break the will of their opponent. 
Public support and a supportive media will be harder to get in today’s wars, be-
cause they are wars of choice, not survival. Young and Jesser describe how the 
social contract between a citizen and the state does not demand the same degree 
of loyalty as previously due to this fact.15 The same goes for the media. The lower 
degree of support might make it more difﬁcult to sustain the ﬁghting power of 
the troops and the state’s patience with the military option might be short lived. 
On the other hand, a war based on interests might neither interest the media nor 
the people if the political cost is low enough. 
In today’s wars a third priority becomes apparent. This is to achieve some 
level of acceptance by the local and regional population. Of course, this has been 
a prerequisite for the many peacekeeping operations under the UN ﬂag since the 
Second World War. Nevertheless, it seems that it has somehow been forced into 
the background by the imperatives of the Cold War, at least when it comes to 
high intensity conﬂicts. Considering the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is easy to spot 
that the US-led coalitions did little to achieve a dialogue with the Arab press. 
Steve Tatham, British military spokesperson during the war, describes how Arab 
14 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds, p. 7.
15 Young and Jesser, The Media and the Military, pp. 6-10.
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journalists were denied access to press brieﬁngs, and denied interviews because 
some coalition ofﬁcers did not approve of their coverage and how the lack of 
translators made it difﬁcult to get messages across to the local and regional 
press.16 As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq today are fought according to coun-
ter insurgency (COIN) tactics, it makes sense to view media operations as part of 
this strategy. One needs to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the popula-
tion. Economic aid, reconstruction and governance are, in addition to security, 
the basic lines of operation in a COIN strategy. However, if these acts are not 
supported by a culturally aware media policy demonstrating the good intentions 
of the coalition, they will be to no avail. Gaining local acceptance at the opera-
tional level should in theory be based on a foundation of acceptance gained at 
the strategic level through diplomacy and soft power. The challenge on the two 
battleﬁelds mentioned above seems monumental, because the strategic inﬂuence 
prior to invasion was miniscule. Joseph Nye points out that as the Berlin wall 
came down, 95 per cent of the population in Eastern Europe had access to the 
Voice of America. The night before the start of operation Iraqi Freedom only 
two per cent of the Arab population had access to US-based radio broadcasts.17
Holistic versus atomistic approach
Given the challenges facing the commander to get his messages across, which 
approach would be the most beneﬁcial, the holistic or the atomistic? The sim-
pliﬁed description depicts them as extensions of the three traditional levers of 
power available for the state: the diplomatic, economic and military. The three 
levers will be represented in different geographical areas in any given theatre. 
The difference between the two approaches is that with the atomistic approach, 
the Norwegian Armed Forces deploy the desired military forces and allow the 
coalition to decide the area in which they will be most helpful. 
The holistic approach limits all Norwegian levers of power, economic, dip-
lomatic and military, to one geographic area where the three would make up a 
comprehensive national effort. 
One way of assessing the two approaches would be to discuss how they 
would promote the three priorities of public support, local acceptance and op-
erational security. Public support would ﬁrst and foremost mean working with 
the national media. Still, in coalition operations public support is also a func-
tion of the support of all contributing states. This might include relations with 
international media, but as Norway is most likely to ﬁeld one of the smaller 
16 Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and Minds.
17 J. S. Nye Jr, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, May/June (2004).
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contributions, the international impact will be a result of national support, and 
the commander should therefore prioritise the national media. National media 
are normally not permanently present in conﬂict areas, and embedding is not a 
policy frequently used by the Norwegian Armed Forces. Reporting is therefore 
based on sporadic visits and tends to focus on domestic politics related to the 
contribution with coverage of the operation itself usually reserved for extraordi-
nary events. It is therefore difﬁcult to get the everyday reality of the military con-
tribution across. If the public only gets information on Norwegian forces when 
they are involved in violent clashes, or are accused of some type of misconduct, 
it is difﬁcult for the public to get a comprehensive understanding of the mis-
sion. Access restrictions and lack of transparency concerning certain units like 
Special Forces adds to this problem. Under the atomistic approach, this would 
continue to be a problem. With a holistic approach the national press is likely 
to be more interested in the scenario if the Norwegian contribution in one geo-
graphic area is more diverse. This would make it easier to build relations with 
the media and promote a dialogue which would give the journalist more insight 
and understanding of the military operations. It would also be more apparent 
how the different levers of power resulted in a comprehensive approach. Telling 
the most compelling story to gain the support of the Norwegian public would 
probably be easier. This would also beneﬁt the coalition. However, if every small 
state preferred the holistic approach it could be taken as a sign that the coalition 
had problems cooperating fully in theatre. The reluctance of Norway and other 
nations to move their forces from RC North in Afghanistan to the more hostile 
south and east has raised the question of burden sharing within NATO and 
weakens the resolve of the coalition. These sorts of disagreements are promptly 
picked up by the press and might be seen as an argument in favour of the ato-
mistic approach. 
Under a holistic approach coordination between the agencies marshalling 
the economic, political and security efforts would be easier if they all shared the 
same language, culture and nationality. It might make the situation less com-
plex for the commander. However, the presence of other departments in theatre 
would probably make it harder to separate political and operational messages. 
The tendency towards the politicisation of operations places more constraints 
on the commander’s media operations and might make it harder to get the mili-
tary side of the story across. 
Concerning local acceptance, there seems to be an advantage locally in us-
ing the holistic approach as one can argue that one nation controlling all three 
state powers will be perceived as more coordinated and comprehensive than a 
multinational force. The opposing argument is that this might lead to a percep-
tion of the coalition as uncoordinated since different nations follow different 
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policies in different geographical areas. To achieve some degree of local accept-
ance one needs insight into local culture, demographics, language and media 
habits. There are many examples of Western forces failing in fairly simple mat-
ters like translating statements, estimating illiteracy rates and so on. With a ho-
listic approach, the combined national resources, such as the number of experts 
on local issues, would probably be better, so decreasing the chances of making 
insensitive mistakes. The level of insight and cultural understanding might also 
improve if one accepts that three contributions from the same nation would be 
better at sharing information and building an institutional knowledge base on 
local affairs. Furthermore, a holistic effort offers a better possibility of adhering 
to a national interpretation of the mission, which might in turn make the effort 
more comprehensible and easier to relate to for the local population. 
Operations security demands a balance between secrecy in a few priori-
tised areas and transparency in the remaining. The obvious reason for transpar-
ency is founded in the principles governing democracy. Further, the commander 
should attempt to inform the media in a proactive manner. Any void in informa-
tion from a military unit engaged in operations will be ﬁlled by reports based 
on rumour, hearsay and information from other sources, so making the media 
coverage unbalanced and often critical. The commander needs to be in a posi-
tion where he gets his side of the story across to the media. The basic approach 
is to establish a media function or staff at every major level. Such a unit will be 
responsible for linking up with the strategic level, coordinating with other units 
and agencies and handling any media requests. This staff will be responsible for 
coordinating and releasing information in a timely manner. As the gap between 
events and information reaching the public today is just minutes where before 
it was hours and days, this is an enormous challenge. Coordination through 
the different chains of command takes time, and coordination across the three 
levers of power reﬂects the fact that it is still early days for the comprehensive 
approach. There have been several recent examples of the challenge of handling 
information regarding Norwegian forces placed under allied command. Both 
during operation Anaconda in 2002 and operations in conjunction with the 
Afghan election in 2007, information concerning Norwegian Special Forces was 
released by US and NATO sources. In the latter case, Norwegian military ofﬁcials 
refused to conﬁrm the information due to national media policy. These sorts of 
problems will very likely continue to be a challenge under both approaches, but 
the coordination between the three levers of power might be made easier with a 
holistic approach because the process of establishing routines for the rapid coor-
dination of messages would be a national responsibility. This might provide the 
desired transparency while at the same time avoiding situations were sensitive 
information is released without proper coordination. 
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Tentative conclusions
At the national level the holistic approach would seem to be the better option 
to enable the commander to address his media operations priorities and thereby 
to tell “the most compelling story”. The approach gives the beneﬁt of coordi-
nating the efforts along the three levers of power within a national context, 
making cooperation and coordination easier and resulting in a higher degree of 
comprehensiveness. This will most likely also be reﬂected in the media coverage 
and resulting public perception of the contribution, nationally and locally. How-
ever, it seems that the beneﬁts of the holistic approach would be balanced by 
the problems it might create for the coalition as a whole. There is little comfort 
in achieving comprehensiveness locally if it makes the theatre-wide approach 
seem uncoordinated. To address this problem, coalitions based on the NATO 
framework should strive to improve mechanisms for coordinating civilian and 
military contributions. In this way the beneﬁts of structuring the contributions 
under a national umbrella would be less signiﬁcant. Until then, discussions of 
burden sharing and national interests will be a major threat to the attempt to 
convince the world that the coalition’s story is a compelling one.
A GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN A NORWEGIAN CONTRIBUTION?
Charlotte E. Ingalls
Introduction
Gender mainstreaming, and more broadly diversity policies, may at ﬁrst glance 
appear to unnecessarily complicate already complex and costly operations. As 
a result, frequently gender issues are treated as secondary in importance to the 
hard issues of politics and security. Gender mainstreaming is not, however, a 
“soft” issue, but is at the core of security.1
The ﬁnal point in the above quote may create the impression that a gender 
perspective is appreciated and implemented in security and military matters.2 
However, for most who have devoted time to the study of the use of military 
power, even in today’s context of complex conﬂicts, gender issues were prob-
ably far from the core of their studies, if included at all. Gender mainstreaming 
would entail that gender issues are adequately addressed as well as recognised 
as a resource in international efforts in conﬂict prevention and resolution.3 Con-
sequently, military contributions to such efforts should include the capability 
to understand and apply a gender perspective. However, with few if any ex-
ceptions, the value of considering the connection between gender, security and 
the use of military power is rarely on the top of the agenda of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. That may be about to change. Not only is this a result of the 
focused attention that this connection has been receiving for some time in the 
United Nations, and increasingly also from Norwegian policymakers, and more 
1 Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF), CWINF Guidance for NATO 
Gender Mainstreaming (2007), p. 7.
2 According to the United Nations, “Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping 
Operations” the term gender refers to the social differences and social relations 
between women and men. It therefore refers not to women or men, but to the 
relationship between them, and the way this is socially constructed. (UN [online 21 
Mar 2009]).
3 According to the United Nations Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997: 
“Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for 
women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes 
in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences 
of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres 
so that women and men beneﬁt equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate 
goal is to achieve gender equality.” (UN [online 21 Mar 2009]).
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recently in NATO. It is also due to advances in our knowledge of how gender 
awareness can constitute an important tool in better understanding the impact 
of operations. 
One example of the latter is the recent study Equal Peace which addresses 
gender power relations as one example of a power relation within a state, and 
how this speciﬁc power relation is frequently and unintentionally affected by 
peace operations. The study develops the concept of security equality as one 
dimension of gender power relations, the former to be understood as the distri-
bution of protection between men and women. The study raises the question of 
whether gender power relations deteriorate (become more unequal) or improve 
(become more equal) as an effect of operations, and argues “that expanding 
the inquiry of peace operations to incorporate their effects on gender power 
relations produces a more detailed understanding of peace operations and their 
contribution to peace”.4 This is an example of how the inclusion of a gender 
perspective can therefore lead to an improved and more nuanced understanding 
of the impact of a mission in an area of conﬂict, and thus contribute to reducing 
the likelihood of unintended negative consequences.
Recognition of the value of including a gender perspective is also on the 
increase within NATO, and the Alliance is currently working on how best to 
implement the gender perspective in a manner relevant to the conduct of NATO-
led operations and missions:
In recognising the important and distinctive role that women can play in conﬂict 
resolution, NATO and its Partners seek to improve the effectiveness of NATO-
led Operations and Missions to ensure overall mission success. The complexity 
of peace building efforts argues for an approach that addresses the speciﬁc needs 
of all groups in a conﬂict zone. Gender issues are an important component of 
such efforts, and a tailored approach will be needed in each situation to ensure 
that maximum effect can be drawn from incorporating gender perspectives into 
NATO’s approach. While initial efforts based on this paper to implement the 
resolution will focus on operational issues, further work should take a wider 
perspective in addressing the issues raised by UNSCR 1325. 5
4 L. Olsson, Equal Peace. United Nations Peace Operations and the Power-Relations 
between men and women in Timor-Leste (PhD diss., Uppsala University, 2007), pp. 
2–8.
5 NATO, NATO decision on 12 December 2007, document of 10 December 2007, 
Annex 1, EAPC(C)D(2007)0022 Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and 
Security.
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As a NATO member, it is reasonable to expect that Norway would want to be 
active also in contributing to the conceptual development of the Alliance. As il-
lustrated by the above quote, this involvement can now include the integration 
of a gender perspective in the planning and conduct of operations, and subse-
quently in an even wider perspective. 
The point of departure for this book is the concept of comprehensiveness 
as presented in the ﬁrst chapter. An interesting question in this context is wheth-
er it is accurate to claim that there is a comprehensive approach if gender issues 
are not adequately addressed at the strategic level as well as in the planning and 
execution of activities and operations, but that question will not be pursued 
further here. This chapter sets out to shed light on the core question of which of 
the options, holistic vs. atomistic, can currently be considered as best suited to 
ensure the satisfactory inclusion of a gender perspective in a Norwegian contri-
bution. The underlying assumption for this question is that the comprehensive 
approach aims to draw on the inclusion of a gender perspective as a tool in the 
efforts to resolve the issue at hand.    
Approach to exploring the issue 
Gender mainstreaming and processes aimed at integrating a gender perspective 
are complex processes. For the purpose of this chapter the action plan launched 
by the Norwegian Government in March 2006 for the implementation of UN-
SCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security will serve as the starting point.6 
The purpose of UNSCR 1325 is to integrate the gender perspective in all areas 
concerning peace, security and development. The Government’s action plan con-
tains a number of measures in a host of different areas, including development 
and security aspects. I shall not discuss the substance of the plan here, just say 
that it signals a strong commitment by the Norwegian Government to follow up 
on UNSCR 1325. The introductory policy statement of the action plan assures 
the reader that “Norway will pursue a policy that promotes gender equality at 
home and in a global context.”7 The policy statement was signed by the respec-
tive Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Environment and International Development, 
Justice and the Police, Children and Equality, as well as Defence. This broad 
interest is in line with the relatively high level of attention devoted to gender 
and equality issues in Norwegian society in general. The action plan is a strong 
6 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Norwegian Government’s Action Plan 
on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security (Oslo, 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Publication nr. E-799 E, 2006).
7 Ibid., Policy declaration.
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policy statement, and it is reasonable to expect its subject matter to be addressed 
in subsequent major sector-speciﬁc policy documents. 
The core question will be approached by examining the relevant sectors’ 
emphasis on gender mainstreaming in sector-speciﬁc policy documents in the 
time following the release of the Governments action plan for the implementa-
tion of UNSCR 1325. 
This will be carried out in three stages. First, the status of the implementa-
tion of a gender perspective in the military will be addressed. This will be done 
by examining a selection of documents from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
looking for indicators of the importance placed by the Ministry on ensuring that 
the military organisation will have the capability to understand the relevance of 
and utilise a gender perspective.  
Second, the status of the implementation of a gender perspective in a wider 
context at the strategic level will be looked at. This will be carried out by exam-
ining a selection of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), as 
the MFA is responsible for a wide range of policy areas including development 
cooperation, human rights, peace and reconciliation, security policy and trade 
policy. Consequently, the relative inﬂuence of the MFA is assumed to be greater 
under a holistic contribution than it would be under an atomistic contribution. 
Third, the ﬁndings will be discussed in light of the strategic choice. 
Within the scope of this chapter, only a relatively small number of the doc-
uments emanating from the ministries with references to the gender perspective 
could be examined. Gender is mentioned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Minister of Defence in several speeches. In this chapter, documents were selected 
for closer examination from those on which formal political decision making 
takes place at the national level. It is recognised that there is some weakness 
in the methodology of looking into the status of the implementation of gender 
mainstreaming. This, however, does not preclude our ability to fulﬁl the ambi-
tion of this chapter, to shed light on which of the options, holistic vs. atomistic, 
can currently be considered best suited to ensure the satisfactory inclusion of 
a gender perspective in a Norwegian contribution. Although the ﬁndings and 
preliminary conclusions of the chapter rest on a relatively narrow foundation, 
it is considered to be relevant and solid enough for the stated ambition, as the 
sources are authoritative documents informing political decision making at the 
strategic level in the respective sectors.   
Prior to proceeding to the examination of the documents, some thoughts 
on the connection between the gender perspective and the atomistic vs. holistic 
strategic options will be presented.   
If Norwegian military forces are to successfully participate in the imple-
mentation of a gender perspective under a multinational comprehensive frame-
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work, be that an atomistic or a holistic contribution, the forces should have 
the required knowledge and understanding of the background, contents and 
relevance of such a perspective. If they do not, it would seem unreasonable to 
expect the military to effectively promote or ensure the inclusion of a gender 
perspective in the Norwegian contribution. 
This applies in particular in case of an atomistic contribution, where the 
relative inﬂuence of the military is assumed to be larger than under the holistic 
option where there is a wider spectrum of actors to contend with who can affect 
the contribution. As a consequence, in case of a holistic contribution, the empha-
sis on the gender perspective by policymakers able to inﬂuence the diplomatic, 
developmental and economic elements is likely to have greater impact on the de-
sign and content of the contribution. So even in case of weak gender awareness 
in the military, strong gender awareness in other relevant sectors might favour a 
holistic option in the end. In such a case, this option could increase the pace of 
building gender awareness and thus achieve a more rapid gender mainstreaming 
in the military sector. 
If gender awareness and mainstreaming are strong in the military, then an 
atomistic option would be very well suited to secure the inclusion of a gender 
perspective in the national contribution. This causal effect applies under a holis-
tic contribution as well, but whether or not this latter option would promote the 
gender perspective depends on the degree to which gender issues are addressed 
in the other elements of the contribution. If military, diplomatic and economic 
elements all were to have a high level of gender awareness and mainstreaming, 
then the holistic option would do much to secure the inclusion of a gender per-
spective.  
If the level of gender awareness is low in the diplomatic and economic 
elements, and seen in connection with the assumed higher relative inﬂuence of 
these elements in case of holistic contributions, the holistic option would not be 
indicated. This applies even in the event of a strong gender mainstreaming effort 
in the military, as the relative inﬂuence of the military under a holistic contribu-
tion is weaker than under an atomistic.   
An attempt to illustrate these connections between degree of gender aware-
ness and mainstreaming in M and D+E respectively, and the impact it could 
have on the two strategic options ability to promote the gender perspective is 
presented in ﬁgure 8.1 on the next page. 
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Degree of gender 
awareness and 
mainstreaming 
atomistic contribution 
(M)
holistic contribution 
(D+E+M)
Weak in M 
Not well suited to 
secure inclusion of a 
gender perspective in the 
contribution 
Uncertain, as M is not suited 
to support the inclusion of a 
gender perspective, but strong 
gender focus in D+E may point 
towards this option being 
suitable     
Strong in M 
Very well suited to 
secure the inclusion of 
gender perspective in the 
contribution 
If also strong gender awareness 
in D+E, this option would be 
very well suited to secure the 
inclusion of a gender perspective
Weak in D+E
N/A as M is the relevant 
variable in case of an 
atomistic contribution 
Not suited, even in case of 
strong M which is considered 
insufﬁcient for this option to be 
suitable 
Strong in D+E
N/A as M is the relevant 
variable in case of an 
atomistic contribution
Uncertain, but strong gender 
focus in D+E may point in 
direction of this option being 
well suited, even if weak gender 
awareness in M 
Note that the ﬁgure is meant only to serve as an illustration, and that no further 
elaboration of the connections will be carried out. My intention is simply to set 
out a frame of reference for the ensuing interpretation of the empirical data and 
for the tentative conclusions in the chapter. 
A gender perspective in an atomistic contribution?   
With reference to the previous section on the approach to exploring the issue, 
the following defence sector documents have been studied, selected from docu-
ments found on the websites of the MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces:   
Increased recruitment of women to the armed forces, White Paper, no. 368
The Norwegian Chief of Defence’s defence study 2007. Final report9
8 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Økt rekruttering av kvinner til Forsvaret [Increased 
recruitment of women to the armed forces], White Paper, no. 36 (2006-2007) 
(Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).
9 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport [The 
Norwegian Chief of Defence’s defence study 2007. Final report] (Oslo: Norwegian 
Armed Forces, 2007).
•
•
Figure 8.1 Connection between gender awareness in M (military) and D (diplomatic)+E (economic) 
respectively, and the impact this may have on the suitability of the two contribution options in 
securing a gender perspective. 
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Defending Norway’s security, interests and values, Proposition to the Stor-
ting, no. 48 (2007-2008)10
For the ﬁscal year 2009, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-2009).11
They were selected because they were either readily available policy documents, 
or were input to such documents, providing steering and guidance on a wide 
range of matters at the strategic level of the military organisation. In searching 
for indicators of the status of the work of gender mainstreaming, emphasis will 
be placed on identifying clear guidance to integrate gender awareness into the 
operational planning process, ensuring availability of gender expertise for advis-
ing commanders on gender issues in operational planning and conduct of opera-
tions, and integrating gender expertise at all decision making levels.
Another option was to look for indicators of guidance to increase the 
number of women in the military. Although often presented as the primary focus 
in the implementation of a gender perspective in the armed forces, the approach 
does not address the inclusion of gender issues in the core activity of the military, 
which is often described as the conduct of operations.12 Therefore, the inclusion 
of an appropriate gender perspective in the operational planning process is an 
important prerequisite for being able to say that gender mainstreaming has been 
achieved. 
The presence of women in a military unit can be of high value in ensuring 
the ability of a unit to conduct operations in an appropriately gender sensitive 
manner in support of mission success. But to leave gender mainstreaming at that 
would be suboptimal, as there are strong indications that awareness is the key 
factor in successfully maintaining a gender perspective in an operation. “Aware-
ness in implementation” Olsson advises, 
should rather be understood as awareness of gender speciﬁcity. This factor is 
considered to be relevant a) on the international level where operation mandat-
ing and planning takes place (that is, at UN headquarters), b) in the operation 
leadership which makes decisions about the implementation when the operation 
10 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser 
og verdier [A defence for the protection of Norway’s security, interests and values], 
Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008) (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).
11 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, For budsjettåret 2009 [For the ﬁscal year 2009], 
Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-2009) (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).
12 See, for example, Norwegian Defence Staff, Norwegian Armed Forces Joint 
Operational Doctrine (Oslo, 2007), pp. 14 and 158. 
•
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has been deployed, and c) among the operation personnel implementing the 
operation mandate.13 
Even though the context of this chapter and book is not a UN operation, Olsson’s 
point that gender awareness must permeate the strategic, operational and tacti-
cal levels is considered relevant also for the context of this project, which is the 
comprehensive approach framework. Consequently, even if the military were to 
remain male dominated for the near future, which is most likely,14 this should 
not exclude gender awareness from permeating the organisation, which any-
way should not wholly dependent upon the ratio of male to female personnel. 
Gender awareness can be seen as a contributing resource in analysis and in 
determining the most effective way of solving the complex tasks in a comprehen-
sive approach framework, regardless of the gender composition of the mission 
personnel. Even though the presence of female personnel may be a prerequisite 
for being able to reap the full potential beneﬁts from implementing a gender 
perspective in a mission, the absence of female personnel should not exclude the 
establishment of gender awareness among mission personnel. 
However, when examining Increased recruitment of women to the armed 
forces, White Paper, no. 36, which addresses the need to increase the recruitment 
of women, it is clear that the military must do more to draw on the resources 
and competencies women can bring to the organisation. Although not primarily 
intended as a policy document for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, section 
4.4 does highlight the link between the main burden of the report and the im-
plementation of Resolution 1325. In section 4.6 “Why do the armed forces need 
more women?” the following statement is included: 
UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, among other things points 
out that war and conﬂict affect women and men in different ways. It is therefore 
important that the gender aspect is considered in connection with the planning 
and conduct of military operations.15
 And in section six of the report, it is stated,
Norwegian forces participating in international operations shall, in accord-
ance with the Government’s Action Plan to implement UNSCR 1325 (2000) 
on Women, Peace and Security, have received training and awareness about the 
13 Olsson, Equal Peace, p. 179.
14 According to Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Økt rekruttering …, 93 per cent of the 
of total number of ofﬁcers and contract personnel are men.
15 Norwegian Ministry of Defence,    Økt rekruttering …, p. 9. Author’s translation. 
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gender aspect in international operations. The gender perspective shall be inte-
grated in all exercise scenarios for international missions.16 
It is interesting to note that the above quotes seem to describe a desired end 
state more than the current status. Nevertheless, these are clear defence-speciﬁc 
signals from the political level and indicate an appreciation of the importance of 
gender mainstreaming in the military organisation. They also build on the sig-
nals in the Government’s Action Plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. It 
will therefore be interesting to see whether this appreciation, and the associated 
policy guidance, manifests itself in the subsequent long-term plan for the devel-
opment of the Norwegian armed forces, Defending Norway’s security, interests 
and values, Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008).
However, prior to doing so, the ﬁnal rapport of Defence Study 2007 com-
piled by the Chief of Defence will be the object of attention.17 As it was one of 
the inputs to the current long-term plan, the defence study was examined in 
order to determine the extent to which it supports gender mainstreaming by 
alluding to the value of a gender perspective. The Defence Study 07 mentions 
UNSCR 1325, or a gender perspective, in several contexts. One is in connection 
with joint Swedish−Norwegian operational Military Observation Teams (MOT 
1325) and also the statement:18
A joint Norwegian−Swedish project on military teams in international opera-
tions will be started by year end 2008. The project focuses on operational teams 
with specialist expertise on gender perspectives. The teams will comprise both 
sexes. A Norwegian−Swedish group of experts on operational activities and 
training will also be established by year end 2010; the location has yet to be 
decided. The goal is to provide new and relevant expertise of use to participation 
in international operations and to ensure that Norway can meet its international 
commitments in accordance with UN resolution 1325. 19
In section 5.4 of the study, “Recruiting personnel”, the value of a gender per-
spective is also acknowledged.
16 Ibid., p. 15. Author’s translation    
17 Norwegian Armed Forces,   Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007.
18 Ibid, section 4.11 “Norsk-svensk samarbeid”     [Norwegian-Swedish cooperation], p. 
30. 
19 Ibid, section 5.6.5 “Kvinner i internasjonale operasjoner” [Women in international 
operations], p. 38. Author’s translation with the kind assistance of Ms Linda Adamcik. 
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The ambition is to signiﬁcantly increase the number of women in the Armed 
Forces. The expertise women bring to the organization should to be utilised to 
a greater degree in operations. In certain situations, this expertise may provide 
effects beyond what is being achieved today, for instance in dialogue with civil-
ians in the area of operations, situational awareness and security. This resource 
ought to be given more prominence, recruitment efforts must be increased, and 
more women must be motivated to opt for a career in the Armed Forces. The 
force generators must include the gender perspective in operational planning 
and manning.20
I have not been able to ascertain whether the above forecasted MOT 1325 
has been established, although it is my impression that it has not. The joint 
Swedish−Norwegian competence-building exercise in with regard to UNSCR 
1325 is not yet operational, and some time remains before its expected imple-
mentation. However, the two quotes above seem promising by indicating an 
awareness within the military organisation of the value of a gender perspec-
tive to international operations and operational planning. Even so, the wording 
points to a desired but not yet achieved end state. 
The next object of attention is the current long-term plan for the develop-
ment of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Defending Norway’s security, interests 
and values, Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008), which outlines the 
development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. In light of the action plan for the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325, the Government’s commitment to promoting 
gender issues in a security and development context, White Paper, no. 36 (2006-
2007) and the Defence study 2007, it would be reasonable to expect it to be 
reﬂected in the most recent long-term plan for the defence sector. 
Most of the references to women in the proposal are primarily connected 
with recruitment, providing education opportunities, career development pro-
grammes or facilitating ways of combining family life with a military career.21 
The main point of a gender perspective in this proposal is to be found 
in box 5.2 “Gender and operations abroad”. The fact that this is actually ad-
dressed in the section entitled Operations, could be interpreted as an indicator 
of how much policymakers want to see gender taken into account in the core 
20 Norwegian Armed Forces,   Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007, section 5.4 
“Rekruttering av personell”, p. 34. Author’s translation with the kind assistance of Ms        
Linda Adamcik. 
21 Norwegian Armed Forces,   Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport. See for  
example section 1.3, page 13; section 2.10, page 21; section 8.1.2, pages 112–113; 
section 8.3.4, page 117.
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activities of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Even so, there is no reference to, or 
elaboration of, the contents of box 5.2 in the ensuing subsections of section 
5.6. Nevertheless, the text of box 5.2 clearly indicates a desire to continue what 
was set out in policy statements concerning gender mainstreaming in a military 
context, from the policy signals in the Government’s action plan for the imple-
mentation of UNSCR 1325, White Paper, no. 36 (2006-2007) as well as The 
Norwegian Chief of Defence’s defence study 2007. Final report.22 This indicates 
coherence in that the policy proposals in the long-term proposition rest on rec-
ommendations set forth in previous policy documents as well as recommenda-
tions presented by the Chief of Defence.   
On examining For the ﬁscal year 2009, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 
(2008-2009), one ﬁnds mention of implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender 
mainstreaming in part III of the document, in chapter six, section 6.5. An ex-
cerpt of the text states that “both the MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces 
are working on incorporating the gender perspective in, among other areas, op-
erational planning, mandates, training and education, as well as in the conduct 
and evaluation of operations.”23 
In the same section there are also references to the previously mentioned 
MOT 1325 and a Nordic collaborative effort in this area. Again however, the 
wording presents a picture of the establishment of a gender perspective capa-
bility within the Norwegian military a work in progress. Altogether, it seems 
reasonable to draw the conclusion that the Norwegian Armed Forces are in the 
process of implementing a gender perspective in a number of important areas of 
the organisation. The indications of will to implement seem strong at the strate-
gic policy level, and as illustrated by the mentioning of the Swedish−Norwegian 
MOT 1325, this may soon bring results at the tactical level. Curiously though, 
at the operational level the evidence of implementation is less pronounced. This 
is interesting as the complete implementation of a gender perspective in the mili-
tary organisation should entail permeation of the perspective at all levels, that is 
to say, the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Based on these ﬁndings, the Norwegian Armed Forces are arguably mov-
ing towards achieving gender mainstreaming and gender awareness. The ques-
tion is how long it will take to fully integrate a gender perspective, and to what 
extent the Norwegian military will succeed in this effort. Presently it seems safe 
to maintain that the Norwegian military would at present probably only to a 
limited degree be able to integrate a gender perspective into the military portion 
22 Norwegian Ministry of Defence,    Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet ...
23 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, For budsjettåret 2009, p. 98. Author’s translation. 
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of a contribution. With reference to ﬁgure 8.1, the ﬁndings indicate a rather low 
level of gender awareness and mainstreaming in M is, although it is in the proc-
ess of being improved. 
A gender perspective in a holistic contribution? 
With reference to the previous section on the approach to exploring the issue, I 
examined the following documents for the purposes of this task, selected from 
the website of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): 
“For the ﬁscal year 2008”, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2007-
2008)24
“On equal terms. Women’s rights and equality in the development aid 
policy”, White Paper, no. 11 (2007-2008)25
“For the ﬁscal year 2009”, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-
2009)26
“Report on the progress of the Government’s plan to carry out Resolution 
1325 (2000) on women, peace and security”.27
The ﬁrst document, Proposition to the Storting no. 1 (2007-2008) For the ﬁs-
cal year 2008, is the MFA budget proposal for 2008. It contains several refer-
ences to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the action plan, all of which 
will not be quoted here. However, it is worth noting that the pursuit of the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 is mentioned in many different contexts, and 
therefore seems to permeate several areas of responsibility within the MFA.28 It 
appears that the MFA places great emphasis on addressing gender issues across a 
wide spectrum, for example in human rights and development issues in general, 
which is then complemented by the more speciﬁc peace and security perspectives 
included under UNSCR 1325.  
24 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, For budsjettåret 2008 [For the ﬁscal year 
2008], Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2007-2008).
25 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,     På like vilkår: Kvinners rettigheter og 
likestilling i utviklingspolitikken [On equal terms. Women’s rights and equality in the      
development aid policy], White Paper, no. 11 (2007-2008) (Regjeringen [online 21 
Mar 2009]).
26 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, For budsjettåret 2009 [For the ﬁscal year 
2009], Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (Regjeringen [online 14 May 2009]).
27 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Framdriftsrapport for Regjeringens 
handlingsplan for gjennomføring av FNs Sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon 1325 (2000) om 
kvinner, fred og sikkerhet [Report on the progress of the Government’s plan to carry 
out Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security] (Regjeringen [online 21 
Mar 2009]).
28 See for example Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, For budsjettåret 2008, pp. 11, 
27, 67, 99, 141 and 225.
•
•
•
•
1233/2009 APPROACHING COMPREHENSIVENESS 
The subject of On equal terms. Women’s rights and equality in the develop-
ment aid policy, White Paper, no. 11 (2007-2008) is women’s rights and gender 
equality in Norway’s international development policy. The report addresses the 
topic from several angles. Of particular interest here is the report’s mention of 
how gender equality policies can be considered a trademark for Norwegian so-
ciety, and how Norway can put this advantage to use in international forums.29 
It is also relevant that the MFA in this report views the process of promoting 
gender equality in a gender power relations perspective.30 
The next examined document is Proposition to the Storting no. 1 (2008-
2009) For the ﬁscal year 2009, the MFA budget proposal for 2009, section 11 
of which speciﬁcally addresses gender equality. It remarks on the process of 
implementing UNSCR 1325, and the following statement included: “The gender 
perspective is central in Norwegian efforts to promote peace and reconciliation 
globally.”31 This serves to illustrate the emphasis MFA places on the holistic per-
spective in pursuing the gender perspective, and the wide scope of the efforts.32 
That is not in itself surprising, as the MFA is responsible for pursuing policies 
across a very large and diverse portfolio. 
The ﬁnal item of particular interest is the progress report on the Govern-
ment’s Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, 
Peace and Security.33 As lead responsibility for coordinating the implementation 
of the action plan rests with the MFA, they are also responsible for the progress 
report. It is comprehensive, 50 pages long, and contains both tentative ﬁndings 
and experiences, as well as recommendations and challenges. The report is a 
way of measuring the progress of the implementation process in the areas under 
the jurisdiction of the respective ministries, including the MoD. The evaluation 
is intended to be an annual report, but at present no progress report is available 
for 2008. 
In the report it is stated that the implementation work is gaining momen-
tum, but that the process of following up on the action points is not adequately 
systematic, and that it too often depends on the drive and initiative of individu-
als. From reading the report, it is clear that the national and international net-
29 See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, På like vilkår, section 1, Innledning og 
sammendrag [Introduction and summary], p. 6
30 Ibid., see for example p. 8.
31 Ibid., “Kjønnsperspektivet har en sentral plass i norsk arbeid for fred og forsoning 
globalt” [The gender perspective is central to Norwegian contribution to peace and 
reconciliation], section 11, Likestilling [Equality], p. 265. Author’s translation.
32 Ibid., see for example pp. 36, 37, 117, 162, 172, 271 and 273. 
33 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Framdriftsrapport for Regjeringens 
handlingsplan ...
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works, and the organisations which in some way are engaged in the implementa-
tion of UNSCR 1325, are substantial. Here the MFA is in a unique position to 
monitor the resources, both nationally and internationally, being used to further 
the implementation of a gender perspective, including implementation in opera-
tions based on a comprehensive or integrated approach.  
The progress report point out that “There is a substantial need for guid-
ance on how to operationalise the action plan via planning, conduct and evalua-
tion of actions in a gender perspective.”34 Further, the report highlights the need 
for actively integrating the implementation work in the ministries. The Ministry 
of Defence is mentioned several times in the report, but the following statement 
was of particular relevance to the perspective of this chapter: 
In its work to implement the action plan, MoD focused on recruiting more 
women to MoD, the armed forces and international operations. It is therefore 
doubtless ﬁtting that lead responsibility for the action plan’s implementation 
rests with the department in charge of personnel. But the action plans goes fur-
ther than increasing the number of women. In order to promote a wider appre-
ciation of a more holistic approach to the action plan, there is reportedly a need 
to strengthen cooperation with other MoD departments and sections – not least 
the department of security policy and the department of operational and prepar-
edness planning. This applies in particular to questions related to international 
operations.35 
This indicates a less than adequate integration of the gender perspective in the 
various departments of the MoD, in contrast to the apparent level of apprecia-
tion within in the MFA. 
Based on the ﬁndings from the examination of the MFA documents, the 
conclusion is that the MFA has a high level of awareness of gender issues. With 
reference to ﬁgure 9.1, the ﬁndings indicate the degree of gender awareness and 
mainstreaming in D+E is leaning towards strong. 
Tentative conclusions
The goal of this chapter was to shed light on which of the two options, holistic 
vs. atomistic, may currently be considered best suited to ensure the inclusion of 
a gender perspective in a Norwegian contribution. The preferable status would 
be to have strong gender awareness and mainstreaming in the military as well as 
34 Ibid., p. 15. Author’s translation.     
35 Ibid., p. 23. Author’s translation.
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in the diplomatic and economic sectors. This would secure the greatest possible 
freedom of action for Norway when considering which of the two contribution 
options, atomistic and holistic, to adopt, while at the same time desiring to 
pursue the stated political goal of promoting gender equality at home and in a 
global context. However, at present the Norwegian Government does not seem 
to ﬁnd itself in such a position.   
To summarise the ﬁndings, the ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to 
promote a gender perspective in the military portion of a contribution is limited, 
whereas the diplomatic and economic sectors seem well prepared to undertake 
such an effort in their part of a contribution. With reference then to ﬁgure 8.1, 
the degree of gender awareness and mainstreaming in M is leaning towards low 
and the level of gender awareness and mainstreaming in D+E is leaning towards 
strong.  
This suggests that an atomistic option, with a purely military element, 
would at present not be likely to secure the inclusion of a gender perspective 
in a Norwegian contribution. This may at ﬁrst glance seem to indicate that 
the holistic option is also poorly suited, as the lack of gender awareness in the 
military element would weaken the likelihood of securing gender awareness in 
the Norwegian contribution. But that is not automatically the case. A holistic 
contribution, it is assumed, would give the MFA relatively more scope to inﬂu-
ence the parameters and content of the contribution than would be the case if 
the contribution was atomistic,  i.e. purely military. 
According to the ﬁndings, the MFA appears to have a good overview of 
resources and actors engaged in the implementation of a gender perspective in 
operations abroad, and furthermore seems to have gender awareness in many of 
its departments and sections. With a holistic contribution the MFA could act as 
a driving force in working towards mainstreaming gender considerations within 
all elements, to some extent also in the military one.  
The tentative conclusions, based on the ﬁndings of this study, show that at 
present the holistic option would be more likely to encourage gender awareness 
as an integral aspect of Norwegian operations abroad. Such a contribution could 
then serve as a way of improving capacity to effectively address a greater variety 
of security issues in the local population – both male and female – in the area 
of responsibility. It could help in avoiding unintended negative consequences of 
an operation. And ﬁnally, as recognised by NATO, addressing gender issues is 
part of the ongoing efforts to improve operations and missions to ensure overall 
mission success. Conceptual development, which requires gender awareness and 
gender mainstreaming, is an area in which Norway, with its strong tradition for 
promoting gender equality, should be able to make substantial contributions in 
the ongoing efforts in the Alliance.  

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC CHOICE
Håkan Edström
Suggestions for further work
The aim of this study is to examine and discuss the two grand strategic op-
tions available to Norway to provide military resources to multinational crisis 
management, and their likely consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
We have, in other words, wanted to shed light on the options available to small 
states as they consider how to exploit their military resources and to assess some 
of the potential consequences of such a strategic choice. Raising the level of am-
bition a little opens up a number of fruitful areas for further study. 
A ﬁrst step might focus on the discussions surrounding validity and re-
liability in the introductory chapter. With reference to validity, for example, 
additional independent, or perhaps intermediate variables and their interdepen-
dence, could be explored further. With reference to reliability, the outcomes of 
the dependent variable could, for example, be deﬁned and constructed to allow 
its application more or less independently of the applied perspective. Even the 
outcome of the independent variable could be reﬁned to improve the measur-
ability of the sliding scale between the two dichotomies. Such an approach could 
in turn lead to the development of more than the two options so far considered. 
In reality, however, this exploration belongs in a study more focused on the gen-
eration of theory than the present one. 
Another issue not addressed in the present study revolves around the op-
tions available to a small state regarding the use of its military resources beyond 
its territorial borders and in contexts other than low intensity multinational cri-
sis management. Consideration of this issue could take as its point of departure 
the voids in knowledge associated with the general use of grand strategic tools. 
In an Alliance perspective such a study could, for example, aim to shed 
light on the options available to a small state regarding the provision of military 
support to another Alliance member within the framework of high-intensity 
contributions under Article 5. In such a case the variation would be attached 
to the conﬂict spectrum while the options would remain at the grand strategic 
level. Another option is to envision a search for variety by continuing to focus 
on low intensity multi-national crisis management, while analysing options and 
consequences at the operational or tactical level, although this would entail ad-
dressing an altogether different void in knowledge.  
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However, another void in knowledge we have partially addressed, albeit 
superﬁcially, in this study is about the possible consequences for the multilateral 
organisation, in this case NATO, of the particular strategic choice made by the 
contributing state. Such an analysis, carried out in connection with the devel-
opment of new multinational concepts, would be possible and appears to have 
much to recommend it. 
Yet another void in knowledge that we have touched upon, but not pur-
sued, is the question of how small states can contribute to the conceptual de-
velopment of multilateral organisations. Rather than solely concentrating on 
the comprehensive approach, as in this case, this study would explore various 
problem areas within conceptual development. It could also address conceptual 
challenges at different levels, within the conﬂict spectrum as well as from a hi-
erarchical viewpoint.   
As highlighted in the ﬁrst chapter and in each of the above examples, it is 
important to be aware of the differences between, on the one hand, international 
crises and conﬂict management in general and, on the other, a speciﬁc empirical 
case such as the current international efforts in Afghanistan. We intended to re-
ﬂect this when stating, in the ﬁrst chapter, that our ambition was to contribute to 
increased understanding of the implementation of the comprehensive approach, 
and not to explain related processes. 
It would of course be possible to approach the topic with even higher am-
bitions, or apply scientiﬁc perspectives other than those chosen in this study. 
However, as our choice of perspectives was coloured by the Norwegian context, 
further studies could look at one or more other small states and, in doing so, se-
lect perspectives appropriate to the particular state(s) chosen. In light of the po-
litically declared ambition of increased military cooperation between Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, further research based on such an approach has a certain 
appeal. It is possible to envisage an expansion in several dimensions whereby the 
aspects of validity and reliability already addressed could serve as a foundation. 
One dimension suitable for expansion could thus be the national context where 
not only Norway, but also Sweden and Finland are considered.
Sweden and Finland are both EU members and NATO PfP countries, so the 
comprehensive approach is relevant to both national contexts. Still within the 
framework of trilateral cooperation, another possibility for expansion would be 
to address concept development in relevant arenas within the EU. Although not 
a member of the EU, Norway has, for example, made contributions under the 
framework of the EU Battle Group concept. An expansion as envisaged could 
therefore take into consideration several multilateral organisations as well as a 
number of different concepts. 
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In the following sections of this ﬁnal chapter, three problems are discussed. 
As our intention is to shed further light on the problem we have addressed in 
this work, we will not be providing answers to these new problems. Instead we 
are arguing for the need of further research. 
The ﬁrst problem is related to the issue touched upon in the ﬁrst chapter. 
Is there a conceptual supremacy of the great powers? How much space do actu-
ally small states have in developing the conceptual framework of international 
organisations? 
The second problem is related to the need of clear deﬁned political guid-
ance. Is there a policy based top-down alternative? Are the existing national 
policies actually implemented? And what about an experience-based bottom-up 
alternative? 
The ﬁnal problem is related to the international organisations and their 
efforts in implementing multilateral concepts such as comprehensive approach. 
What are the consequences for NATO if the members of the organisation choose 
the holistic option when providing military resources? What if they choose the 
atomistic option?
Conceptual supremacy of great powers? 
As early as March 2004, Denmark launched a national initiative aimed at get-
ting all Danish actors, or at least those at governmental level, who were partici-
pating in international crisis management to work in a coordinated manner. The 
initiative, to be known as Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military 
Activities in International Operations (CPA), aimed at ensuring a concentrated 
Danish civilian effort in areas where Danish military forces were to be deployed. 
This programme offered, unfortunately, no clear guidance on achieving integra-
tion. The Danish CPA approach may, however, serve as an example of a small 
state developing concepts ahead of the great powers.1 Recent research indicates 
that so was the case:
By the spring of 2006, ﬁve more nations – Canada, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, the Netherlands, Norway and Slovakia – had joined the growing chorus 
1 See Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, “Samtænkning af  
civil og militær indsats i internationale operationer” [Coordination of civilian and     
military contributions to international operations] (Forsvarsministeriet [online 19   
Mar 2009]), the opening speech “Transforming NATO – A Political and Military 
Challenge” held by Søren Gade, Danish Minister of Defence, at the NATO seminar          
on civil and military activities in international operations, Copenhagen, 20 June 2005 
(NATO [online 19 Mar 2009]); and K. Fischer and J. T. Christensen, “Improving civil-
military cooperation the Danish way”, NATO Review, summer (2005).
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of Allies pressing for a codiﬁed plan of action. The United States followed soon 
after, and events culminated in the ﬁrst ofﬁcial articulation of the CA by the 26 
member states at the Riga Summit in November.2
Considering the fact that the UK had introduced a national comprehensive ap-
proach policy only some months before the Riga Summit, at least some steps 
would seem to have been taken by the great powers to advance conceptual. 
Otherwise, small state initiatives are not likely to be taken seriously within by 
the international organisations. Britain explains the comprehensive approach as 
a necessary step to coordinate the three national instruments of power (deﬁned 
as diplomatic, military and economic instruments) in order to speed the achieve-
ment of national strategic objectives. The UK sees the comprehensive approach 
as a conceptual framework enabling cross-departmental decision making. It in-
cludes, apart from the national instruments, independent developmental and 
humanitarian instruments and “a customised, agile and sensitive inﬂuence and 
information effort”.3 
It would be interesting therefore to explore the opportunity of small states, 
such as Denmark and Norway, to actually play a part in concept development in 
international organisations. Is this a privilege for great powers? Is Denmark an 
exception to the rule of small state reluctance?  
Within two years of the idea ﬁrst being ﬂoated by the Danes, Ambassadors sup-
ported by the International Staff had made haste to set the plan in motion.4
Top-down or bottom-up? 
Following the Riga Summit the UK organised an informal workshop with some 
of her allies (e.g. Canada, Denmark, Norway), to address issues arising in the 
implementation of a comprehensive approach. The workshop took place in 
Brussels 8 March 2007. One partner nation attended: Sweden. One of the pro-
posals for further work arising from the workshop concerned the interdepend-
ence between the approaches at the national and international levels. Another 
2 B. Smith-Windsor, Hasten slowly – NATO’s Effect Based and Comprehensive 
Approach to Operations, NATO Defence College Research Paper, no 38 (Rome: NDC, 
2008), p. 5.
3 UK Ministry of Defence, The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, 
January (Shrivenham: The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, 2006).
4 Smith-Windsor, Hasten slowly… p. 5.
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proposal concerned the need for maximising synergies between the approaches 
at the national and multilateral levels.5 
The UK had introduced a national policy in 2006 and Denmark, as we 
saw, in 2005. Another participant at the Brussels Workshop, Canada, had also 
recently introduced a new policy. The new vision indicated a signiﬁcant shift 
in Canadian military strategy.6 Hence at least three of the participants (e.g. 
Canada, Denmark and the UK) seem to have conceptual points of departure 
on which to build further progress. This also indicates a top-down approach by 
which military actions are conducted on political guidance issued in terms of an 
ofﬁcially declared policy. 
A critical question is, however, whether small states actually practise a 
top-down perspective and make policy-based choices between different strategic 
options (or strategies). The empirical ﬁnding from Denmark indicates that so 
is the case but what other options, aside from the holistic CAP, did the Dan-
ish policymakers consider? Was there, for example, an atomistic alternative at 
hand? And is Denmark actually implementing CAP in southern Afghanistan or 
simply carrying on with military business as usual?7 
And what about Norway? Is, for example, the absence of an explicit policy 
indicative of a choice in itself? Without a clear policy to light the way, ﬁeld 
experiences might be the only guidance at hand for commanders in the area of 
operation. This might be the intention of the political leadership,  i.e. to take a 
bottom-up approach to the problem, but it  could also be that the politicians are 
shying away from providing the necessary guidance. 
A Master’s thesis presented at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff 
College in the spring of 2008, analyses the evolution of Norwegian participa-
tion in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.8 The 
5 UK Delegation to NATO, “Comprehensive Approach Workshop, Brussels, 8 March 
2007” (UK delegation to NATO [online 18 Mar 2009]).
6 See Canadian Department of National Defence, “Defence Policy White Paper”, 1994 
(National Defence and the Canadian Forces [online 19 Mar 2009]); and Canadian 
Department of National Defence, “Defence Policy Statement – A New Vision for the 
Canadian Forces”, 2005 (National Defence and the Canadian Forces [online 19 Mar 
2009]).
7 Informal discussions between representatives of the defence colleges of Austria, the 
Baltic states, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden during a 
workshop on comprehensive approach at the Danish Defence Academy in Copenhagen 
in the end of October 2008 indicate that Danish military units are focusing more on 
military cooperation within the British-led military task force than with other Danish 
representatives, NGOs as well as governmental, in southern Afghanistan.
8 T. M. Flatemo, Norsk konseptutvikling i Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymahne 
[Norwegian concept development in Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymahne] 
(Oslo: Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, 2008).
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study ﬁnds that although different Norwegian ministries participated in the 
efforts of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) there was no intentional 
coordination between them. The civilian advisers were, as an example, sub-
ordinated to the embassy in Kabul and Norwegian development aid was dis-
tributed to the Afghan central authorities, not the provincial. The Norwegian 
elections in 2005 ended the term in ofﬁce of the centre-right cabinet led by Prime 
Minister Bondevik, replacing it with a centre-left cabinet led by Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg. This change of guard did not, however, lead do a new conceptual 
direction. The implicit atomistic approach was hence preserved. Experiences 
from the ﬁeld led, however, to two dramatic changes in 2006. First, the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs called for a written policy on the interdepartmental PRT 
concept. (Which indicates that no policy was at hand, at least not a written one.) 
Second, development aid for Afghanistan was disbursed to local rather than 
central authorities. 
Our critical point is, however, that lessons learned in Afghanistan have so 
far not been translated into a general policy of how Norway intends to contrib-
ute to NATO’s concept of comprehensive approach. 
The Danish case indicates a top-down approach to the comprehensive ap-
proach without implementation of the explicitly articulated and existing general 
holistic policy. The Norwegian case, on the other hand, indicates bottom-up 
generated developments of the existing, but only implicitly formulated, policy 
of the speciﬁc case of Afghanistan. These ﬁndings underscore the importance 
of examining the pros and cons of the strategic options at hand, both general 
and speciﬁc, when it comes to small states and their choice of strategy. Further 
research is therefore highly recommended.
Consequences for NATO? 
Based on the lessons of previous international peace support operations, differ-
ent regions of an area of operations clearly have different needs. The current 
operation in Afghanistan is no exception and will therefore serve as an example 
in the ensuing discussion related to the use of the diplomatic (D), military (M) 
and economic (E) instruments. 
In the southern parts of the country some Alliance members and partners 
are conducting counter insurgency operations in order to create security. With-
out security it is extremely difﬁcult for the unarmed grand strategic tools, i.e. 
diplomatic and economic, to work. Hence the presence of military units is a pre-
condition for success. The Danish experience indicates that a holistic top-down 
policy might be impossible in these circumstances. 
In the area of the capital, Kabul, it can be argued that higher levels of 
security have been established, at least in comparison to the South. One of the 
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main challenges in the capital area is to create national Afghan instruments of 
governance. Some Alliance members and partners are conducting stabilisation 
operations to preserve order. Military units are still a success criterion, but the 
main effort is presumably provided by diplomatic resources. 
In the provinces of northern Afghanistan, the more secure environment increases 
the chances of making a lasting impression. Some Alliance members and part-
ners are conducting humanitarian assistance operations in support of progress. 
Foreign military units are not necessarily a precondition. The Afghan national 
army and police might very well be in a position on their own to enable gov-
ernmental organisations and NGOs to work. Even if the argumentation so far 
might be over simplistic, it can still serve as a point of departure for the further 
discussion.
An application of a holistic approach in, for example, northern Afghanistan 
might not necessarily be the most efﬁcient way of using the different grand stra-
tegic tools, at least not if each of them is analysed separately. In a region where 
the main effort is supposed to be carried out by unarmed economic instruments, 
the armed forces have to accept a less prominent role. The inclusion of NGOs 
makes the picture even less favourable for the military. This does not, however, 
indicate that the military has no role to fulﬁl at all. Until the national Afghan 
army and police are capable of ensuring security and stability by themselves, and 
as long as other Norwegian grand strategic tools are at work, the Norwegian 
Armed Forces must continue to ﬁeled a contribution. Convincing the military 
on the kind of operations they are supposed to conduct in order to serve the 
Figure 9.1: Different regions – Different needs. In general terms, the needs of the different governmental 
instruments of power, i.e. military (M), diplomatic (D), and economic (E), might differ from one 
region to another. This might impact on the choice of a holistic or atomistic approach.
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overarching grand strategic objective is possibly the main challenge. Once that 
has been clariﬁed, relevant units with proper equipment can be deployed. This 
indicates the importance of orchestrating the different grand strategic tools, not 
only between the different governmental departments in Oslo, but also within 
the area of operations. Needless to say, the guidance of an explicit policy is fun-
damental for success. 
There is, however, little comfort in achieving comprehensiveness in some 
of the provinces if it makes the wider ISAF approach seem uncoordinated. To 
address this problem, NATO has to improve mechanisms for coordinating civil-
ian and military input. The beneﬁts of structuring the contributions holistically 
under a national umbrella would otherwise be less signiﬁcant. 
An application of the atomistic approach in northern Afghanistan is an-
other option. The national difﬁculties in orchestrating different grand strategic 
tools, not to mention the involvement of NGOs, might be avoided if the task 
were left to the multinational commanders in the area of operations. A funda-
mental problem is, however, that NATO itself lacks not only the capability but 
also the authority to command and control non-military resources and units. 
It is most likely that the UN will have to take the leading role as long as the 
overarching objectives are multifunctional in their nature and the use of military 
force is limited to humanitarian assistance and/or disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration.  
When it is possible to conduct stabilisation and reconstruction operations 
more or less separately from the operations conducted by the non-military grand 
strategic instruments, it might very well be appropriate for NATO to lead. An 
application of an atomistic approach in, for example, the Kabul area, therefore 
seems to be a possible option.
In the southern parts of Afghanistan, where the intensity of the conﬂict is 
higher than in other parts of the country an atomistic approach might be prefer-
able due to the high threat level and risks. Due to national considerations and 
caveats, however, the operational options of the military commanders might be 
extremely limited. 
It is a paradox that even though the highest national interest of Norway 
is in strengthening and increasing its inﬂuence in NATO, when it really counts 
there seems to be no political will to send Norwegian armed forces (other than 
special forces) to areas where the military could make a difference. Since not 
only Norway, but other members as well, are reluctant to contribute to high 
intensity combat operations this is a key dilemma for NATO to solve. The chal-
lenge is to create a reliable concept,  i.e. an atomistic approach in good faith, 
which enables all members to provide relevant forces.
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Burden sharing through a concept based on an atomistic approach in good 
faith might be what NATO should concentrate its conceptual efforts on. By its 
own ambition, however, NATO might have created a “catch 22” situation. As 
a consequence of introducing the comprehensive approach, NATO is effectively 
assuming more functions than it actually has the capability and authority to 
command and control. The problem has at least two dimensions. The ﬁrst is the 
multinational dimension that comes naturally with international organisations 
such as NATO. The second is the multifunctional dimension of comprehensive-
ness, including not only the military, but also diplomatic and economic instru-
ments.
If all member states had deployed their armed forces atomistically, NATO would 
have had to rely solely on the military instrument. It only takes one member 
state’s adoption of a holistic approach to change this situation. The problem is 
that in regions with high intensity conﬂict,  i.e. where NATO might be the most 
relevant organisation to manage the crisis, a large number of member states, if 
not all, would probably prefer an atomistic approach. In regions where security 
and stability already are established, and NATO’s relevance not that obvious, 
Figure 9.2: The holistic and atomistic approaches and NATO’s quest for comprehensiveness. The 
context consists of a multi-national dimension and a multi-functional dimension. The latter comprises 
the three governmental instruments of power, military (M), diplomatic (D), and economic (E).
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a large number of member states, if not all, would instead presumably prefer a 
holistic approach. To take the discussion one step further; if NATO’s relevance 
is unchallenged only in regions with high intensity conﬂict, and if only a few 
of the organisation’s members are prepared to contribute their armed forces to 
these regions, and if, ﬁnally, the contributions actually provided in these regions 
take an atomistic approach which is not in good faith, what then is the point of 
struggling to implement the concept of comprehensive approach? It seems clear 
that NATO has created an enormous conceptual challenge for itself.
Final remarks
Approaching comprehensiveness is not, as we have seen, an easy operation. 
Once the Norwegian policymakers have decided how Norway should proceed, 
the country will be able to take a more constructive role in, and provide a more 
signiﬁcant contribution to, the ongoing development of the conceptual frame-
work of the international organisations. Hand in hand with such a decision 
come the necessary premises guiding the development of the national grand stra-
tegic concept. Following the strategic traditions of the Cold War era, deciding 
whether to adopt an atomistic or holistic approach would then be the third and 
ﬁnal step. In the new strategic settings this step might, however, have to be the 
ﬁrst. That being so, the military instrument might have gained in importance in 
the new millennium. 
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